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Abstract
At the heart of any investment fund (whether public or private) is an investor 
protection concern that arises from the collectivized nature of the fund.  In a 
bilateral arrangement, a client may negotiate ‘bespoke’ terms with a prospective 
investment manager.  By contrast, an investment fund provides ‘off the shelf’ 
terms to prospective participants, many of whom may have relatively small 
percentage positions in the ultimate fund, although the sums of money they 
provide may often be very significant to them. 
The governance challenge at the heart of all collectivized investment structures is 
most clearly seen in connection with private investment funds.  Largely, the 
structure of such funds has been driven by the need to comply and obtain 
necessary exemptions under the financial regulatory rules, while simultaneously 
addressing a series of interrelated tax issues arising from various pieces of anti-
avoidance legislation adopted over the years.  
Three private monitoring solutions are identified which would enable fund 
investors to address more directly the problems arising from the governance 
challenge by facilitating a better flow of information from the fund manager to the 
investors:
(1) side letters, which provide a particular investor with further information 
and/or control rights with regard to the operation of the fund;
(2) improving the operation of the board of directors in either corporate-based 
funds or the general partner vehicle of limited partnership structures by 
the inclusion of independent directors; and
(3) listings of private investment funds on securities exchanges as a means 
of adopting ongoing compliance oversight.
Each approach recognizes the commercial contexts in which private investment 
funds operate by emphasizing voluntary steps that fund managers and investors 
can take incrementally.  Further, each focuses on the provision of information as 
the means to overcome the investment protection concerns that arise due to the 
collectivized nature of the private investment fund.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction to the Governance Challenge in Private Investment Funds 
1.1 Introduction
At the heart of any investment fund (whether public or private) is an investor protection 
concern that arises from the collectivized nature of the fund.  In a bilateral arrangement, a 
client may negotiate ‘bespoke’ terms with a prospective investment manager and would retain 
the responsibility for overseeing the ongoing fulfilment of those terms.  By contrast, an 
investment fund provides ‘off the shelf’ terms to prospective participants, many of whom may 
have relatively small percentage positions in the ultimate fund, although the sums of money 
they provide may often be very significant to them. 
Investment funds
1
enable the collectivization of investment management relationships.  
Through a fund, the professional services of an investment manager can more efficiently be 
provided to a large number of prospective clients pursuing similar investment objectives.
2
  In 
order to provide these services, an intermediate vehicle is placed between an investment 
manager and a group of potentially disparate participants which serves concurrently as (i) a 
means of pooling the investors’ monies and (ii) a single client for whom a single investment 
objective can be pursued.
3
  
For ongoing oversight of the investment manager, participants must rely on the governance 
mechanics of the legal entities used as funds, as supplemented from time to time by any 
additional contractual agreement of the parties.  To the extent that particular vehicles have 
material differences in such mechanics, the ability of participants to protect their investments 
will vary. The use of one or more legal entities to intermediate between the manager and the 
clients can operate to diminish or impede the effectiveness of legal, equitable or regulatory 
remedies that otherwise might be available to a client in a bilateral relationship with the 
manager.  
Governance concerns are only one of several factors that determine the ultimate structure of a 
private investment fund.
4
  In addition to the commercial arrangements agreed between the 
                                               
1
For a history of investment funds over the centuries, see Jerry W. Markham, “Mutual Fund Scandals – A 
Comparative Analysis of the Role of Corporate Governance in the Regulation of Collective Investments;” 3 
Hastings Business Law Journal 67, 70-76 (2006).
2
The use of such vehicle provides access for certain investors with smaller sums to invest to managers who 
would not otherwise be commercially motivated to take them on as clients.  Additionally, these vehicles can 
provide managers with administrative efficiencies where multiple clients wish to retain the firm to provide 
substantially similar services.  
3
For a general discussion of financial intermediation and its regulation post-financial crisis, see Charles 
Whitehead, “Reframing Financial Regulation,” 90 Boston University Law Review 1 (2010).  As Whitehead 
observes, “[f]inancial intermediation helps bridge the gap between suppliers and consumers of capital, many of 
whom are located at a distance.  In a frictionless world, the financial markets would allocate the kinds and 
amounts of capital that business require without the assistance (or cost) of an intermediary.”  Ibid. at 8.
4
In the UK, the US, and other countries with developed financial markets, public investment funds are subject to 
specifically tailored regulation, in addition to the general financial services regulatory regime.  This further 
regulation is based on a recognition that by collectivizing the investment management relationships and 
interposing intermediate vehicles, the risks of fraud and malfeasance increase significantly.  Primarily, the 
concern is focused on retail investors.  Both the UK’s approach to authorized collective investment schemes 
and the US’s approach to registered investment companies apply substantive ‘product-level’ regulations to 
investment funds marketed on a retail basis.  Very particular limitations are placed on what so-called ‘mutual 
funds’ can and cannot do.  Only by complying with such requirements may these funds be made publicly 
available.  See Section 3.4 below.  As a general rule, non-retail investors have been provided with greater 
2parties, the particular legal structure selected for an investment fund will need to take into 
account the regulatory and tax impact of interposing such a vehicle between the parties.
The tax consequence of the entity being used as an investment fund must be examined and 
addressed.  Unless the intermediary vehicle is broadly ‘tax neutral’ for the proposed investors, 
investors will be reluctant to participate.  As a general rule, investors will want to be in 
essentially the same tax position as if they were to make the investments directly.  In the case 
of public investment funds, which are marketed widely to retail investors, specific provisions of 
the relevant tax statutes typically provide for such treatment, subject to compliance with the 
rules imposed by the financial regulator.  In the case of private investment funds, which are 
marketed on a limited basis only to sophisticated investors, however, the tax issues must be 
addressed structurally by selection of an appropriate legal vehicle and the inclusion of 
necessary provisions in the legal documentation.
5
A private investment fund (whether a private equity fund or a hedge fund
6
) must, therefore, 
make use of a vehicle that is either (i) tax transparent (i.e., disregarded for purposes of any 
entity-level tax) or (ii) tax exempt.  This requirement substantially limits the type of potential 
entities available for use.  Historically, limited partnerships, which are generally tax-transparent 
in most jurisdictions,
7
and companies established in offshore jurisdictions, which are effectively 
tax exempt in those jurisdictions
8
, have served as private investment funds.
Importantly, neither entity was originally developed specifically with the function of serving as a 
private investment fund.  Their use as such has been driven by the needs of the parties for tax 
efficiency, rather than a genuine affinity for the history and governances of such vehicles.  As a 
result, questions of governance that arise in connection with private investment funds must be 
analyzed and addressed in the context of the nature and limitations of the legal entity (i.e.,
limited partnership, offshore limited companies) that tax concerns mandate they adopt.  
In sum, the problem that this thesis will address is how to enable investors in private funds, as 
private actors in the absence of government regulation, to significantly improve the governance 
structures of the funds in which they invest.
In this Chapter, I will discuss the scope of this thesis and the choice of law applicable to private 
investment funds.  Then, I will describe the governance challenge that these funds face, in the 
                                               
flexibility and, in appropriate circumstances, they may participate in other investment funds on a private basis.  
See Section 2.5 below.
5
See Sections 2.6 and 2.7 below.
6
For a brief definition of private equity funds and hedge funds, and a discussion of their numbers and sizes, see 
Vijay Sekhon, “Can the Rich Fend for Themselves?:  Inconsistent Treatment of Wealthy Investors Under the 
Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010,” 7 Hasting Business Law Journal 1 at 4 (2010) 
(“Private equity funds generally acquire companies using leverage (i.e., debt) for the purpose of restructuring 
the companies . . . for their eventual sale or public offering of securities.  On the other hand, hedge funds 
generally implement a wide array of investment strategies . . . to produce risk-adjusted positive returns from 
various market opportunities.”).  Industry research estimate that over 540 private equity funds raised 
approximately $600 billion between 2007-2009, while approximately 10,000 hedge funds had over $1.5 trillion 
in assets under management.  Ibid. at 4-5.
7
See Section 2.3 below.  Although an established feature in many jurisdictions, the tax-transparency of 
partnerships has not been without some good-natured doubters.  See Larry E. Ribstein, “An Applied Theory of 
Limited Partnerships,” 37 Emory LJ 855, 872 (1988) (“There may be substantial reasons why certain types of 
businesses should be taxed on a flow-through basis and others taxed as entities.  But no reason appears why 
the tax approach should depend on the form of business the parties have chosen.”).
8
See Section 2.4 below.
3context of corporate governance generally, paying particular attention to the distinctions which 
exist between companies and partnerships.  Next, I will analyze the role of the fund manager 
as the agent of the fund and the consequences of governance failures when they occur.  
Finally, I will discuss the legal and regulatory duties owed by fund managers and identify 
alternatives to centralized, top-down regulation for fund managers and fund participants.
In Chapter 2, I will describe the structure and operation or private investment funds, including 
both partnership and company fund structures, as well as relevant marketing and tax issues.  
In Chapter 3, I will analyze and critique the adequacy of financial regulation and private law to 
address the governance challenge.  Chapter 4 will identify and examine the effectiveness of 
recent regulatory changes on both sides of the Atlantic to address concerns related to private 
investment funds.  Next, in Chapter 5, I describe the function of self-regulation in private 
investment funds and the role of private actors in addressing the governance challenge.
In Chapter 6, 7 and 8, three private monitoring solutions are identified which would enable fund 
investors to address more directly the problems arising from the governance challenge by 
facilitating a better flow of information from the fund manager to the investors:
(a) side letters, which provide a particular investor with further information and/or 
control rights with regard to the operation of the fund;
(b) improving the operation of the board of directors in either corporate-based funds 
or the general partner vehicle of limited partnership structures through the 
increased involvement of independent directors; and
(c) listings of private investment funds on securities exchanges as a means of 
adopting ongoing compliance oversight.
By “private monitoring solutions”, I am referring to different means by which to enrol private 
actors into the internal governance mechanisms of the fund vehicle by establishing a 
monitoring role, supported where necessary by appropriate changes in the fund 
documentation, and thereby reinforce the governance processes of the fund vehicle.  This 
monitoring role can either be performed by the fund participant itself, in the case of side letters, 
or by a designated third party.  In the case of independent directors, this role is being 
performed in connection with the particular fund on which board they sit, while in the case of 
securities exchanges, this role is being performed for all of the funds that are admitted to listing 
on that exchange.
Each approach recognizes the commercial contexts in which private investment funds operate 
by emphasizing voluntary steps that fund managers and investors can take incrementally.  
Further, each focuses on the provision of information as the means to overcome the 
investment protection concerns that arise due to the collectivized nature of the private 
investment fund.  Importantly, all three approaches currently feature in the commercial practice 
of many investment funds, thereby providing an initial confirmation of their viability in 
implementation.
Finally, in Chapter 9, I conclude this thesis with a critical assessment of the private monitoring 
solutions, evaluating their effectiveness and discussing issues that arise in their 
implementation.
1.2 Scope and Choice of Law
In evaluating the private monitoring solutions proposed above, I will address what particular 
roles need to be fulfilled in order to address the governance challenge and then identify 
whether, and under what circumstances, prospective fund investors and their agents can 
4perform such roles.  Accordingly, I will analyze relevant regulatory provisions to determine the 
current frontier of the command-and-control control model of regulation in connection with 
private investment funds.
9
  Also, I will survey relevant elements of the private law that impact 
on the relationships between funds, fund participants and fund managers, and which operate 
in tandem with regulation.
10
  Finally, as this thesis takes a doctrinal and normative approach to 
these questions, focusing on an analysis of relevant legislation, regulation and case law, the 
relevant academic literature will also be identified and critically assessed.
In order to draw appropriate conclusions from the analysis herein, it is essential that the scope 
of inquiry match the actual present state of private funds as they currently exist in practice.  
The law and regulation applicable to private investment funds and their managers are uniquely 
linked to their history and current operations.  The choice of law covered herein, therefore, is 
driven by the nature of the legal vehicles for the funds and the location of the fund managers 
providing advice.  For the funds themselves, the legal vehicles chosen are either partnerships 
created under the laws of Delaware
11
or England and Wales, or limited companies established 
under the laws of offshore jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands.  As a result, other entities, 
for which there is a rich academic literature, such as UK companies established under 
Companies Act 2006, are not used for funds, and therefore such law and commentary are not 
directly relevant and so are not addressed herein.  Important distinctions with the law of such 
legal vehicles in other jurisdictions will be considered where appropriate.  However, the 
purpose of this thesis is not to provide, for example, a systematic comparison and evaluation 
of the Cayman Islands company law and the UK Companies Act 2006.
12
  
The fund managers are established principally as authorized investment managers in onshore 
jurisdictions such as the US and the UK.  Therefore, this thesis will consider the financial 
regulatory regimes in these countries as applicable to investment managers and investment 
advisors who have as their clients unregulated collective investment schemes.
13
Private investment funds are currently the subject of great debate on a number of fronts, 
ranging from the appropriate amount of tax that they and their principals should pay to whether 
the retail investors should be granted more access to these funds (whether directly or indirectly 
through listed or authorized funds-of-funds).  Some would even question their ability to deliver 
meaningful investment returns on a net-of-fees basis.
14
Due to the breadth of their activities and significant growth in their sizes over the last decade, it 
is now difficult, if not impossible, to have detailed discussions or debate about any significant 
aspect of the financial markets without mentioning hedge funds and private equity funds.
15
  
                                               
9
See Sections 3.3-3.7 below.
10
See Sections 3.8-3.12 below.
11
For an interesting discussion of the Delaware law issues surrounding private investment funds established in 
the US, see JW Vereet, “Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital:  Hedge Funds Regulation, Part II, a Self-
Regulation Proposal,” 32 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 799, 804-805 (2007).
12
Even where Cayman companies are used, fund structures go to great length to mimic key elements of 
partnership structure in the constitutional documents.  See Section 2.4 below.
13
See Sections 3.5 and 3.6 below.
14
See, e.g., David Leonhardt, “Worth A Lot, but are Hedge Funds Worth It;” New York Times (May 23, 2007).
15
Unfortunately, much of these discussions have been tainted by negative stereotypes and uninformed 
allegations about what private investment funds actually do.  See Daniel Awrey, “The Limits of EU Hedge 
Fund Regulation;” Law and Financial Markets Review, 5:2 Law and Financial Markets Review 1, 2 (2011) (“It 
can be difficult to cut through the rhetoric and demagoguery which surrounds the debate over the debate over 
the regulation of hedge funds, private equity funds and other alternative investment vehicles.”).
5The focus of this thesis, however, is on the governance challenge present within private 
investment funds and whether the enrolment of private monitoring solutions can be effectively 
implemented at the level of fund documentation by agreement between the fund participants 
and the fund manager.  Although the answer to this question is relevant to the other queries 
raised above, it is distinct from them.
Importantly, as the distinctions between hedge funds and private equity funds have become 
less obvious over the years, with both investment strategies and investment professionals 
crossing the frontier between these asset classes, it is more useful to discuss these issues 
broadly in connection with private investment funds in general.
16
  Where relevant, however, 
differences between these types of funds will be highlighted. 
Finally, an observation on the state and scope of the existing literature, as applicable to this 
thesis, might be useful at this point.  The current state academic literature, whether doctrinal or 
theoretical, concerning hedge funds, private equity funds and other private investment funds is 
tentative and incomplete.  Given the importance of these funds to the functioning of the 
modern financial markets, this omission should be addressed.
Although practitioners, with access to the confidential, uncirculated documentation related to 
private funds, have regularly published legal handbooks and practical guides, robust academic 
assessments have been rare.  Much of the past literature has focused on areas where these 
funds impact other aspects of the financial markets (such as insider trading and takeovers) and 
consequently complement ongoing scholarship in those areas.  But private funds are too 
important to be ignored.  In recent years, overt attempts to alter the regulatory categorization 
or tax treatment of these funds has attracted academic comment, primarily in the US, but more 
scholarly attention is warranted.
This thesis takes an important step towards addressing this gap by positioning private 
investment funds, and the governance challenges faced by their investors, in a wider 
theoretical framework.  By doing so, a rigorous analysis can be engaged in regarding where 
these funds sit in the regulatory landscape generally and how private actors may use other 
tools at their disposal to address shortcomings in both their legal structure and documentation, 
as well as the current regulatory response to them.
1.3 The Governance Challenge
By their collective nature, all investment funds (public and private) face potential investor 
inertia, ignorance and apathy.
17
  As a result, a governance challenge that sits at their heart:  
how can the integrity of a professional relationship (i.e., the investment manager) be 
                                               
16
As Andrew J. Donohue, Director of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management has observed, “[a]lthough 
hedge funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds reflect different approaches to investing, legally 
they are indistinguishable.  They are all pools of investment capital organized to take advantage of various 
exemptions from registration.”  Andrew J. Donohue, “Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment 
Pools”, Speech to 3rd Annual Symposium on the Regulation of Investment Funds (Feb. 19, 2010). 
17
The long-standing approach followed by both in the US and the UK of special supplementary regimes 
applicable to “investment companies” and “collective investment schemes”, respectively, demonstrates that 
special concerns arise in these funds above and beyond other financial transactions and relationships.  See 
Section 3.4 below.
6maintained where the ultimate clients (i.e., the participants in the fund) are distant and 
dispersed?
18
The governance challenge in private investment funds exists on the boundary between a fund 
participant’s rights and a fund manager’s obligation.  As that line necessarily traverses through 
the internal documentation and operation of the fund vehicles, financial regulators must 
approach their targets with a focus on how to best support the negotiating position of potential 
investors in obtaining the governance rights they may believe necessary - e.g., adequate 
information flows and effective means to directly or indirectly change the fund’s course -
without fatally undermining the core economic proposition that is being offered by the fund 
manager. 
Investment funds are unique in that they are externally managed.  In other words, they are 
established and operated by individuals and firms whose financial interests, and primary duties 
of loyalties, lie outside of, and apart from, the legal entity they have just formed. Unlike 
ordinary businesses established as companies, which possess executive and non-executive 
directors, as well as officers and employees,
19
the impact of the embedded conflict between 
fund and fund manager sits behind, and casts a shadow over, all aspects of day-to-day 
relations between the various parties.
20
  The intersection of concerns over the “arms-length”
nature of any decisions made in connection with the fund, with the position of trust that any 
investment manager assumes when he or she invests money on behalf of a client, creates 
fertile ground for the governance challenge faced by fund participants. These concerns may 
arise, for example, from approvals of derogations from investment restrictions, waivers for 
various violations of service agreements, or requests for further information to enable 
adequate oversight.
A fundamental characteristic of investment management (whether bilateral or collectivized) is 
its discretionary nature.  Managers have wide discretion to invest the assets of their clients, 
subject to those basic restrictions agreed initially with the client and amended from time to 
time.  Unlike non-discretionary advice provided to the client for him or her to action, an 
investment manager is typically empowered by the client to implement its decisions without 
reference back for approval.  The investment manager issues buy and sell orders to third 
parties in relation to the client’s portfolio, but typically makes no guarantees about ultimate 
returns.  Losses to the portfolio are to the account of the client, absent claims for breach of 
either legal (e.g., contractual or tortious), equitable (e.g., fiduciary) or statutory (e.g., 
regulatory) duties.
As a result, a client’s ability to monitor the actions and decision-making process of an 
investment manager (and thereby make appropriate decisions as to changing or terminating 
the mandate) is of paramount importance.  In the case of investment funds, the participants 
are one step removed from the relationship with the manager due to the imposition of the 
                                               
18
See, e.g., Harry McVea, “Hedge Fund Regulation, Market Discipline and the Hedge Fund Working Group,” 
Capital Markets Law Journal, Vol 4, no. 1, 63 (2008).
19
Of course, the road to the modern corporation, withs its current structure and operation, was a long one with 
many twists and turns along the way.  See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, Reiner Kraakman and Richard Squire, 
“Law and the Rise of the Firm,” 119 Harvard Law Review 1333 (2006).  And at each step along that road, the 
law’s recognition of certain entities and relationships was crucial to the next stage of development.
20
See, e.g., David Rosenberg, “Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of Contract; 2002 
Columbia Business Law Review 363 (“In a venture capital firm, organized as a limited partnership, the 
interests of the general parties and the limited parties are not always aligned.”).
7intermediary vehicle.  Adequate monitoring of the investment manager, therefore, becomes 
fundamentally intertwined with the governance mechanics of the selected legal entity.
This governance challenge is most clearly seen in connection with private investment funds.  
In the case of public funds, many financial regulators have deemed such governance 
mechanics insufficient in themselves.  Detailed product-level regulations are adopted to 
provide public monitoring solutions, which ensure that risks associated with conflicts of 
interest, lack of transparency, and mismanagement are adequately addressed.
21
  In the case 
of private funds, the participants are expected to rely on their own ability to negotiate adequate 
levels of protection to address those risks.
22
  As a consequence of limiting the extent to which 
private funds may be marketed and establishing particular status and/or size requirement in 
participants (e.g., investment professionals), the presumption of the regulator is that such 
investors have adequate negotiating leverage to address any governance concerns that they 
may have.
23
  Absent special contractual terms, such investors will rely instead on the 
governance mechanisms of the fund vehicle (e.g., limited partnerships, offshore companies).
As noted above, the structure of such funds has been driven by the need to comply and obtain 
necessary exemptions under the financial regulatory rules, while simultaneously addressing a 
series of interrelated tax issues arising from various pieces of anti-avoidance legislation 
adopted over the years.  Private investment funds must sail between this ‘Scylla and 
Charybdis’ in order to deliver to the parties an effective structural framework for their agreed 
commercial arrangements.  
As a result, after 40 years of accelerating growth, private investment funds look and operate as 
they do largely in response to the financial regulation and tax requirement imposed on them by 
relevant onshore governments.  The influence of onshore governments should not be 
downplayed.  Onshore tax authorities establish the basis on which certain vehicles will be 
taxed and others left untaxed.
24
  Onshore financial regulators determine who must be 
authorised and who may be marketed securities and what sorts of investment activities are 
forbidden.
25
  As a result, the onshore governments play a key role in setting the priorities for, 
and delineating the options available to, the private investment funds.
Governance systems in private funds have evolved to the extent they have in the open space 
circumscribed by these tax and regulatory concerns. Unfortunately, these two sets of 
regulatory and fiscal provisions can operate to create a tension within the structure and 
operation of the fund.  Where marketing restrictions on private investment funds attempt to 
ensure that participants have the standing and sophistication to ensure that their interests are 
protected, the relevant tax rules in numerous respects undermine this position by, for example, 
forcing investors to limit their role in a particular structure or mandating that a fund vehicle be 
operated in an offshore jurisdiction.  
Moreover, private investment funds can take one of two legal forms:  limited companies or 
partnerships.  The governance challenge has slightly different characteristics depending on 
which is used.  The governance challenge within limited partnerships centres primarily on 
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22
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8restrictions imposed on limited partners with regards to involvement in the management of the 
partnership’s business.  Secondly, given the rise of limited liability entities serving in the 
general partners role, legitimate questions can be asked about how effectively the directors of 
such vehicles can simultaneously fulfil their own obligations to the general partner vehicle and 
that vehicles obligations to its fellow partners in the partnership. 
The governance challenge within offshore limited companies centres primarily on the role that 
directors fulfil as an oversight mechanism on the actions and inactions of the fund manager.  
The directors are responsible for the management of the company, but delegate the bulk of 
that responsibility to the fund manager, retaining only a limited role of monitoring and 
evaluation.  Although only a small role, it is essential to participants in a private investment 
fund that the individuals selected as directors have the past experience and current knowledge 
and information to fulfill the duties they owe to the company and its shareholders.  
Often, private investment funds fail because their managers make poor investment decisions.  
However, many funds fall victim to frauds perpetrated by individuals within the fund manager.  
Recent cases of malfeasance that have arisen in the context of private investment funds 
include the making of false statements regarding a funds’ investment objections and/or 
performance, misstatements concerning the risks of the fund, defective valuation practices and 
other issues concerning how the fund manager operates the fund.
26
  Improved corporate 
governance can be seen as one way in which these incidents could have been either 
prevented or detected at an earlier stage.
Concerns over the governance challenge in private investment funds have an antecedent in 
earlier concerns raised over the standard of corporate governance in listed companies. The 
definition of corporate governance originally adopted in the Cadbury Report in 1992 is 
instructive when contemplating the governance challenge faced by investors in private funds:
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled.  
Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies.  The 
shareholders’ role in the governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to 
satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place.  The 
responsibilities of the board include setting the company’s strategic aims, providing the 
leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the business and 
reporting to shareholders on their stewardship.  The board’s actions are subject to 
laws, regulations and the shareholders in the general meeting.
27
Importantly, the governance challenge can be even greater in a private investment fund than in 
a typical company.  An equity-holder in a vehicle typically has a collection of governance rights 
that allow it to participate in certain fundamental decisions that the vehicle undertakes.  
Supplementing this direct decision-making role is frequently the ability to select and replace 
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9those agents (e.g. directors, general partners) who are charged with making the remaining key 
decisions for the vehicle.
28
  As private investment funds traditionally deny their participants 
these rights,
29
the position of an investor in such fund can be for most practical purposes not 
that of a true equity-holder, but rather no more than a glorified creditor awaiting payment of 
monies owed when due. 
30
1.4 Corporate Governance
The governance challenge in private investment funds can be seen as a need to improve the 
standard of corporate governance
31
in the legal vehicles that comprise them.  Although 
traditional publicly-listed corporate vehicles differ in many respects from alternate business 
associations, like limited partnerships (and also in a few material respects from privately-held 
offshore companies), governance concerns exist in common across all of them.  Differences in 
legal documentation and statutory requirements, however, must be acknowledged and 
reflected in the manner in which solutions to such governance issues are structured and 
implemented.
As discussed above, corporate governance refers to the manner in which transparency and 
accountability is effectuated within the management of a company.
32
  Standards in this area 
can be found in case law and statutes, as well as contractually in the company’s organizational 
documents,
33
and also from non-legal sources, such as specialist committees appointed by 
governments or financial regulators to promote the development and adoption of best 
practices. 
For traditional operating companies, corporate governance practice has been driven in the UK 
by the UK Code on Corporate Governance, issued by the Financial Reporting Council,
34
and 
in the US by the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protections Act of 2002, 
commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Over time, certain corporate governance 
mechanisms have been specifically encouraged by regulatory intervention over other 
mechanisms, although it is unclear whether the most effective mechanisms have consistently 
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received this preferred treatment.
35
  For private investment funds, specifically, and offshore 
companies, generally, corporate governance has not been a prominent topic of discussion or 
reform.
36
  Importantly, the doctrinal literature has identified aspects of “corporate governance” 
as they apply to entities other than traditional operating companies.
37
  Unfortunately, however, 
there has been no critical legal assessment of governance structures specifically in the context 
of private investment funds.  Although private fund partnership agreements have been credited 
by commentators with reducing agency costs
38
between the parties,
39
the effectiveness of 
these provisions is now being questioned.
40
  Due to the limited rights that fund participants 
have to intervene in the investment process and challenge the decisions made by fund 
managers, agency problems may develop,
41
with fund managers pursuing their own self-
interest instead of the interest of fund participants.  Fund documentation, as currently drafted, 
provide only limited solutions to these problems, such as the use of incentive compensation to 
align the interests of fund managers with fund participants.
42
The question of governance and private investment funds, when it does arise in academic 
literature, has predominately been focused on the manner in which hedge funds and private 
equity funds impact on the corporate governance of the portfolio companies in which they 
invest.
43
  Little attention has been paid to date on the internal arrangements of these vehicles.  
Private funds embody an agency relationship where the agent (fund manager) has the 
discretion to make decisions that directly impact their principals’ property (fund investors).
44
  As 
a result divergent interests can develop between these parties.  For example, a fund manager 
may decide to allocate an investment opportunity to another client who has contracted to pay 
higher fees than the fund, or the fund manager may withhold important information from the 
fund participants about the value of certain securities held by the fund (i.e., information 
asymmetry).
45
  In the rich literature involving agency issues within corporate entities, academic 
commentators have championed the use of private contractual solutions to mitigate against 
agency costs.
46
  Improving the legal documentation of private funds to enable more effective 
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monitoring and enforcement by the fund participants themselves can be a solution to the 
problems identified herein, supplementing public enforcement mechanisms already in place.
Applying a traditional corporate governance analytical framework to private investment funds 
could begin by distinguishing between three functions in regards to each particular party:
(a) does the party have an interest in the fund?
(b) does the party have power over the fund?
(c) is the party empowered to act with respect to it?
47
Similar to the positions of “owner” and “manager” in a traditional enterprise, the fund participant 
and the fund manager may be distinguished in part by their levels of activity, with fund 
participant typically remaining quiescent, while the fund manager take the active role.  As a 
result, the same dichotomy of “owners without applicable control and the control without 
appreciable ownership”
48
emerges.  Traditionally, parties to private investment funds have 
focused on aligning the interest of the fund participants and the fund manager by way of 
economic incentives.  However, checks on the use (or misuse) of power may be established 
by other means, including political or social conditions.
49
  Where the interests of control (i.e. 
fund manager) are opposed to the interest of ownership (i.e. fund participants), the owners are 
at risk.
1.5 Companies and Partnerships
As one commentator has observed:
[D]efects in investor decision-making and information deficiencies, which can deter 
investors and damage the wider reputation of market investment, can also be 
countered through intermediation in the form of collective investment.
50
Collective investments thus enable investors to access greater expertise and experience in 
making investment decisions.  However, the legal vehicles that facilitate collectivization also 
bring with them their own additional governance concerns.  As noted above, subtle distinctions 
in governance can be identified and evaluated when considering partnership-based private 
investment funds (Partnership PIFs) and company-based private investment funds (Company 
PIFs). 
In a corporation, the law itself prescribes the creation of a management structure from which 
ownership and control are separate, with directors and officers of the corporation assigned
specific roles to play.
51
  In a partnership, a similar allocation is present in the distinction created 
between general partner and limited partners.  The role of corporate law and partnership law is 
to establish a set of default provisions that parties can subsequently agree to alter and amend 
                                               
47
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to best fit the terms on which they wish to operate together.
52
  As such, the “fill in the blank”
function leaves adequate room for the contracting parties (fund participants and fund manager) 
to adapt aspects of these legal vehicles, such as their management structures and balance 
between ownership and control, to best suit their interests.
53
Close (i.e., non-public) corporations, like partnerships, have much less separation between 
management and risk bearing than their public-listed kindred.
54
  As a result, although 
informative, the existing literature on corporate governance in public companies would have 
only limited applicability to legal vehicles being used as private investment funds.
55
  A better 
analogy to close companies, particularly in the context of private investments, would be limited 
partnerships.  Many of the core economic terms of private funds, which originally grew out 
partnership structures, have migrated to corporate structures.
56
  Although there may be 
limitations to this analogy if pushed to the extreme,
57
comparisons can be useful.
One key difference is that corporations have formal boards of directors, which are subject 
under the applicable companies law to specific rules about their composition, operation and 
responsibilities.
58
  Partnerships, by contrast, can establish boards to perform an advisory 
function, but there is no requirement that they do so.
59
  Another notable difference is that whilst
many corporate statutes limit the ability to waive the fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith, 
limited partnership statutes in the same jurisdiction may permit both to be significantly 
restricted or waived.
60
  So despite a number of practical advantages that partnership have over 
corporations,
61
the use of limited partnerships as private fund vehicles is not without 
governance issues.  For example, in Partnership PIFs, limited partnership law in both 
Delaware and England and Wales prevents the limited partners from participating in the 
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decision-making process of the general partner.  The consequence of stepping over this line is 
severe:  the partner would risk losing his or her limited liability.
62
  However, there still remains 
an ability to consult with and advise the general partner with respect to the partnerships 
business.  As a result, Partnership PIFs can operate “advisory boards” which may serve as 
mechanisms for granting waivers and consents, upon the request of a general partner.
Unfortunately, the spectre of unlimited liability, which would make parties liable for the amount 
of any debts in excess of the fund assets, can still impede many fund investors from more 
active engagement in the governance of Partnership PIFs.  These investors may find comfort 
in the reputational risk that the fund manager faces should current and prospective investors 
determine that they abused their discretion in pursuit of their own interest.
63
  As a result, some
fund investors may categorically decline to involve themselves in governance activities.  
The private monitoring solutions proposed herein will therefore contemplate only the partial 
participation of fund investors, and not require that they act in concert or are required to reach 
unanimous decisions.  These private monitoring solutions will provide for increased monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms involving some fund participants who wish to address the 
governance challenge in the activities and decision making process of the fund manager prior 
to the discovery that bad acts have occurred.  It is notable that there have been very few 
litigated disputes between fund managers and participants, outside of the hedge fund sector.
64
  
And where there have been litigation in hedge funds after the uncovering of bad acts, 
damages recovered have been small and inadequate.
65
Further, these private monitoring solutions should be viewed as supplementing both the 
economic alignment of interest embedded in the profit sharing arrangements in private funds,
66
whether established as Partnership PIFs or Company PIFs, and the top-down regulation that 
emanates from financial regulators such as the SEC and the FSA.
67
  In terms of agency cost, 
there are traditionally two methods that such costs can be reduced:  (i) more directly aligning 
the interests of the agent with the principal, and/or (ii) appointing a monitor to oversee and 
discipline the agent.
68
  Economic alignments are an example of the former, and top-down 
regulation is an example of the latter.  In this context, the private monitoring solutions can be 
viewed as a further attempt to fulfil the monitor role, either by enlisting one or more fund 
investors, or independent directors or a third-party securities exchange. 
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1.6 Fund Manager as Agent of the Fund
The relationship between a fund and its fund manager is, among other things, an agency 
relationship.
69
  The fund, as principal, delegates decision-making power to the fund manager, 
an agent.
70
  Due to the risk that the interests of the parties may diverge, costs will be incurred 
by both parties to limit any such divergences.  In the case of funds, the principal is itself a legal 
entity with its own matrix of agency relationships.  As a result, the fund’s agent (the fund 
manager) will have a distinct advantage in its transactions with its principal due to its more 
substantive existence.  A fund manager will typically possess actual professional and 
administrative staff, which the fund will lack.  A fund manager would also possess 
infrastructure, such as permanent office space and informational technology resources, that 
the fund will lack.  Finally, the fund manager will both pre-exist and ultimately service the fund, 
in almost all cases.  As one commentator has observed:
A range of risks is generated relating to the agency costs which 
arise between investors in the fund and its managers and 
promoters who cannot easily be monitored by  unsophisticated 
investors.  Classic occasions for abuse, often reflecting conflict of 
interests, including the extraction of benefits through excessive 
costs and abusive trading practices, incompetence in fund 
management, and fraudulent diversion of assets from the 
fund...
71
  
In the case of private funds, the principal will both be very dependent on its agent, and also 
potentially face significant procedural impediments and inefficiencies in conducting the 
corporate actions necessary to oversee and monitor the agent.
72
  As has been observed by 
commentators:
Agency problems arise because contracts are not costlessly
written and enforced.  Agency costs include the costs of 
structuring, monitoring and abiding by a set of contracts among 
agent with conflicting interests . . . Control of agency problems in 
the decision process is important when the decision makers who 
initiate and implement important decisions are not the major 
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residual claimants and therefore do not bear a major share of the 
wealth effects of their decisions.
73
Under the transaction cost theory,
74
a firm will adopt a governance structure that aligns with 
transaction-specific characteristics to reduce transaction costs and increase investment 
returns.
75
  Governance, therefore, can be seen as an alternative to top-down regulation
76
to 
reduce agency costs that result from the appointment of managers, to whom investors 
delegate decision-making power, by means of proper alignment of incentives.
77
When the separation of “ownership” and “control”
78
in a business organization is discussed, the 
focus is typically on those circumstances where important decision makers do not bear a 
substantial share of the ultimate effects of the decisions they make.
79
  What is meant by 
“control” in the context of Company PIFs and Partnerships PIFs?  In its simplest phrasing, 
control of an entity could mean the power to determine the business strategy of the entity and 
the necessary steps to achieve such strategy.
80
  In a traditional company, control is vested with 
the board of directors
81
and then some, but not all, of this authority is delegated to officers.
82
  In 
a private investment fund, such delegation is made by the board (or by the general partner of a 
partnership) to the fund manager.  “Control” can be distinguished from “voice,” an equally 
important concept when looking at governance issues.  Voice refers to situations where 
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investors have only relatively small stakes, but are able to combine them in order to wield a 
meaningful influence over the management of the entity.
83
The decision making process itself can be broken down into two different elements:
(a) decision management, which covers initiation and implementation of decisions, 
and
(b) decision control, which covers ratification and monitoring of decisions.
84
In private investment funds, decision management resides with the fund manager, who takes 
investment decisions on his own initiative.  The question then becomes to what extent can 
decision control reside with fund participants and to what extent they have a voice in 
connection with such decisions, either before or after they are made.
1.7 Consequences of Governance Failures
In recent years, reports of fraud and other malfeasances involving private investment funds 
(especially hedge funds) have become increasingly common.
85
  Underlying these incidents is 
the fundamental question of whether more effective governance mechanisms within the fund 
would have served to better protect investors over time.  
An already eventful 2008 ended with the arrest of Bernard Madoff, and concurrent regulatory 
and criminal actions instigated against his firm, Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities, in 
connection with what is generally reported as perhaps the largest investment fraud in history, 
rumoured to be in an amount of up to $50 billion.
86
  Although various investigations on the 
Madoff affair remain underway, the case provides a useful meter stick against which these 
concerns about the governance challenge in private investment funds - e.g., lack of adequate 
information about the nature and operation of the fund’s activities and an inability to effect 
change in those activities going forward (either directly or indirectly through duly appointed 
agents) - can be analyzed and improved.  
At a time such as this, when “increased regulation” is a high priority for financial market 
reformers who wish to prevent fraud on investors,
87
the SEC has admitted that it has received 
numerous reports of concern about Madoff and his firm, yet despite such warnings, failed to 
take necessary action.  Any claims that further rules and regulations can in themselves serve 
an adequate deterrent to the repeat of such incidents must be thoroughly reflected upon in 
light of the systemic failure of SEC personnel to take heed of any one of the early indicators it 
received of Madoff’s pyramid scheme. 
Although well-reported and discussed in the mainstream and financial press, the Madoff affair 
is not the only case of fraud or malfeasance in the private investment funds arena that has 
unfolded recently.  The SEC  and other international regulators have in recent years pursued a 
growing number of enforcement actions against hedge funds that involved theft of assets, 
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fraudulent violations of securities held by the fund and false information provided to investors.
88
  
Civil lawsuits by investors are also becoming a recurring feature in US courts, and include 
claims involving misrepresentations of performance, misleading disclosures and improper 
valuations.
89
  A brief survey of recent hedge funds cases in the US can serve to illustrate the 
scope of potential issues which effective governance must address in the private investment 
funds area.  Importantly, neither the private equity industry nor the UK hedge fund sector has 
been immune to such incidents.
90
  
However, the global reach of the Madoff affair is staggering, both in terms of the amounts of 
money at issue and the breadth of individuals and institutions involved.  The question of 
whether effective multi-national coordination of financial regulators is possible is left 
unanswered here.  Nonetheless, the absence of any substantive role by the SEC or its sister 
regulatory organizations in either the prevention or detection of the Madoff scheme serves as 
an unfortunate reminder of the practical limitations of imposed regulation.  
The consequences of fraud and malfeasance on private fund investors can be severe, 
especially where fund participants are individuals.
91
  The global financial markets have seen a 
dramatic increase in complexity in the past few decades.
92
  Private funds have both driven that 
trend and been directly impacted by the complexity they have helped create.  As 
commentators have observed:
Among the many leitmotifs of the financial crisis is the failure of 
lawyers as regulators and gatekeepers . . . The Madoff Ponzi 
scheme personifies the “new” new era of economic catastrophe 
. . . Importantly, the scandal provides the best documented 
episode and case study of how lawyers and the SEC, a principal 
financial market regulatory agency operates mostly by lawyers, 
failed to understand the market they regulate and the nonlegal 
complexities surrounding their work.
93
In light of the recent financial turmoil, traditional corporate governance models are being 
questioned anew.
94
  After decades of debating the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms for listed companies,
95
it is timely and appropriate to now 
begin considering these questions in the context of private funds.  Historically, top down 
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financial regulation of private funds have necessarily ignored their governance mechanisms 
and focused instead on those aspects of their operation (e.g., marketing to investors) which is 
easiest for them to regulate.
96
  Both the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 
(AIFMD), unfortunately, continues this trend.
97
  The private monitoring solutions proposed 
above will instead focus on private solutions which can supplement these government-
sponsored extensions of regulatory responsibility.
1.8 Legal and Regulatory Duties of the Investment Manager
A meaningful analysis of the manner in which the governance mechanism of private funds can 
be improved must include an understanding of the legal and regulatory obligations imposed 
upon the fund manager in the context of the services that it provides to the fund.  Despite their 
reputation as being ‘unregulated’, numerous legal and regulatory issues arise in the structuring 
and operations of private investment funds, touching on a variety of substantive legal 
disciplines, in addition to a number of potentially relevant foreign jurisdictions.
98
  To understand 
the legal and regulatory environment in which these funds operate, the larger policy concerns 
that resulted in the particular exemptions of which they are attempting to avail themselves 
must be identified and analysed.  
Generally, those individuals and investment firms who launch private investment funds will 
attempt to minimize the extent of their regulation.
99
  In the UK, this means they will not seek 
authorization for their funds, which would curtail their freedom of investment.  Consequently, 
they will restrict their marketing efforts to certain permitted categories of institutions and 
individuals.
100
  In the US, exemptions will be secured under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 
Securities Act), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Securities Exchange Act), the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 (the Investment Company Act), and the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 (the Investment Advisers Act).  These exemptions are provided to address 
circumstances where regulation has been deemed unnecessary, either because of the 
sophistication of the individuals involved or because of the limited scope of activities 
conducted.
101
  As a result of ‘opting out’ of the regulatory regime imposed on public funds, the 
extent to which private investment funds provide for investor protection concerns varies greatly 
from structure to structure.  The question of the governance challenge that exists at the heart 
of all collective investment funds must be answered, therefore, in terms of the legal remedies 
that are found outside the product regulation regimes that have been established for mutual 
funds and other retail investment products.
102
The relationship between an investment manager and his client differs in several important 
respects from the relationships between most other participants in the financial markets.  As a 
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result, the legal rights and duties of an investment manager also differ from that of other 
service providers.
103
  Where many counterparties to a financial contract will have only an 
obligation to perform their contractual duties (e.g., delivering of a security, exchange of 
payments),
104
an investment manager will owe to his client both (i) a common law duty of care 
in tort,
105
and (ii) fiduciary duties.
106
  An investment manager with discretion to implement its 
own recommendations for its client’s investment portfolio owes a particular duty of care to such 
client.
107
  A fiduciary duty of loyalty is also owed to the client, in addition to the duty of care, 
which provides a means to protect a client against conflicts of interest on the part of the 
investment manager, both as regards the investment manager’s own interests and the 
interests of other clients.  This fiduciary duty exists alongside a growing array of regulatory 
measures addressing conflict management in the modern financial services firm.
108
Where an investment vehicle intermediates the relationship between the investment manager 
and the client(s), the analysis becomes more multifaceted and nuanced.  To the extent that an 
investment manager contracts to provide services with respect to the assets of the participants 
in those vehicles, he will possess similar degrees of control and discretion over such assets as 
would be typically seen in bilateral client relationship.  In case of a Company PIF, or a 
company is used as the general partner vehicle for a Partnership PIF, the directors of such a 
company will owe fiduciary duties to the company.
109
Such duties will directly affect the 
manager in which the board oversees the ongoing relationship between the fund and the fund 
manager.
The reality of fund managers who may be “judgement proof” with few assets available to fulfill
successful damages actions against them, as well as the plethora of various fund management 
entities and multiple fund vehicles that can be involved in fund structures of substantial size (as 
is the case with the Madoff scheme), raises the legitimate question of who can fund 
participants look to for recourse when fraud or malfeasance is uncovered.  Unfortunately, by 
this time often it will be too late.  As discussed in Chapter 3, private law remedies and 
regulatory actions
110
that occur “after the fact” may provide investors with only a fraction of 
their original investment.  
Proactive steps, therefore, should be taken to ensure that investors fully understand the 
current status and prospects of their fund, and are empowered to intervene effectively should 
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the need arise.  Addressing the governance challenge through private monitoring solutions, by 
implementing direct changes to the documentation and operation of the fund, can provide a 
more reliable means of protecting private fund investors from the risks they necessarily face, 
than relying on top-down “command-and-control” regulation by the state.  
1.9 Alternatives to Centralized, Top-Down Regulation 
One potential approach that could be taken to improve the governance mechanisms of private 
investment funds would be mandate particular governance structures by law or regulation.
111
  
However, to date legislators and regulators have consistently refused to take meaningful steps 
in that direction.  As a result, private actors must consider steps they can take themselves to 
address these concerns.
In recent years, there has been an increase in the amount of financial services regulation in 
connection with the investment management industry, most recently seen with the adoption of 
the Dodd-Frank in the United States and the AIFMD in the EU.
112
  However, centralized top-
down regulation is only one aspect of a larger framework of relationships that provide the 
regulatory process for investment managers and their clients.
113
  Interested parties, other than 
a national regulator, can become involved in, and contribute to, this process.  
In the case of private investment funds, these parties may include the prospective and current 
fund investors themselves, either on a case-by-case basis or acting in a more coordinated and 
long-term basis.  By enrolling these interested parties in the regulatory process, the national 
financial regulators would be better equipped to achieve their goals, especially in light of the 
primary factors limiting their success:  namely, limited budgets, limited personnel and limited 
expertise.  
This thesis will identify and critique the effectiveness and legitimacy of the different approaches 
(i.e., private monitoring solutions) that prospective and current fund investors can take to 
perform this role.
114
Knowledge and power within the financial services regulatory system is 
fragmented.  The choice between state regulation and self-regulation is not “either/or”.
115
  
Under the command-and-control model, a set of legal rules is enforced by a government 
regulator using a variety of sanctions.  This approach can be complimented by non-legal 
norms, such as non-binding guidance issued by the regulator on a general or ad hoc basis.
Traditionally, private investment funds have existed along the fringes of the command-and-
control approach.
116
  The limitations of command-and-control regulation and the growing 
complexity of the financial services industry have provided these funds with wide scope to 
operate.  Recently, however, regulators in the United States and Europe have attempted to 
expand their reach to include either the fund managers or the fund themselves (or both).
117
  
Whether top-down regulation on its own will be adequate is unclear.  
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Although formalized self-regulatory systems have not evolved around private investment 
funds, the potential for “stakeholder-led” self-regulation, by the fund investors themselves, to 
address regulatory concerns is also a potential solution.
118
  Empowering fund investors to 
implement improved governance structures in the funds in which they invest could therefore be 
a means to this end.  This thesis will also evaluate how the use of private monitoring solutions
to address the governance challenge would support the pursuit of these regulatory goals.  In 
particular, private actors can possess regulatory capacities which could complement those of 
public regulators.
Regulatory capacity has been described as “the actual or potential possession of resources 
plus the existence of actual or potential conditions that make it likely that those resources will 
be deployed . . . in such a way as to further the identified goals of the regulatory system . . .”
119
  
Those resources would include:
120
informal, expertise, financial and economic resources, 
authority and legitimacy, strategic position, and organizational capacity.
The regulatory regimes in both the UK and the US which excuse private investment funds from 
substantive regulation operate on the presumption that the select group of investors who are 
permitted to participate in these funds have some or all of the above traits.
121
  Therefore, it is 
worthwhile to explore the extent to which fund investors who possess some or all of these 
resources can contribute to the hybrid regulatory process.
122
  Importantly, different fund 
investors may possess different combinations of these resources, and therefore their 
contribution to the regulatory function may vary over time or with regard to different types of 
funds.  This is particular so, given that in both the US and the UK, retail investors are 
precluded from participating in private investment funds.
123
  Institutional investors and 
sophisticated individuals could play a meaningful role in the attainment of regulatory goals, 
particularly in relation to the governance challenge, and the private monitoring solutions 
proposed herein look to them to be enrolled in the monitoring process.  A statute-based 
regulator, such as the SEC or the FSA, benefits from legal authority and legal legitimacy, as 
well as other benefits deriving from its strategic position as the authority which provides for 
registration and licensing of regulated forms.
124
  Other participants, however, may have 
perceived authority and legitimacy, based on technical expertise, prior experience and/or 
relevant knowledge, which would enable them to perform a regulatory function.
Just as each regulated firm is an actor in a regulatory system, and as a result has a role which 
it must perform in order to ensure that regulatory goals are achieved, each individual or 
institution which transacts investment business with such firm is similarly an actor in the same 
regulatory system, potentially contributing to the ultimate attainment of these regulatory goals.  
In this light, a relevant question is how might the capacity of investors in private funds to assist 
national regulators in achieving their desired regulatory goals for such private funds be 
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enhanced.
125
  Different investors may have different capacities (and appetites) for performing 
such a role, and efforts to enroll them should recognize these differences.
A frequently cited example of collaboration between national regulators and market 
participants is standard setting.
126
  Unfortunately, despite the rise in recent years of “Best 
Practices” documents in various asset classes of private funds,
127
the non-public nature of 
market for, and operation of, private funds necessarily limits the scope and implementation of 
these efforts, as compared to codes on mortgage lending or retail deposit taking, for example.  
However, behavior modification can be obtained by other means, based on the relationship 
between a fund investor and a fund manager, as well as between various fund investors in the 
same fund.
Enhancing the role of fund participants recognizes the fragmented nature of modern regulation 
regimes, and can reflect differences in formality and explicitness that exist among different 
categories of fund investors.  As a result, pragmatic solutions can be identified and 
implemented involving such actors which will supplement and extend the reach of national 
regulators in achieving their goals.  Applying the analytical framework of enrollment of the 
relationship of fund investors and fund managers in private investment funds will provide a tool 
to expose and evaluate private monitoring solutions to the governance challenge as an 
alternative to further top-down, command-and-control regulation from the SEC or the FSA.  
The success of fund investors in this context is also a success for these regulators in achieving 
their goals.
It is not necessary for the regulation of private investment funds to be tied exclusively to the 
state.  There are other options.
128
  By taking a decentered perspective
129
on the regulation of 
private investment funds, and recognizing that the SEC and the FSA are not in themselves the 
entire regulatory system, the private monitoring solutions presented herein will be shown to be 
complimentary to these traditional regulators, and not adversarial to them.
130
  Five concepts sit 
at the heart of decentered regulation, each of which is found in the structure and operation of 
private investment funds:  complexity, fragmentation, interdependencies, ingovernability and 
the lack of a public/private distinction.
131
  As a result, private investment funds are a natural 
subject for a decentered approach to regulation.
This thesis will also analyze and critique recently adopted regulation (i.e., Dodd-Frank and 
AIFMD) and assess its impact of the private monitoring solutions proposed herein.  A lengthy 
digression into the relative merits of “public interest” theory
132
and “public choice” theory
133
in 
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the realm of financial services regulation is not necessary to acknowledge the less contentious 
point that all forms of regulations are subject to potential deficiencies and/or unforeseen 
limitations.
As Cheffins said concerning company law, which is equally appropriate in the context of 
investment funds:  
To sum up, the law’s role in company affairs is complicated.  Clearly, legal rules 
do matter sometimes.  Nevertheless, they are certainly not always of 
fundamental importance.  Often company participants pay little attention to the 
state of the law.  Furthermore, when they do, they are just as likely to be 
contracting around legal rules as complying with applicable doctrine.
134
A private investment fund, like the company that often (but not always) finds itself at the heart 
of its structure, is a nexus of contracts which reflects a network of explicit and implicit bargains 
reached by the fund participants and fund manager.
135
  The role of law
136
and top-down 
regulations is necessarily only one part of a larger array of factors that influence decision 
making.  One basis on which regulation of market transactions can be justified is that such 
actions are necessary to avoid outcomes that are so unfair, either procedurally or 
substantively, as to require governmental intervention.
137
  Another basis is that regulatory 
actions are necessary in order to increase allocative efficiencies.
138
  The question of which of 
these is the better justification for the incremental regulatory expansion undertaken by Dodd-
Frank and AIFMD is beyond the scope of this book.
The more relevant question for these purposes is to what extent can private ordering still be 
utilized to address the governance challenge, given that Dodd-Frank and AIFMD neither 
regulated private investment funds as we know them out of existence, nor did they, for once 
and for all, remove from them the risks that may arise from malfeasance, negligence, fraud or 
other bad acts (intentional or unintentional) on the part of the fund manager.
1.10 Conclusions
Balancing risk and reward in a commercial relationship is always challenging.  In the context of 
investing, the risks can be particularly complex and interconnected.  Private investment funds 
seek to generate economic returns against a background of external factors over which they 
have little direct influence, including market volatility, counterparty risks, liquidity crises and 
political uncertainty.  However, the manner in which such a fund is governed is subject to 
certain parameters established and implemented by the fund managers and the fund 
participants.
139
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Where funds are not registered for public distribution
140
(as is the case with private investment 
funds such as hedge funds and private equity funds), investors are left to negotiate such 
limitations (if any) with the fund and its promoters.  This thesis will therefore examine both the 
driving forces behind the established structures currently used for private investment funds (e.g., 
regulatory, tax)
141
and the governance challenges present in the two principal fund vehicles:  the 
limited partnership
142
and the offshore exempt company.
143
Private monitoring solutions can be contrasted with public monitoring solutions, which would 
include mandated governance regulations put in place by legislation or regulations.  The 
detailed product-level requirements of the Undertakings for Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities (“UCITS”) directive is an example of public monitoring solutions.
144
  
The UCITS directive established a common, harmonised framework for retail investment funds 
across the EU.  Despite significant new laws and rules addressing issues surrounding private 
investment funds that were adopted in the US and the EU in 2010, no attempt was made to 
address the internal governance of such vehicles.
145
  As a result, in the absence of 
governmental action, private actors must address these issues themselves.
Each of the private monitoring solutions discussed herein address the governance challenge 
by redressing informational asymmetries between the parties (i.e., fund manager and fund 
participants) and by establishing legally enforceable conduct standards that apply to the fund 
manager and provide fund participants or their agents with causes of action which they can 
pursue at law or equity.
The private monitoring solutions proposed in this thesis are not based upon antipathy or 
animosity towards “top-down” regulation as a component of the overall regulatory enforcement 
landscape.  The purpose of this thesis is not to demonstrate the relative superiority of private 
actors and private solutions over public regulation.  Instead, this thesis recognizes, like much 
of the “New Governance” literature, that “top-down” regulation is only one element of a broader 
array of potential tools that can be effectively used to obtain identified regulatory goals.  
Further, this thesis recognizes that sophisticated investor can contribute, and have contributed, 
to regulatory failures in the past by either not conducting adequate due diligence or not acting 
upon such information in a prompt and credible manner.  However, the private monitoring 
solutions acknowledge those potential deficiencies and operate as a means to remedy those 
shortcomings in certain circumstances.  To the extent that the regulatory regime is altered at 
some time in the future to seek to address the concerns underlying the governance challenge, 
the implementation of the private monitoring solutions in the meantime would not impede or 
undermine such efforts.
As the role of a private fund is to collectivise a number of separate investment management 
relationships,  a thorough analysis of the legal vehicles commonly used should be the starting 
point for any evaluation of potential solutions to the governance challenge.  As discussed 
above, the governance challenge has slightly different characteristics depending on whether 
limited companies or partnerships are used as the legal vehicle.  The following chapter will 
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analyze each of these in more depth, focusing in particular on material limits on information 
flow or impediments to a participant’s ability to exercise its legal and equitable rights. 
26
Chapter 2
Structure and Operation of Private Investment Funds
2.1 Introduction
A fund is an answer to a question.  Invariably, that question will involve queries relating to the 
specific participants and their particular requirements.  Despite the prevalence of well 
established ‘market forms’ for many types of private investment funds, each fund will be 
structured to address the unique requirements that derive from the tax treatment of the 
participants and/or the underlying investments, the regulatory status of the fund manager and 
the types of underlying investments being made. 
To begin, it is worthwhile making a few observations about the modern private investment 
funds industry.  Because of their private nature, there are no central repositories for 
information on, or documentation concerning, private investment funds.  As a result, the best 
source of date are often either trade associations or private commercial firms who have been 
able to accumulate enough information upon which to make reasonable estimates.  In the case 
of private equity funds, it is estimated that close to $2.4 trillion dollars were invested in these 
funds.
146
  In 2010/2011, just under 70% of new funds were launched by managers based in the 
United States (50%) and the United Kingdom (11%).
147
  In the case of hedge funds in 2010 it is 
estimated that there were approximately 6,800 hedge funds in existence,
148
managing over $2 
trillion in assets.
149
  The majority of hedge fund managers are based in the US, with the UK 
being the next largest country.
150
Investors in private funds include a wide variety of institutional investors, such as public and 
private pension plans, charitable endowments and foundations, as well as family offices and 
other very high net worth individuals.
151
  By participating in lightly regulated investment 
vehicles such as hedge funds and private equity funds, these investors face a number of 
particular risks, including lack of trading independence when a fund manager trades through 
an affiliated broker/dealer, investors being unable to redeem their investments in a timely 
manner, lack of audits by reputable independent accounting firms, investments in highly illiquid 
assts that are difficult to value and personal trading activities by personnel of the fund 
manager.
152
Over the last three hundred years,
153
as investment funds have been established in different 
countries to pursue different investment objectives, one recurring feature that has remained is 
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that existing legal structures are utilized out of necessity to deliver to fund participants the 
collectivisation of relationships that is required in order to entice the investment manager to 
undertake the mandate.  Each investor in the fund is entitled to a portion of the proceeds from 
the fund in proportion to the amount of assets initially contributed, net of expenses and fees 
provided to the fund manager.  The intermediation of a fund vehicle between the prospective 
clients and the investment manager is a “necessary evil” that the clients must endure as they 
typically lack the assets individually to retain the manager directly. As such, the fund vehicle 
must simultaneously appeal to the fund manager, to induce it to provide its services, and to the 
prospective fund investors, to induce them to entrust their money to it.
The governance structures available for private investment funds derive primarily from the 
choice of legal vehicle, together with the number, nature and demographics of the various fund 
participants.
154
  As noted above, limited partnerships and offshore companies have become
key vehicles of choice for private investment funds not because they reinforce or protect the 
rights of investors, or because they serve to mitigate against the governance challenge facing 
all collective investment structures, but rather because of certain tax and regulatory 
efficiencies.
155
In the case of Partnership PIFs, limited partnerships are treated as tax transparent in many 
jurisdictions.  As a result, there is typically no taxation at fund level (i.e., payable by the 
partnership itself) and partners are taxed as if they hold the portfolio of investments directly 
(e.g., including in their taxable income their pro rata share of the partnership’s net income).
156
  
One of the primary virtues of partnerships is that it allows more flexibility in establishing capital 
accounts for each participant in the fund, thereby enabling their participation in the underlying 
investment activity to be tracked individually and directly, rather than indirectly through the 
holding of shares.
In the case of Company PIFs, companies offer a simple and familiar structure that can be 
easier to organize and operate than a limited partnership.  However, since companies are 
frequently subject to entity level taxation in many onshore jurisdictions, ‘exempt companies’ 
are often established in familiar offshore jurisdictions, such as the Cayman Islands, Bermuda 
and the Channel Islands of Jersey and Guernsey.  Company laws, even in such offshore 
jurisdictions, are generally more highly evolved than the law of partnership, and definitive
answers to questions regarding the rights and obligations of parties are more easily obtained.
Importantly, neither entity was originally developed specifically with the function of serving as a 
private investment fund.  Their use as such has been driven by the needs of the parties for tax 
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For a discussion of the impact of entity law on the value of a business enterprise, see, e.g., Robert Daines, 
“Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value,?” 62 Journal of Financial Economics 525 (2001).
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Notably, the legal vehicles used as private investment funds have been particularly effective at delivering 
economic gains to both fund managers and fund participants.  See, e.g., Rosenberg at 363-364 (“Venture 
capital funds introduced two mechanics crucial to the kind of successful entrepreneurship that has 
characterized the last twenty years of high-tech development: (1) they created an investment vehicle through 
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draw on their experience to nurture young entrepreneurial companies into profitability.”).
156
See Harris, “Critical Theory” at 9.  (“One legal advantage of private equity limited partnerships that is not 
necessarily available in the corporate form is that capital gains from investments are not taxed at the entity 
level as they are in the corporate form.  Rather, income from investments in limited partnerships passes 
through directly to investors, where it is taxed as ordinary income.  In addition to pass-through taxation, 
partners in such partnerships receive income that has been taxed at the lower capital gain rate of 15%, as 
opposed to the higher rate or ordinary income of 35%, which is standard for the corporate form.”).
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efficiency,
157
rather than a genuine affinity for the history and governances of such vehicles.  
As a result, questions of governance that arise in connection with private investment funds 
must be analyzed and addressed in the context of the nature and limitations of the legal entity 
that tax concerns mandate they adopt.
Generalizing about private investment funds can be very difficult at times.  They vary greatly in 
size and complexity from small entrepreneurial start-up funds to complex fund structures with 
billions of dollars in assets.
158
They differ in terms of the assets in which they invest, the 
strategies that they pursue, the legal form in which they are structured and the types of 
investors from whom they seek contributions.  Regardless, sufficient structural similarities exist 
between the different types of private investment funds that a broad description can be given 
of how they are established and operated.
159
  Unfortunately, governance investor protection 
concerns are addressed, if at all, at late stages of negotiations between the parties, after 
issues such as the economic arrangements between the parties and the investment objective 
of the fund will take priority and often will consume most of the negotiations.  Investors can, 
and should, do better.
In this Chapter, I will describe how the relationship between fund managers and fund 
participants is documented, and in particular the issues that arise when using either 
partnerships or limited companies as private investment funds.  Next, I will analyze the 
marketing restrictions applicable to such funds, and the limitations that are in place to limit 
participation to non-retail investors.  Finally, I discuss the manner in which these funds are 
taxed, identify how these rules impact the structure and operation of private investment funds.
2.2 Documenting the Relationship between the Fund Manager and Investors
Any analysis of the legal and equitable duties owed by a fund manager to an investor in a private 
investment fund will begin with a thorough reading of the written documentation entered into as 
part of the establishment of the fund.  Accordingly, the law of contract will be central to the 
structuring and operation of any private investment fund.
160
  In addition to breach of contract 
claims, such documentation will be relevant to assessing the common law duty of care in tort 
161
owed to the investor and any limitation on the fiduciary duties of the fund manager.
162
The key documents include the following:
(a) the offering memorandum provided to investors to explain the structure and goal 
of the fund;
(b) the constitutional documents of the fund, which will depend on the type(s) of 
vehicle(s) used;
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(c) the subscription application between the prospective investor and the relevant 
fund vehicle; and
(d) the investment management agreement, between the fund manager and one or 
more fund vehicles.
The offering memorandum outlines key information about what the fund can and cannot do.
163
  
When funds are structured as ‘blind pools’, investors in these funds rely on the fund manager to 
identify successful investments without retaining for themselves the ability to decide whether or 
not to participate in a particular investment.  Although a fund manager’s discretion may be quite 
broad, limits are typically agreed by reference to detailed ‘investment restrictions’ contained in 
the offering memorandum.  These restrictions can include diversification and concentration limits 
on the fund, imposing discipline on the manager providing confidence to the investors that the 
investments will be of a type, size, and sector as previously agreed. 
The type of legal entity used will dictate the form of the constituent documents of the fund.  
Whether a limited partnership agreement for a Partnership PIF or memorandum and articles of 
association for a Company PIF, similar issues are addressed, such as:
(a) the grant of sufficient authority to the fund manager to invest the assets of the 
fund;
(b) the calculation of any performance allocation and/or management fee;
(c) the process by which fund interests are issued, valued and redeemed, including 
any ability of the fund manager to compel redemptions under predetermined 
conditions;
(d) the allocation of initial and on-going expenses as between the fund and the fund 
manager;
(e) governance issues relating to investor voting and the process by which the 
constituent documents may be amended from time to time; and
(f) limits on the fiduciary duties otherwise applicable to the fund manager.
Subscription documentation will vary in length and content based on the type of investors sought 
and the jurisdictions in which they are located.
164
In addition, the subscription documentation, 
completed and signed by the investor, is the principal means by which a fund manager can 
obtain the necessary representations, warranties and indemnities it requires to protect itself and 
bind the investor to its future obligations.
The investment management agreement, establishing the scope and terms of the engagement 
of the fund manager, will be relevant in determining the scope of the duties (including fiduciary) 
owed to the private investment fund as client.  A fund could claim for the breach of either an 
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express or an implied term in the investment management agreement.
165
  In the case of the 
former, any absolute obligations on the investment manager, or an obligation to use ‘best 
endeavours’, could be the basis for a claim against the fund manager.  In the case of the latter, 
an implied term that imposes a duty on a service provider to exercise reasonable skill and care 
may also be actionable.
Importantly, there is ample room throughout the documentation identified above to adequately 
address the governance challenge present in private investment funds.  However, any 
discussion of appropriate steps to take must take place in light of the current commercial realities 
in this industry.  Until recently, the perception has been that fund managers who are able to 
deliver consistently strong investment returns are able to raise any further required capital from 
their existing investors.
166
  A central feature of the Madoff scheme, for example, was the 
perceived exclusiveness of the opportunity and the fact that the funds were generally “closed” for 
further investment.
167
  As a result, in the perceived difficulty in gaining access to desired funds, 
investors may be less willing or unable to negotiate adequate levels of protection in the fund 
documentation to fully address the governance challenge.
To implement changes in fund documentation, it is important to understand, and work within, the 
key distinctions that exist between Partnership PIFs and Company PIFs.  As noted above, the 
choice of law covered in this thesis is driven by the nature of legal vehicles actually used for 
private investment funds.  Over the last several decades, the legal vehicles selected by fund 
managers and fund investors have primarily been partnerships created under the law of either 
Delaware or England and Wales, or limited companies established under the laws of an offshore 
jurisdiction, such as the Cayman Islands.
2.3 Partnership PIFs
Partnerships, established under the laws of England or Delaware, are frequently used in the 
structuring of private investment funds.
168
  The benefits of partnerships include:
(a) flow-through tax treatment;
(b) flexible remuneration arrangements for general partners; and
(c) flexible internal governance and control.
169
Unlike a general partnership which requires no formal documentation or filings and is created 
whenever two or more persons carry on a business for profit as co-owners, a limited 
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partnership is available only by statute, upon satisfaction of a number of formalities.  The 
primary benefit of a limited partnership over a general partnership is it permits an investor who 
is a limited partner to participate in the profits of the partnership without personal liability for the 
obligations of the partnership.
170
  
The affairs of the partners are governed by the partnership agreement, the scope and contents 
of which are negotiated by the general and limited partners.
171
  The partnership agreement 
constitutes the partnership and establishes the parameters of the relationships among the 
limited partners and between the limited partners and the general partner.
172
  These 
agreements can vary widely in their level of detail and breadth of subject matter, depending on 
the number of investors, any special needs or requirements of particular investors, and the 
complexity of the commercial arrangements involving the general partner and its 
remuneration.
173
Every limited partnership must have a general partner.
174
  A general partner may be either an 
individual or, more commonly in private investment funds, a limited liability legal entity, which 
may be specifically organized for this purpose.
175
  The right to manage a limited partnership 
belongs solely to the general partner and not to the limited partners. Limited partners may be 
deemed to be general partners and lose the benefit of their limited liability if they participate in 
the management of the partnership.  Where this line is ultimately drawn varies significantly 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  The general partner owes a duty of good faith towards the 
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limited partners in a limited partnership, just as all partners owe such duties to their fellow 
partners in a general partnership.
176
English limited partnerships are governed by both the Partnership Act 1890 (the 1890 Act) and 
the Limited Partnership Act 1907 (the 1907 Act).  While the 1890 Act focuses on general 
partnerships,
177
the 1907 Act provides for modifications in the case of limited partnerships.  As 
a general rule, partners have unlimited personal liability for the obligations of the partnership.  
If the assets of the partnership are insufficient to cover outstanding liabilities, then the personal 
assets of the partners will be available to the creditors.  Further, liability for partners is joint and 
several.
178
  Each partner is therefore liable for the acts of the other partners. The 1907 Act 
provides that partners may form limited partnerships in which one or more partners have 
limited liability,
179
so long as one partner has unlimited liability.  Such partnerships must be 
registered.  
Since under the 1907 Act a limited partner may not take part in management,
180
the limited 
partnership is a useful vehicle for investors who do not wish to take an active role in the 
management of their funds.  They may use it to create an investment fund under the control of 
a general partner who alone has unlimited liability for the partnership’s obligations.  The limited 
partner is only liable to the extent of his capital contributions (if any), provided he does not take 
part in the management of the partnership business.
181
This limitation on involvement in management contributes to the governance challenge in 
private investment funds established as limited partnerships by potentially reinforcing in 
investors a reluctance to become too directly involved in decision-making processes, 
particularly in regards to contentious matters. However, other jurisdictions, such as Delaware 
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in the US, have addressed these concerns, and Delaware is now the preeminent jurisdiction 
for Partnership PIFs in the US.
182
There are a number of significant advantages from using a Delaware limited partnership for a 
private investment fund instead of an English limited partnership.   Most importantly, the limited 
partners of a Delaware limited partnership benefit from a greater ‘safe harbour’ in relation to 
their participation in the affairs of the partnership.  As a result, partners can exercise greater 
control without loss of limited partner status.  Unlike English law, Delaware law expressly 
provides for the exercise of certain enumerated rights and powers by limited partners that will 
not constitute participation in the control of the partnership’s business which might otherwise 
prejudice a limited partner’s limited liability.
183
  Underlying this approach is an 
acknowledgement that questions of ‘management’ within the vehicle are primarily internal 
issues that do not undermine the positions of third parties.
Accordingly, a Delaware limited partnership agreement can be drafted that would afford 
particular limited partners significant protection with respect to partnership governance without 
subjecting that limited partner to liability as a general partner.
184
  The limited partnership 
agreement could restrict the general partner from taking certain actions while requiring the 
consent of the limited partners, or even a particular limited partner individually, to take other 
actions. Mechanisms such as this can provide investors with effective means of oversight and 
accountability to overcome the governance challenge embedded in private investment funds 
structured as limited partnerships.
The contrast between the shortcomings of English limited partnerships, and the certainties 
provided by Delaware, have been widely noted.  For example, the 2003 Joint Report of the 
Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission (the Joint Report) 
acknowledged that the 1907 Act has not been regarded as a model of draftsmanship and 
included this particular concern as part of its considerations.  The 1907 Act provides current 
and prospective limited partners little guidance as to the types of activities that may constituent 
‘management’.  Considering the severity of the consequences for taking part in ‘management’ -
the loss of limited liability - in the face of uncertainty partners have overwhelmingly taken the 
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side of caution.  The Joint Report recognizes this lack of clarity as a major defect in the 
1907 Act, and recommends that a ‘safe harbour’ be established by statute that will clearly 
identify those activities which a limited partner may undertake.
185
Unfortunately, no legislation 
implementing the Law Commission’s proposals have been forthcoming.  There are strong 
arguments, however, to support the Law Commission’s views.
The limited partnership has proven itself very useful over the years as a means for collective 
investment.  As commentators have observed:
The limited partnership has long been a major investment 
vehicle.  It began in the nineteenth century as a way to achieve 
limited liability without incorporation.  Later it came to be used 
widely as a tax shelter vehicle, mostly by wealthy investors and 
entrepreneurs.
186
The limited partnership can be seen as a form of contract, as well as a form of business 
organization.
187
  As a business organization, limited parties exercise far less control than 
shareholders of a corporation, being analogized at times to “disguised creditors.”
188
  As a form 
of contract, the participants enjoy great latitude to establish the commercial terms and liability 
preferences between them that they feel are most important under the particular 
circumstances, without being bound to follow the statutory or judicial biases that accompany 
company law.  Historically, this has meant that many partnership agreements have lowered 
duties owed by general parties to limited partners,
189
but this is an arrangement that is not 
mandated by the law and is within the scope of terms that can be negotiated by the parties.
A valid question can be raised regarding what differences, if any, should exist in the 
governance of partnerships as opposed to companies.  It has been observed that:
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The principal question regarding limited partnership governance 
is whether the limited partner’s role should differ from that of 
corporate shareholders, who are also passive, limited liability 
owners.  The critical difference between limited partners and 
shareholders follow from differences in the management of the 
two different business forms.  In the corporation, management is 
in the hands of executives who are not necessarily owners of the 
corporation.  Shareholders monitor management through a board 
of directors that serves as the agent of the shareholders . . . In 
the limited partnership, by contrast, management is in the hands 
of general partners who are themselves owners and not merely 
agents of the limited partners.  Because of their equity interest 
and guarantee, removal of the general partners can be costly.
190
This tension between the limitations on the activities of limited partners and the potential for 
entrenchment by the general partner frames the analysis of the governance challenge in 
Partnership PIFs.  As one commentator has noted:
By default, investors in private limited partnerships have limited 
rights to participate in day-to-day operations or challenge 
decisions of fund managers.  As a result of this set of default 
legal rules, investors in these funds face a familiar agency 
problem.
191
2.4 Company PIFs
Funds established in offshore jurisdictions are often structured as limited companies that issue 
shares to investors.
192
The constitutional documents of a Company PIF will generally consist 
of its memorandum of association and articles of association. The articles of association will 
deal with matters related to the internal workings of the company and authorize the directors to 
transact the business of the company.
The directors are responsible for the management of the company and may accordingly 
exercise all the power of the company, absent explicit restrictions in the memorandum and 
articles.  All companies, as artificially created legal persons, must act through their agents.
193
  
In the case of Company PIFs, which typically lack executive officers and employees, such 
agents will predominantly be the directors themselves. 
The duties and obligations of directors of Company PIFs are governed by two sources of law:
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laws in the jurisdiction in which it is established. 
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(a) the companies law of the jurisdiction of incorporation (e.g. the Cayman Islands); 
and
(b) the relevant common law.
In recent years, the Cayman Islands has established itself as one of the most popular 
jurisdictions for the establishment of offshore private investment funds. As such, their 
companies law are of particular relevance to questions concerning private investment funds 
and the governance challenge faced by investors.
194
Other than compliance with administrative requirements, the Companies Law of the Cayman 
Islands is silent on directors’ duties. The more prescriptive source of law governing duties and 
obligations of directors of companies incorporated under the laws of the Cayman Islands is the 
common law, which draws upon English and other cases as well as cases in the Cayman 
Islands courts.
195
Although Cayman law is based on English common law,
196
the Companies Law 1998 of the 
Cayman Islands is not easily mistaken for the Companies Act 2006, recently implemented in 
the UK.  The differences are immediately apparent and material.  Like many company statutes 
in other common law offshore jurisdictions, the Cayman statute is a remnant of jurisprudence 
from an earlier generation.  Many of the renovations implemented in the UK in 1986 and 2006 
find no comparable development in these offshore jurisdictions.  As such, much of the 
academic literature in the UK addressing corporate governance and other aspects of the 
modern British company will not be directly applicable to considerations of offshore companies, 
either generally or in the specific context with which they are discussed herein.  Under the 
common law, which forms the foundation for company law in the Cayman Islands, a director’s 
duties to the company can be divided into the fiduciary duties which arise because of the 
nature of the role of a director, and the duties of skill and care in the performance of the 
director’s duties.  Importantly, directors’ duties are owed by each director individually. 
2.4.1 Fiduciary Duties
A director is in a fiduciary relationship to the company, stemming from his role as an agent.  
The fiduciary duties may be described as being those of loyalty, honesty, and good faith to the 
company.  The standard is similar to that owed by a trustee to the beneficiaries of a trust, 
although a director is expected to take commercial risks on behalf of the company in pursuit of 
financial gain. The directors must act in what they consider is the best interest of the 
company, and not for any other purpose.
197
  As a subjective test, the court should only interfere 
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Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1300 (2000).
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success of the company’s business.  Item Software (UK) Limited v Kouroush Fasshihi, [2004] EWCA Civ 1244 
at 41.  Argentine Holdings (Cayman) Limited v Buenos Aires Hotel Corporation SA, [1997] CILR 90.
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if it determines that no reasonable director could have concluded that a particular course of 
action was in the best interests of the company.
198
  
Directors must not place themselves in a position in which there is a conflict between their duty 
to the company and their personal interests.
199
  This obligation may be varied by the articles of 
a company, permitting the director to vote on a matter in which he has an interest, provided 
that he has disclosed the nature of this interest to the board.  The directors must exercise their 
powers for the purpose of which they were conferred and not for an improper or collateral 
purpose.  Directors must also avoid placing themselves in a position where their personal 
interests conflict with the interests of the company unless the company gives informed 
consent.  This duty can cause particular difficulties where a director is a director of a number of 
companies (which is common in private investment funds) and a conflict arises as between his 
duties to each company.  Such director should not participate in a decision that gives rise to 
the conflict of interest.  Where the conflict is to continue for some time, he may need to resign 
from one or more of his directorships.
2.4.2 Duties of Care, Diligence, and Skill
A director’s relationship to the company that he serves is analogous to that of an agent to his 
principal.  The duties of an agent generally include a duty of care, skill and diligence and the 
duties of a fiduciary.  Importantly, an agent is bound to carry out the instructions of his principal 
and, where the instructions are incomplete, an agent must act reasonable in the best interest 
of his principal. 
200
The duties of care, diligence, and skill have been traditionally regarded as subjective.  A 
director is obliged to exhibit only such skill as he actually possesses, and not such care and 
diligence as would be displayed by a reasonable man in the circumstances.
201
  As in the case
of the director’s fiduciary duties, the duties of care, diligence, and skill are owed to the 
company itself and not, to individual shareholders or other parties.  Importantly, the directors 
can, subject to the articles, delegate specific tasks and functions to other parties (e.g. fund 
manager, administrator), and they are entitled to trust the competence and integrity of such 
parties to a reasonable extent.  The directors remain responsible, however, for the supervision 
of such tasks and functions delegated by them.  
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Whatley v Phillips & Co. Ltd, [2007] All ER 43.
201
The three tests laid down in the leading English case on the standard of care, which would continue to control 
in the Cayman Islands, are as follows: 
(a) a director need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater degree of skill than may 
reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge and experience;
(b) a director is not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of the company; and
(c) in respect of all duties that, having regard to the exigencies of business and the articles, may properly 
be left to some other manager, a director is generally justified in trusting an official or manager to 
perform such duties honestly. 
Per Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd (No 1), [1925] Ch 407.  Although more recent English 
cases have found that the duty of care has both an objective and a subjective component, it is not clear that 
Cayman courts will follow such developments.  See Re D’Jan of London Limited, [1993] BCC 646.
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2.4.3 Scope of Duties
The duties of a director are owed to the company.
202
  Usually, the ‘interests of the company’
may be equated to the interests of the company’s shareholders.  Once a company is insolvent, 
the directors must consider the creditors’ interests as part of their duty to act in the interests of 
the company.
203
  These duties are not owed to other companies with which the company is 
associated, to the other directors, or to individual shareholders. As a result, typically only in 
exceptional circumstances may a minority shareholder enforce the rights of a company.
204
  
Directors must often balance the different interests of different classes of current shareholders, 
and of current and future shareholders.  
If a director breaches his fiduciary duty or duty of care, he may be personally liable to the 
company in damages.  The measure of damages will be either the loss suffered by the 
company or the improper profit made by the director.
205
  Directors may also incur contractual or 
tortious liability directly to third parties, where they make negligent misrepresentations, and 
criminal liability, where they are knowingly involved in the issue of accounts which are 
materially misleading or false.  A director, however, is not a guarantor of the commercial 
success of a company (or the investment success of a fund vehicle).  Courts will typically 
require that the director act honestly and reasonably in what he considers the company’s best 
interest. 
206
2.5 Marketing Restrictions
Whether established as Partnership PIFs or Company PIFs, the legal vehicles used to 
structure private investment funds must also be operated in such a way as to remain in 
compliance with tax rules and financial regulations.  Marketing restrictions determine who is, 
and who is not, permitted to participate in a private investment fund.  The principal effect of 
these restrictions, in both the US and the UK, is to exclude retail investors.
207
  As a result of 
limiting Partnership PIFs and Company PIFs to non-retail investors and deciding as an explicit 
policy choice not to subject it to product-level regulation like public investment funds,
208
the 
state explicitly places primary responsibility for the investment decision on the prospective 
investor.
Marketing restrictions operate in conjunction with tax rules
209
to determine the structure and 
operation of private investment funds, but to countervailing effect.  As noted above, on the one 
hand, the financial regulatory regime attempts to exclude retail investors who may not have the 
knowledge or experience required to negotiate adequate protections from participating in 
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As discussed above, the overwhelming majority of hedge funds and private equity funds remain based in 
either the US or the UK.  As a result, this thesis will focus on the marketing restrictions in place in these 
countries when evaluating how those restrictions impact the governance challenge.
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See Section 3.4 below.
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private investments, while on the other hand, in order to prevent these vehicles from being 
instruments of tax avoidance, the fiscal authorities often impose ownership restrictions or 
require management and control of these vehicles to be conducted in such a way as to impede 
solutions to the governance challenge. In order to avoid the substantive investment 
restrictions contained in the product-orientated regulations applicable to public investment 
funds that are available to retail investors,
210
private investment funds are typically marketed 
only to certain designated categories of investors.  Such categories of acceptable investors are 
intended by financial regulators to ensure that the participants in these funds have the ability to 
understand the risks involved in such investments and to negotiate such levels of investor 
protection as they deem sufficient.  
What makes private investment funds “private”?  The answer is a series of affirmative 
decisions taken by the proposed fund’s sponsors, and explicitly agreed to by prospective 
investors, to operate within designated exemptions to securities laws and financial regulations. 
In the UK, the manner in which a private investment fund can be marketed depends on 
whether or not it is deemed to be a collective investment scheme (CIS).
211
  Falling within this
definition raises significant impediments to the marketing of a private investment fund, where 
authorization for retail distribution is not obtained.  Where a vehicle is deemed not to constitute 
a CIS, an authorized person (or, subject to the approval of an authorized person, an 
unauthorized person) may in principle market interests in that vehicle to any investor in the UK, 
regardless of whether they are an institution or a private individual, subject to the COB rules as 
they apply to different categories of investors under the FSMA.
212
  If the entity falls within the 
definition of a CIS, then such an investment may generally not be promoted to private 
customers by either an authorized or an unauthorized person.
213
Section 238 of the FSMA establishes a general prohibition on the promotion of CIS in the UK 
by persons authorized under the FSMA.  Exemptions are immediately provided for regulated 
CISs, and further exemptions may be provided by either Treasury order or rules of the FSA for 
unauthorized CISs.
214
  Generally, an authorized person who wishes to communicate or 
approve a financial promotion, which is not otherwise covered by an exemption in the Financial 
Promotion Order, must comply with the rules contained in COBs 4
215
.  However, in the case of 
an unregulated CIS, an authorized person is prohibited from either communicating a financial 
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the Financial Promotion Order; the FSA rules apply. 
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promotion
216
or approving a promotion relating thereto,
217
subject to two categories of 
exemptions.
218
Under the Promotion of Collective Investment Schemes (Exemptions) Order (the Scheme 
Promotion Order),
219
exemptions are established for high net worth investors (which is based 
on an objective measure of the individual annual income or wealth) and for sophisticated 
investors (which requires a subjective determination that the individual appreciates the risks 
associated with certain categories of investments) to be marketed unauthorised CISs.  In 
addition, the FSA-adopted rules are more restrictive than the exemptions contained in the 
Scheme Promotion Order.  The most useful categories of exemptions under COBs 5.9.1R (4) 
for the marketing of unauthorised CISs include:
(a) an authorized person can promote to a person who is or has been in the last 
30 months a participant in the same or a substantially similar unregulated CIS;
(b) an authorized person can promote an unregulated CIS to a person for whom 
the firm has taken reasonable steps to ensure that investment in a scheme is 
suitable and who is an established or newly accepted customer of the firm;
220
and
(c) an unregulated CIS may be promoted to an eligible counterparty or a 
professional client.
The US approach to the marketing of private investment funds provides an instructive 
counterpoint to the UK system.  Exemptions must be secured under both the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, for the fund vehicle itself, and the Securities Act of 1933, for the 
marketing of the fund’s interests.  Absent an exemption, most private investment funds would 
fall within the definition of ‘investment company’
221
and be required to register with the SEC, 
pursuant to the Investment Company Act.  Registered funds are subject to a number of 
constraints incompatible with many investment strategies pursued by private investment 
funds.
222
  Private investment funds typically make use of the exemptions provided by 
Section 3(c)(1) and Section 3(c)(7) and forgo registration, and the substantive restrictions that 
this entails.
Section 3(c)(1) is the elder and more common of the two exclusions from the definition of 
‘investment company’.  The requirements are twofold:
(a) the interests in the fund must be privately placed to investors; and
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(b) the fund must not have in excess of 100 investors.
223
Section 3(c)(7) focuses on the status of investors in the fund, rather than their number.  The 
requirements are twofold:
(a) as with Section 3(c)(1), the interests in the fund must be privately placed to 
investors; and
(b) the fund may only have as investors:
(i) ‘qualified purchasers’; and
(ii) ‘knowledgeable employees’ of the fund manager.
Section 3(c)(7) was promulgated to allow for an unlimited number of ‘qualified purchasers’ to 
invest in a fund, subject again to their not being a public offering of the fund’s interests. 
When marketing a private investment fund to US investors, not only must exemptions be 
secured in connection with the fund’s potential status as an ‘investment company’, it is also 
necessary to ensure that each offer and sale of interests in the fund is exempt from registration 
under the Securities Act.  Whether constituted as a limited partnership, a unit trust, or a 
company, the interests of a fund will fall within the definition of a ‘security’.  Absent a suitable 
exemption, the offer and sale of such interest will require registration with the SEC.
224
Private investment funds generally avoid the registration requirements by relying on the 
exemption provided by Section 4(2) of the Securities Act.  This exemption covers transactions 
by an issuer not involving any public offer.
225
  Due to some ambiguities with regard to applying 
this section in practice, the SEC promulgated Regulation D as a safe harbour.
A fundamental concept within Regulation D is the ‘accredited investor’.
226
  Provided that the 
other provisions of Regulation D are complied with, an unlimited number of accredited 
investors may invest in a fund without sacrificing the private placement exemption provided by 
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Section 4(2).  In addition, up to 35 persons may invest in the fund who are not ‘accredited 
investors’ provided they are ‘sophisticated investors’.
227
  Underlying the “accredited investor” 
exemption in the Securities Act is the belief, that sophisticated investors have the resources 
and financial expertise required to obtain and evaluate the information necessary to make their 
investment decisions.
228
  In short, they can “fend for themselves.”  A similar belief serves as 
the rationale behind the categories of exceptions for scheme promotion in the UK.  Some 
critics
229
have argued that the fact that so many sophisticated investors fell victim to Madoff’s 
Ponzi scheme is compelling evidence that in fact such investors are either unable or unwilling 
to protect themselves.
230
  If this is correct, continuing to provide a private placement exception 
to enable marketing of investments to such persons would ultimately be counter-productive if 
they lack the presumed ability to fend for themselves.
231
Although a comprehensive survey and critique of the growing literature of behavioural finance 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worthwhile to make certain observations about how 
some of these concepts would apply to investors in private funds.  Behavioural finance focuses 
on the manner and extent to which cognitive and emotional factors impact an individual’s 
investment decisions.
232
  This school of thought focuses on how people actually think while 
they are making financial decisions, rather than assuming that they comply with abstract 
presumptions.  In particular, the use of heuristics, or “rules of thumb”, and framing decisions 
involving anecdotes and stereotypes play a key role in understanding market anomalies that 
classical economic models cannot explain.  Classic models are based on the assumption that 
economic agents will behave rationally in all cases.
In the case of private investment funds, a proponent of behavioural finance would claim that 
investors may succumb to systematic errors, based on their over-reaction (or under-reaction) 
to new information.  These systematic errors could result from common factors such as 
overconfidence, limited attention or loss aversion.  Overconfidence can lead to lack of 
diversification and overconcentration, while loss aversion could result in taking an 
unnecessarily conservative position that leads to loss of investment returns.
233
  Academic 
studies have shown, for example, that hedge fund investors tend to allocate new money to 
funds based on long-term performance, while redeeming money from funds based on short-
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(1997).
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term factors.
234
  Clearly, many of the so-called “gatekeepers” at a variety of financial firms did a 
poor job of perceiving and managing risk in the months and weeks leading up to the global 
financial crisis.
235
However, conceding that individuals may not always be acting in a fully rational manner when 
considering an investment decision is not the same thing as saying that they are incapable of 
making any such decisions on their own behalf.  In the case of retail investors, the 
consequences of cognitive-based errors should be a concern for regulators, and 
comprehensive product-based regulation can be seen as a means for addressing these 
potential shortcomings.  In the case of non-retail investors, although they may potentially suffer 
from similar cognitive gaps or omissions as retail investors, they possess the ability and the 
means to appoint agents to assist them with these concerns.  As a result, the state can make a 
policy determination that such services do not need to be provided exclusively by the public 
purse.  While a retail investor’s potentially irrational choice should be mitigated by regulatory 
intervention within certain predetermined bounds, the non-retail investor can be left to pursue 
his or her irrationality to its foreseeable or unforeseeable ends, if the decision is taken not to 
retain knowledgeable and informed agents to correct such irrationalities.  The observations of 
behavioural finance can make important contributions to better preparing those sophisticated 
investors who choose to participate in private investment funds to understand their decision-
making processes, but they do not go so far as to eliminate from such investors any role in that 
process themselves.
The adoption of the Dodd-Frank amendments to the existing US financial regulatory regime 
represents an attempt by Congress to address some, but not all, of the concerns identified by 
critics of the policies that led to the 2007-09 financial crisis.  Among the elements of Dodd-
Frank is the requirement that substantially all managers of private funds are now required to 
register with the SEC as investment advisors.  Dodd-Frank largely ignored the issues of 
investors suitability specifically, or fund governance generally.
236
Given the significant increase in income and wealth since the original adoption of the 
accredited investor standard, the SEC has begun to slowly question the uniform ability of every 
member of this group to have the means to “fend for themselves.”
237
  Ultimately, as part of 
Dodd-Frank, the net worth test for individuals to qualify as accredited investors was amended 
to exclude a natural person’s primary resource from such calculations.
238
  Perhaps this small 
change is indicative of the speed and scale with which the SEC intends to act in this area.  The 
SEC is further mandated to periodically review the numeric threshold set for accredited 
investors, but has to date not published any significant guidance on how it intends to approach 
any revisions.
                                               
234
See, e.g., Guillermo Baquero and Marno Verbeek, “A Portrait of Hedge Fund Investors: Flows, Performance 
and Smart Money.” ERIM Report Series Research in Management (2005), available at www.erim.eur.nl.
235
See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, “Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to 
Psychology, Culture and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking,” 96 Cornell Law Review 1209 (2011); Donald C. 
Langevoort, “Theories, Assumptions and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited,” 140 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 851 (1992).
236
See Chapter 4 below.
237
As Smith observed, “[t]he Commission questioned the ability of this expanded class of accredited investors to 
understand the complexity and risk of privately offered pooled investment vehicles, including the lack of 
publicly available information about the investment, undisclosed conflicting interests, complex fee 
arrangements and higher risk structure.”  Ibid. at 271.
238
Dodd-Frank Section 413(a).
44
As noted above, this thesis will suggest instead that what such investors require is practical 
legal tools
239
by which they can secure adequate participation in the governance of the funds in 
which they participate.  Private fund investors have both the incentive and the means to look 
after their interests.  The private monitoring solutions proposed herein enable them to do so.  
The question of whether any objective, numerical standard to qualify as an accredited investor 
should be higher (and if so, by how much) is an interesting question, but not one directly 
relevant to the subject addressed herein.  Regardless of where the line is drawn, there will be 
a significant number of people just above, and just below, such line.  This is ultimately the 
function of the line.  Provided the line is not drawn at an arbitrarily high level to, in practice, 
prohibit any investors from qualifying, the mere acceptance of an objective threshold does not 
guarantee any certainty that a particular qualifying investor will have the particular skill and 
experience to invest in a particular fund.
The purpose of the private monitoring solutions proposed herein is to provide such qualifying 
investor the means by which to utilize the skills and experience they actually possess to 
influence the governance of the funds in which they invest to their maximum advantage.
2.6 UK Taxation of Private Investment Funds
As a result of various tax rules applicable to private investment funds, investors in many 
offshore private investment funds may be kept to relatively small percentage ownership.  Such 
dispersed ownership can impede oversight and accountability in such funds, increasing the 
governance challenge facing investors.  Further complicating matters is the prohibition on 
using partnerships for many trading strategies.
The primary advantage of using a UK limited partnership as a private investment fund is that it 
is treated as a tax transparent vehicle for both UK income and capital gains tax purposes.  In 
the case of income, the UK legislation provides that the partnership will not itself be treated as 
an entity separate and distinct from the persons who are partners, so that the income of the
partnership will be treated as income of the partners directly.
240
  Equally, in the case of capital 
gains, any partnership dealings will be treated as dealings by the partners themselves, who will 
be separately assessed on any gains.
241
  
For entities that are otherwise deemed to be companies for purposes of UK tax laws, a number 
of further issues arise that are particularly relevant with regards to offshore vehicles being used 
as private investment funds.
Generally, a non-UK incorporated company will not be subject to UK tax
242
unless the relevant 
company is either ‘managed and controlled’ in the UK or it carries on a trade in the UK through 
a ‘permanent establishment’.  Where a fund is established as an offshore company, it will be, 
therefore, essential that the vehicle be managed and controlled in such a way that it will be 
treated as neither resident in the UK for UK tax purposes nor as carrying on a trade in the UK 
through a permanent establishment.  Unfortunately, a direct effect of these rules is to distance 
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investors from the governance of these funds, thereby increasing the governance challenges 
presented (both literally and figuratively) by those structures.
In order not to be treated as resident in the UK, the affairs of an offshore company being used 
as a private investment fund must be conducted so that the central management and control of 
the fund is not exercised within the UK.  Central management and control involves the 
formulation of the key strategic policies and decisions, rather than the day-to-day operations of 
the company.  In a company, central management and control is typically vested with the 
board of directors;
243
however, it also needs to be established that under the company’s 
constitutional documents (e.g., the Articles of Association) central management and control 
rests with the directors, and that in practice the directors exercise that power and do so outside 
the UK.
Central management and control is normally exercised by the board of directors of the fund but 
it could in appropriate circumstances be exercised by any other person (e.g., the fund 
manager).  In identifying where the central management and control of a fund is exercised, the 
starting point is its board of directors.  Normally, the fund’s constitution will give the board the 
relevant powers and, in considering where the fund is taxable, the location of its board 
meetings is a good place to begin.   However, two further questions will be immediately 
relevant:
(a) does the board have any real discretion or is it only allowed to take decisions 
within narrow parameters set down by (for example) the promoters of the fund?
(b) is the board truly taking decisions when it meets?
The appointment of a fund manager does not contravene this principle provided that the duties 
delegated do not amount to ‘central management and control’.  The board must retain the 
overall responsibility for the setting and regular review of the fund’s investment policies and 
strategies, and for determining whether the fund should appoint new investment managers.
244
In addition, the ‘investment manager exemption’ ensures that provided certain conditions are 
met an offshore hedge fund managed from the UK will generally not be subject to tax in the UK 
on its profits other than in respect of tax deducted at source, such as withholding tax on UK 
source annual interest.
The general rule is that a non-resident person is subject to UK taxation on ‘trading’ profits that 
arise through an agent in the UK.  In the context of private investment funds, this means that in 
the absence of an exemption, the ‘trading’ profits of a hedge fund could be taxable due to the 
activities of the UK-based fund manager.  Non-trading funds (which includes funds-of-funds) 
are not subject to UK tax other than in respect of withholding taxes.
What constitutes ‘trading’ is a fact-driven question not benefiting from definitive statutory 
definition.  It is generally believed that frequent transactions, use of leverage and short-term 
motivations of a hedge fund would support a claim of ‘trading’.  Satisfying the investment 
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manager exemption ensures that the profits of the offshore fund remain outside UK taxation, 
with only the fee income of the fund manager generated by the trades falling within the UK tax 
net.
245
Broadly, the fund manager must deal with the fund on an arm’s length basis to be deemed 
independent. This requires that the fund is either widely held or does not account for more than 
70% of a UK manager’s business (for newly launched funds, this condition must be met within 
18 months of launch to enable managers to build new business).  The manager must not have 
a greater than 20% interest in the fund (measured over a five year period).  
Also, certain UK resident companies may also be subject to tax on the undistributed profits of 
non-UK resident companies which are ‘controlled’ by UK persons and persons connected with 
them.
246
  These provisions subject UK companies that are deemed to be interested in at least 
25 percent of the profits of a non-resident company to UK corporation tax in respect of 
undistributed profits of the fund, and in essence is an anti-deferral mechanism.
A fund will be categorized as a controlled foreign company where the fund is controlled by one 
or two shareholders each owning (together with any associated persons), broadly, at least 40 
percent of the shares in the fund, and where one shareholder is UK resident.  Persons who are 
treated as ‘associated’ with each other for these purposes includes two or more companies, 
one of which controls the other(s), or all of which are under common control.
Finally, unlike the offshore funds rules and controlled foreign companies regimes, Section 13 
of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act (TCGA) counters the avoidance of capital gains tax 
charges by shareholders of closely held non-UK resident companies.  If at any time when a 
capital gain accrues to an offshore company (such as on a disposal of any of its investments), 
the company is itself controlled by a sufficiently small number of persons so as to render the 
offshore company a body corporate that would, were it to have been resident in the UK for 
taxation purposes, be a ‘close’ company for those purposes,
247
then the provisions of 
Section 13 could subject to a UK resident shareholder to tax at the time the gain arises in the 
offshore company.  If Section 13 applies, the UK resident shareholder is treated for the 
purposes of UK taxation as if a part of any chargeable gain accruing to the company had 
accrued to that shareholder directly.  However a Section 13 tax charge is only imposed on UK 
resident shareholders owing at least 10 per cent
248
of the share capital of the offshore fund.
As a result, the net effect of UK tax rules is to promote a dispersal of ownership by limiting high 
levels of ownership concentration in the hands of one or more fund participants.  Although the 
marketing restrictions applicable to private investments funds operate to ensure that retail 
investors are excluded from these funds, and therefore the non-retail investors should have 
access to the expertise and knowledge to adequate review and negotiate, if necessary, the
fund documentation, the tax rules operate to prevent either a small number of large investors 
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or a single control investor, who might be able to exert exceptional influence on the fund 
manager.
2.7 US Taxation of Private Investment Funds
As in the UK, the implication of the US tax rules designed to limit tax avoidance also require 
investors in many offshore private investment funds to have relatively small percentage of 
ownership in funds.  Again, such dispersed ownership can impede oversight and accountability 
in such funds, increasing the governance challenge facing investors.
249
An organization, whether or not organized under US law, that is classified as a partnership for 
US federal income tax purposes is not subject to federal income tax itself, although it must file 
an annual information return with the US taxing authorities if it has certain US-source income 
and/or US partners.
250
  Each US limited partner
251
will be required to take into account in 
computing his federal income tax liability his distributive share of a partnership’s income, gains, 
losses, deductions, credits, and tax preference items for any taxable year of the partnership 
ending with or within the taxable year of such limited partner without regard to whether he has 
received or will receive a cash distribution from the partnership.  Each item generally will have 
the same character and source (either US or foreign), as though the limited partner realized 
the item directly.  
Income recognized by limited partner that is a tax-exempt entity is exempt from US federal 
income tax except to the extent of the entity’s ‘unrelated business taxable income’ (UBTI).  
UBTI generally does not include dividends, interest, and gains from the sale of property that is 
neither inventory nor held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.
252
   The 
general partner will frequently undertake to use reasonable efforts to conduct the affairs of a 
partnership (including the structuring of any borrowings, guarantees, and undertaking) so as to 
minimize the amount of UBTI incurred by a tax-exempt investor.  Typically, UBTI is ‘blocked’
by the interposition of a corporate entity between the US tax-exempt investor and the 
partnership, thereby transforming UBTI into dividend income.  The interposition of a blocker 
entity between the fund and the tax-exempt entity, however, further distances the tax-exempt 
investor from the governance of these funds, thereby increasing the governance challenges 
presented by these structures.
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A tax-exempt entity deriving gross income characterised as UBTI that exceeds US$1,000 in any taxable year 
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US Treasury regulations provide a largely elective regime for determining whether a business 
entity will be taxed as a partnership or as an association taxable as a corporation.  Under this 
regime, certain business entities are treated as per se corporations for federal tax purposes 
and may not elect to be taxed as partnerships.  All other business entities generally may 
choose their classification by filing a ‘check the box’ election with the IRS.  Non-US entities that 
are eligible to elect their status and which have at least two members, at least one of which is 
personally liable for the debts of and claims against the entity, are generally classified as 
partnerships by default, without having to make an affirmative election.
If a US person owns at least 10 percent of the voting stock of a non-US corporation, the US 
person may be considered a ‘US Shareholder’ with respect thereto.  If US Shareholders in the 
aggregate own more than 50 percent of the voting power or value of the stock of such 
corporation, the non-US corporation would be classified as a ‘controlled foreign corporation’ (a 
CFC).  A number of complex attribution rules apply for purposes of determining ownership of 
stock in a non-US corporation for purposes of the CFC rules. 
If the corporation qualified as a CFC for an uninterrupted period of 30 days or more during the 
taxable year, the US Shareholders of the CFC would generally be subject to current US tax on 
certain types of income of the foreign corporation (e.g., dividends, interest, certain rents and 
royalties, gain from the sale of property producing such income, certain income from sales and 
services) and, in certain circumstances, on earnings of the CFC that are invested in US 
property, regardless of whether they are in receipt of cash distributions from the CFC.  In 
addition, gain on the sale of the CFC’s stock by a US Shareholder (during the period that the 
corporation is a CFC and thereafter for a five-year period) would be classified in whole or in 
part as a division.
US tax law also contains special provisions dealing with ‘passive foreign investment 
companies’ (PFICs).  A PFIC is defined as any foreign corporation if either:
(a) 75 percent or more of its gross income for a taxable year is ‘passive income’; or
(b) 50 percent or more of its assets in any taxable year produce or are held for the 
production of ‘passive income’.
253
The PFIC provisions of the Code impose potentially punitive income tax treatment (an interest 
charge and re-characterization of net capital gains as ordinary income) on gains from the sale 
of, and on certain distributions with respect to, the shares of a PFIC owned directly or indirectly 
by a US taxpayer. There are no minimum stock ownership requirements for PFICs that must 
be met by a US shareholder in order to be subject to these rules.
Once a corporation qualifies as a PFIC it is, subject to certain exceptions, always treated as a 
PFIC, regardless of whether it satisfies either of the qualification tests in subsequent years.  
Any gain on disposition of stock of the PFIC as well as income realized on certain ‘excess 
distributions’ by the PFIC, would be treated as though realized by the shareholder rateably 
over his holding period in such stock.  In addition to the tax on such gain or income as ordinary 
income, an interest charge would be imposed on the US person on the tax deferred from prior 
years in which the corporation was a PFIC. 
A US person may elect under the Code to treat the PFIC as a ‘qualified electing fund’ (a QEF 
election).  In lieu of the foregoing treatment, such person would be required to include in 
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income each year a portion of the ordinary earnings and net capital gains of the PFIC, even if 
not distributed.  In order to make such election a US person would, among other things, be 
required to supply the IRS with an annual information statement provided by the PFIC.   
Alternatively, an election may be made in the case of certain ‘marketable stock’ to ‘mark to 
market’ the stock of a PFIC on an annual basis.  Pursuant to such an election a US person 
would include in each year as ordinary income the excess, if any, of the fair market value of 
such stock over its adjusted basis at the end of the taxable year, and could deduct the excess, 
if any, of its adjusted basis for the stock over its fair market value, but only to the extent of any 
net mark-to-market gain included in income in prior years.  
As noted above, tax rules such as these that prohibit either small numbers of large investors or 
a single control investor from taking a position in a private investment fund establishes a 
functional limit on the potential effectiveness of negotiations with the fund manager.
2.8 Conclusions
When prospective investors are contemplating an investment in a particular fund, their analysis 
will primarily (if not exclusively) focus on the talent and abilities of the fund manager.  The 
assembled wisdom and experience of other fund participants will be an overwhelmingly 
secondary concern, if it is even expressly considered at all.  Similarly, each investor will expect 
only limited circumstances where management of the fund can be materially changed by 
action of the other investors.  Instead of control, the governance issues that arise in private 
funds are focused around the need for the fund manager to be held accountable to fund 
participants as they exercise their broad discriminatory authority.
254
  
The legal vehicles which predominantly serve as private investment funds - i.e., limited 
partnerships and offshore companies - have established their prime position not due to any 
inherent advantage or benefits to be found in their internal governance structures.  In general, 
both the limited partnership and the offshore company offer tremendous flexibility for fund 
managers to significantly limit the influence and oversight of participants, while facilitating the 
ability of managers to exercise control.  Accountability can be significantly curtailed by fund 
documentation that provides only limited options to concerned investors.  
The typical choice between either doing nothing or attempting to suspend the manager or 
terminate the fund is often too stark to address any situation other than the most dire and 
catastrophic.  Simple problems can often be better solved by simple solutions than with 
extreme solutions.  Where investors have recourse only to extreme solutions, fund managers 
may feel immune to investor sentiment when making important decisions for the fund. 
The tension between the two principal regulatory forces - i.e., tax rules designed to protect tax 
receipts by prohibiting structures that avoid taxes payable, and marketing rules that seek to 
ensure the wider retail markets are protected from investment vehicles not fully vetted by 
regulators - neither addresses nor promotes solutions to the governance challenge. However, 
this tension is indicative of the conflicting drivers that operate to fashion private investment
funds within the vacant spaces created by various legal and regulatory regimes, whether 
onshore or offshore.
As a result, investors will have to fall back on the effectiveness of the legal and regulatory 
duties to which the fund manager is subject to protect their position.  The next chapter will 
therefore identify, analyze and critique the duties as they arise in the principal jurisdictions 
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where fund managers are located:  the US and England and Wales.  If they are inadequate to 
provide for effective governance of private funds, we will then have to look elsewhere to 
supplement them.
51
Chapter 3
Adequacy of Financial Regulation and Private Law to Address the Governance 
Challenge
3.1 Introduction
As we saw in the previous chapter, the legal structure of private investment funds, and the 
interests and rights of investors, are driven by the need to navigate tax and marketing 
restrictions.  The combined impact of these requirements creates a fundamental tension: 
although investment funds can be marketed to sophisticated or professional investors, the 
implications of the legal vehicles used and the relevant tax laws are such that investors can be 
impaired in exercising the very expertise and experience on which the marketing rules and 
client classifications are based.  
As a result, a central plank of investor protection is the duties imposed on the fund managers 
by regulatory rules and common law.  A fund manager is appointed by one or more fund 
vehicles to determine the fund’s investment strategy for the benefit of numerous fund 
participants.  However, in recent years, reports of frauds and other malfeasances by fund 
managers have become increasingly common, prompting serious questions as to the 
adequacy of the applicable rules and duties, and of their enforcement, either through private 
law or through regulatory enforcement.  
Regardless of the regulatory status of such funds, their investment managers will often be 
regulated under the applicable financial services regime
255
in the country in which they 
operate.  In addition, such managers have to date typically operated from common law 
jurisdictions which impose on them fiduciary and other duties to the investors in their funds 
under the general law as a result of the discretion that exists in the relationship.  In the 
absence of substantive product-level regulation,
256
the role of such regulatory and common law
duties in securing investor protection is of primary importance.  
In this chapter, I will analyze the adequacy of financial services regulation to address the 
governance challenge, by contrasting the product-level regulation of public investment funds 
with the approach taken by each of the SEC and the FSA.  Next, I will critique the adequacy of 
the private law to address the governance challenge, including discussions of the duty of care, 
fiduciary duty and contract law.
3.2 The Madoff Debacle
The US has been a rich source of case studies for governance failures in private investment 
funds.  Although hedge funds and private equity funds are not registered under the Investment 
Company Act, they and their advisers (regardless of whether the advisers are registered under 
the Investment Advisers Act) are subject to the antifraud provisions of the US federal securities 
laws.  In recent years, the SEC has instituted a significant number of actions alleging fraud in 
relation to private investment funds (especially hedge funds), with no indication that the 
numbers will decline.  Given the structural similarities between hedge funds and other types of 
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private investment funds, such as private equity funds and venture capital funds, an analysis of 
investor protection failures in hedge funds can provide insights of more general application.   
As noted above, the Madoff affair provides a useful meter stick against which these concerns 
about the governance challenge in private investment funds - e.g., lack of adequate 
information about the nature and operation of the fund’s activities and an inability to effect 
change in those activities going forward (either directly or indirectly through duly appointed 
agents) - can be analyzed and improved.  The Madoff affair is instructive because its scale and 
its scope provide ample examples of alleged failures in reporting, oversight and governance 
mechanisms which investors could encounter in connection with any participation in such 
vehicles, whether hedge funds, private equity funds, real estate opportunities funds or other 
more esoteric investment pools.
On 11 December 2008,  the SEC filed an emergency action in the Southern District of New 
York to halt the ongoing fraudulent activities of Bernard L. Madoff and his firm, Bernard L. 
Madoff Investment Securities (BMIS).
257
  The SEC’s complaint alleged that Madoff informed 
two senior employees that his investment advisory business was a fraud and that he had for 
some time been paying returns to certain investors with principal received from other investors, 
estimating his losses to be at least $50 billion.  The complaint charged Madoff and his firm with 
violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act and the 
Investment Advisers Act.  In the words of Andrew M. Calamari, Associate Director of 
Enforcement in the SEC’s New York Regional Office, “Our complaint alleges a stunning fraud 
that appears to be of epic proportions”. 
258
Liability and recovery in a private investment fund is primarily viewed as between fund 
manager and the participants in the fund.  However, fund participants who benefited from 
fraudulent activity and are able to withdraw monies from the fund before the fraud was 
detected can also be liable to return some or all of their gains, even in the absence of any 
knowledge of, or a role in, the fraudulent activity.
259
  As the Madoff affair unfolded, the issues 
of whether “winners” should be required to give up their gains to “losers” was clearly on the 
table.
260
  Importantly, not all victims of fraud, either generally or specifically in the context of 
private investment funds, necessarily suffer losses equally. 
The Madoff affair has also demonstrated that many investors who ended up exposed to 
Madoff, whether with their knowledge or without, by way of various feeder funds or funds-of-
funds, believed that in exchange for the fees they were paying their intermediary fund 
manager, they were receiving from these agents a service, provided by a competent 
professional in fulfilment of the fund managers various legal and equitable duties.  In hindsight, 
this appears not to be the case.  
Conflicts of interest
261
abound in these relationships, as well.  In one example that came to 
light as a result of the Madoff scandal, a Swiss private bank acted as investment manager, 
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custodian and leverage provider to one of the largest feeder funds into the Madoff scheme, 
earning separate fees for each service, while allegedly failing to conduct vigorous independent 
due diligence and instead relied on  Madoff’s reputation on Wall Street and his status as a 
registered firm with the SEC.
262
  Importantly, many potential investors approached in 
connection with possibly investing in the Madoff scheme declined to participate in his scheme, 
when due diligence requests and follow-up questions were not satisfactorily answered.
263
  The 
failure of the SEC to act upon clear and detailed information it was presented in connection 
with Madoff raises material concerns about any presumptions that financial regulators are 
better placed than investors in private investment funds to monitor the activities of fund 
managers. 
In recent months, “increased regulation” has once again become a common battle cry for 
financial market reformers who wish to prevent rampant fraud on private fund investors.
264
  
However, a closer inspection of the SEC’s repeated failures during the Madoff affair make for 
discouraging reading.  In a statement issued on 16 December 2008, the SEC admitted that it 
had missed repeated opportunities to uncover the Madoff Ponzi scheme.  SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox stated:
Our initial findings have been deeply troubling.  The Commission has learned that 
credible and specific allegations regarding Mr. Madoff’s financial wrongdoing, going 
back to at least 1999, were repeatedly brought to the attention of the SEC staff, but 
were never recommended to the Commission for action.  I am gravely concerned by 
the apparent multiple failures over at least a decade to thoroughly investigate these 
allegations or at any point to seek formal authority to pursue them.
265
As a result of these perceived failings, Chairman Cox authorized a full and immediate review of 
the past allegations regarding Madoff, including the internal policies at the SEC during this time 
and all staff contact and relationships with the Madoff family.
266
    
Some of the potential oversights by the SEC are particularly notable.  For example, Madoff’s 
firm appeared to possess far fewer assets than the $17 billion he publicly claimed to be 
managing.
267
  Also, it appears to be impossible in practice for the sums of money involved here 
to actually be invested pursuant to his claimed investment strategies because the underlying 
market for such investments was insufficient to handle the necessary trades.
268
These admissions demonstrate the natural incompleteness of financial regulation as the sole 
means to address the governance challenge in private investment funds.
269
  Madoff was well 
known to the SEC, and his brokerage firm and investment advisory firm were registered with 
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the SEC and subject to their oversight.  The SEC had been informed over the past decade of 
concerns and allegations involving Madoff.  He was a known quantity to the SEC and yet the 
SEC failed to uncover that he was engaged in one of the most basic of investor frauds – the 
classic Ponzi scheme.  
The global casualty list from the Madoff affair is also informative.  With victims as far afield 
from New York and Palm Beach as London, Geneva, Dubai and Hong Kong,
270
the ability of 
one national financial regulator to adequately monitor the interwoven web of vehicles, bank 
accounts and agreements is questionable.  
The parties with the most direct interest in seeing that the behaviour of the fund manager is 
adequately monitored are the investors themselves.  Properly equipped, these investors could 
play an important role in a decentralised regulatory regime by assisting the top-down 
command-and-control financial regulator achieve their regulatory goals.
271
  Providing them
effective means for overcoming the governance challenge in private investment funds   first, 
by ensuring that the fund manager provides participants with timely, complete and accurate 
information on the status of the fund, and second, by giving participants the means, either 
directly themselves or indirectly through their appointed agents  (e.g., directors, general 
partners), to initiate changes to the operation and course of action of the fund - will enable 
them to better protect their rights and help avoid outcomes similar to the Madoff affair.  
3.3 Adequacy of Financial Services Regulation to Address the Governance 
Challenge
As explained in Chapter 1, the governance challenge in private investment funds exists on the 
boundary between a fund participant’s rights and a fund manager’s obligation.  As that line 
necessarily traverses through the internal documentation and operation of the fund vehicles,
272
financial regulators must approach their targets with a focus on how to best support the 
negotiating position of potential investors in obtaining the governance rights they may believe 
necessary without fatally undermining the core economic proposition that is being offered by 
the fund manager.  Even where the funds they manage are unregulated, investment managers 
of private investment funds that are authorized or regulated as investment advisors or 
managers can owe regulatory duties arising under the financial services regimes of FSMA and 
EU legislation in the UK, including the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), and 
the Investment Advisers Act in the US.
In the case of public investment funds, comprehensive product-level regulations have been 
adopted (i.e., public monitoring solutions) to ensure that risks associated with conflicts of 
interest, lack of transparency and mismanagement, as well as portfolio risk, are adequately 
addressed.  In the case of private investment funds, the participants are expected to rely on 
their own ability to negotiate adequate levels of protection to address those risks.  As a 
consequence of limiting the extent to which private funds may be marketed and establishing 
particular status and/or size requirement in participants (e.g., sophisticated investors), the 
presumption of the regulator is that such investors have adequate negotiating leverage to 
address any governance concerns that they may have.
273
  The reach of regulators in the area 
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of private investment funds, therefore, is limited and, more importantly, indirect.  Regulators 
must typically make do with the powers they are able to exercise at the level of the authorized 
fund manager.
Through both rules and regulations of direct application to fund managers and the indirect 
influence that can be exerted on regulated firms through the adoption and promotion of “best 
practices” on a voluntary basis,
274
financial regulators can significantly impact the day-to-day 
environment in which private investment funds operate.  However, such influences can be 
exercised by such regulators only within the natural limitations that exist due to limited 
resources and competing agendas and needs across the financial landscape.  
3.4 Public Investment Funds
Many retail investors participate in the financial markets by way of public investment funds, 
known as “mutual funds” or “collective investment schemes”
275
, which are registered with the 
national financial regulator and subject to detailed requirements on what they can do with 
investors’ money.
276
  They make take the legal form of unit trusts, companies, or limited 
partnerships.  Public investment funds have traditionally been subject to intensive regulation, 
due to the participation in these funds of unsophisticated retail investors.  As one commentator 
has observed:
It has long been recognized that collective-investment schemes 
should be regulated in the interests of investor protection, 
particularly as collective-investment schemes are often directed 
at unsophisticated and inexperienced investors who do not 
exercise control over the investments made by the scheme or the 
scheme assets:  the regulation of those who control large pools 
of liquid capital is usually irresistible to regulators fearful of 
abuse.
277
As a result of these concerns, elaborate product-level requirements have been imposed on 
retail funds in many countries, including the UK and the US.  Both retail and non-retail 
investors have access to publically regulated investment funds, such as mutual funds or 
UCITS,
278
if they so wish.  Only non-retail investors may elect to participate in private 
investment funds, and should they decide to do so, such investment must be made in the 
knowledge that the financial regulator has not taken on responsibility, or allocated any 
resources, to ensure that such funds are what they purport to be.
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As opposed to the product regulations which are mandated for funds in which retails investors 
may participate,
279
non-retail investors must research and negotiate fund terms, and ultimately 
decide on their participation (if at all), themselves.
Common to both types of funds, however, are issues of disclosure and the utility of disclosure 
as a regulatory tool.  As one commentator observed:
Disclosure interferes only to a limited extent with the autonomy of 
the investment firm and the investors.  It can empower investors 
to achieve their investment objectives and support regulatory 
efficiencies by accommodating asymmetric investor ability.
280
While much of securities regulation generally, and the indirect regulation of private investment 
funds specifically, has tended to be based in large part on disclosure requirements, in the case 
of public investment funds, regulators have preferred interventionist asset allocation rules, 
which explicitly constrain what these funds can do.
281
  Traditionally, financial regulators were 
reluctant to apply detailed, invasive regulation on private investment funds,
282
although by 
2010, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, both the US and the EU generally moved 
towards an incremental increase in the regulation of private fund managers although did not go 
so far as to impose product-level restrictions on the funds themselves.
Important distinctions exist between public funds and private funds, including in their 
management and governance structure.  As one commentator observed, when comparing 
mutual funds
283
to hedge funds:  
Unlike mutual funds, which must comply with detailed 
requirements for independent boards of directors, and whose 
shareholders must explicitly approve certain actions, domestic 
hedge funds are usually structured as limited partnerships to 
achieve maximum separation of ownership and management.
284
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Until recently, claims have been made that hedge funds had adequately addressed potential 
conflicts of interest without such intrusive devices.
285
  However, it is unlikely that such 
assertions would be accepted on its face in the years following the 2007-09 financial crisis.
3.5 FSA Regulation
In connection with private investment funds, the FSMA addresses two principal regulated 
activities:
(a) management of an investment portfolio with discretion; and
(b) establishing and operating a CIS.
Under the FSA rules, the ‘operator’ of a CIS is the person responsible for the management of 
the property held for or within the scheme.  Establishing, operating or winding up a CIS is a 
regulated activity under the Act, and any person wishing to act as an operator must be 
authorized by the FSA.  In the case of a Partnership PIF, the usual structure would be for the 
general partner (which is usually no more than a shelf company in view of its potential liabilities 
as a general partner) to appoint an appropriate FSA regulated person to be the manager of the 
partnership.  
A CIS includes any arrangement with respect to property whose purpose or effect is to enable 
persons taking part in the arrangements to participate in the profits or income arising from the 
acquisition, holding, management, or disposal of the property.
286
  The arrangements must be 
such that participants do not have day-to-day control over the management of the property,
287
whether or not they have the right to be consulted or give directions.  Such arrangements must 
have either or both of the following characteristics:
(a) the contributions of the participants and the profits or income out of which 
payments are to be made to them are pooled; or
(b) the property is managed as a whole by or on behalf of the operator of the 
scheme.
The limitation on the participants’ day-to-day control
288
over the property gives rise to the 
concept of management by another person.  
Unless considerable effort is exerted otherwise, private investment funds will typically fall 
within the definition of unregulated CIS.  For example, limited partnerships formed for 
investment purposes (such as most private equity funds and many real estate funds) will 
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generally constitute a CIS under Section 235 of the FSMA, when it is operated by way of 
business, as the limited partners cannot have day-to-day control of the management of the 
partnership property without losing their limited liability.
289
  The nature and/or location of the 
property held by the limited partnership is not relevant to this analysis.  
A fund manager will generally need authorization from the FSA if it carries on regulated 
activities in or from the UK.
290
  As most clients of private fund managers will be classed as 
professional clients or eligible counterparties, COBs regulation of their activities is generally 
light.  Importantly, the fund is generally the customer of the manager/operator, rather than the 
investors in the fund.
291
  Under COBs 18.5.3R (2), references to a ‘customer’ are construed as 
references to any scheme in respect of which the operator acts or intends to act and which 
benefits from the operator’s activity.  Therefore, the customer of the manager is the limited 
partnership itself, for example, and not each partner of the limited partnership.  
However, under COBs 18.5.3R (2), when the manager is required to provide information to, or 
obtain consent from, a customer, the manager must ensure that the information is provided to, 
or consent obtained from, the partners in the limited partnership.  This requirement applies 
only to unregulated CISs and is usually dealt with by inserting a reference to the relevant 
matter in the limited partnership agreement.
Where the manager or general partner appoints a specialist investment adviser, the 
investment adviser will be acting as an agent for the limited partners, who may each become 
clients of the investment adviser, as the definition of ‘client’ includes indirect clients.  However, 
COBs 2.4.3R permits the investment adviser to treat the manager as its client if it reasonably 
believes that the manager is an authorized person in respect of the investment services 
provided.  
The fund manager must determine into which category of client a private investment fund falls, 
as this is a requirement under the FSA Rules, and is necessary to establish the extent of the 
duties owed to the client under the FSA Rules.  Retail clients are given the most regulatory 
protection and eligible counterparties the least.  If a private investment fund can be treated as 
an professional client, or if it elects to be treated as such under FSA rules, some of the rules 
can be either modified or excluded altogether.
292
  
In particular, treatment as a professional client would lead to fewer protections under the FSA
regime than would be due to a retail client.  For example, a professional client will receive 
fewer informational disclosures from the fund manager.  In addition, where the fund manager 
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In order to be treated as an professional client the private investment fund must be either:
(a) an unregulated CIS; 
(b) a vehicle which meets the large undertaking requirement in COBs 3.5.2R; or
(c) a retail client, classified as a professional client by the manager in accordance with COBs 3.5.3R.
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determines that a product or service is appropriate for a professional client, the fund manager 
can assume that such client has the necessary knowledge and experience to understand and 
evaluate the risks involved in such product or services.  Also, a professional client is not 
entitled to compensation under the Financial Services Compensation Scheme.
293
Clearly, the distinctions between professional clients and retail clients are material ones and an 
important component of financial regulation in the UK, as harmonized by MiFiD.  In addition, 
where the line is drawn between who is a retail investor and who is not a retail investor is a 
matter of public debate.  However, where such line should be drawn is not within the scope of 
this thesis.  This thesis presumes that such a line will continue to be drawn, as these have 
been no credible proposals for the “retailization” of the entire investment community regardless 
of size or experience or sophistication.  As such, a significant number of potential investors will 
be categorized as non-retail, exempted from certain mandated protections and consequently 
permitted to invest in private investment funds.  Therefore, the private monitoring solutions 
advocated for herein establish tools and constructs for such investors to adequately protect 
themselves in the absence of direct government regulation of these funds.  The practical 
importance of these solutions exists independent of the size of the pool of non-retail investors 
who may invest in these funds, and would not be impaired or comprised should such pool be 
contracted by 10% (or by 50%) due to the raising of the definitional bar.
In sum, while the private investment fund itself sits outside the reach of the FSA, a fund 
manager will be an authorized firm that must comply with applicable UK and European law.  
However, the manner in which a fund is structured and documented, and the potential 
recourse that fund participants would have against a fund manager for wrongdoing, would be 
dependent on other legal avenues.  Although the minimum behavioural standard established 
for fund managers by financial regulation is a necessary component of investor protection, it is 
not sufficient in itself to address all investor protection concerns, including the governance 
challenge.  
3.6 SEC Regulation
The SEC regulates investment advisers and managers primarily under the Investment 
Advisers Act and the rules adopted under that statute.
294
  The Investment Advisers Act is 
intended to protect investors whose assets are managed by investment advisers either directly 
in regards to their own individual portfolio, or indirectly in connection with pooled vehicles.
295
  In 
response to the 2007-09 financial crisis, the US Congress adopted the Dodd-Frank 
amendments to the financial regulatory regime.  These changes are discussed in Chapter 4 
below.
One of the central elements of the US regulatory programme is the requirement that a person 
or firm meeting the definition of ‘investment adviser’ under the Investment Advisers Act register 
with the SEC, unless exempt from registration.  A person or firm is generally required to 
register with the SEC if he or it is:
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(a) an ‘investment adviser’ under Section 202(a)(11)
296
of the Investment Advisers 
Act; and
(b) not otherwise exempt from SEC registration.
297
A person or firm must satisfy all three elements to be regulated under the Investment Advisers 
Act.
298
Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act prohibits misstatements or misleading omissions of 
material facts and other fraudulent acts and practices in connection with the conduct of an 
investment advisory business.
299
  As a fiduciary, an investment adviser owes its clients 
undivided loyalty, and may not engage in activity that conflicts with a client’s interest without 
the client’s consent.
300
  Section 206 applies to all firms and persons meeting the Investment 
Advisers Act’s definition of investment adviser, whether registered with the SEC, a state 
securities authority, or not at all.  As commentators have noted:
The antifraud provisions of Section 206 have served for more 
than forty years as the basis for seemingly countless actions 
against investment advisors.  Lurking behind the use of 
provisions in this way is their breadth and the relative ease with 
which the SEC can prove that an investment adviser has violated 
them.
301
In addition to the general anti-fraud prohibition of Section 206, specifications under the 
Investment Advisers Act regulate, respectively:  investment adviser advertising;
302
custody or 
possession of client funds or securities;
303
the payment of fees by advisers to third parties for 
client referrals;
304
and disclosure of investment advisers’ financial and disciplinary 
backgrounds.
305
Rule 204-3 under the Investment Advisers Act, commonly referred to as the ‘brochure rule’, 
generally requires every SEC-registered investment adviser to deliver to each prospective 
advisory client a written disclosure statement, or ‘brochure’, describing the adviser’s business 
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practices and educational and business background.  The information required by the brochure 
rule is included as Part II of Form ADV, the registration form for investment advisers.
306
  
In reaction to the increased perception of fraud and malfeasance in hedge funds, on 11 July 
2007, the SEC adopted the new anti-fraud Rule 206(4)-8, that prohibits advisers to investment 
companies and other pooled investment vehicles from (i) making false or misleading 
statements to investors in those pools, or (ii) otherwise defrauding them.  The SEC enforces
the rule through administrative and civil actions against advisers under Section 206(4) of the 
Investment Advisers Act.  There would be no private cause of action against an adviser under 
the rule. 
Any investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle is covered by the rule, including 
advisers that are not registered or required to be registered under the Investment Advisers Act.  
The rule does not distinguish among types of pooled investment vehicles and is designed to 
protect investors both in investment companies and in pools that are excluded from the 1940 
Act definition of investment company under Section 3(a) by reason of either Section 3(c)(1) or 
3(c)(7) of the 1940 Act.
307
The wording of the rule, which is similar to that in many other US antifraud laws and rules,
prohibits false or misleading statements of material facts by investment advisers.  Unlike 
rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act and other rules that focus on securities transactions, 
however, rule 206(4)-8 is not limited to fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of a 
security.  Accordingly, rule 206(4)-8(a)(1) prohibits advisers to pooled investment vehicles from 
making any materially false or misleading statements to investors in the pool regardless of 
whether the pool is offering, selling, or redeeming securities.
308
Fund participants have certain avenues of direct recourse under the regulatory regime against 
fund managers for malfeasance on an “after-the-fact” basis.  Similar to the position in the UK 
discussed above, the SEC rules and regulations establish a minimum behavioural standard for 
fund managers, but does not go so far as to mandate structural or governance parameters for 
private investment funds.  
3.7 Effectiveness of Regulatory Enforcement Actions 
While the FSA to date has limited its enforcement activities involving private funds to isolated 
cases of market abuse and insider trading,
309
the SEC’s primary mission is to protect investors 
and the integrity of US financial markets through the enforcement of the federal securities 
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laws.
310
  Although private investment funds are not subject to the detailed, prescriptive 
requirements (and fiduciary safeguards) of retail mutual funds, they remain subject to the anti-
fraud provision of the federal securities laws, which include Section 10(5) of the Exchange Act 
and Rule 10(b)-5 thereunder, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, and Sections 206(1) and 
206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act and Rule 206(4)-8 thereunder.
311
In recent years the SEC has instituted a significant number of enforcement actions against 
hedge funds.
312
  The fraud charged against fund managers has been similar to the types of 
fraud charged against other types of investment advisers.
313
  The majority of the cases 
instituted by the SEC have involved charges under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and 
the Investment Advisers Act.
314
   
The SEC’s focus has historically been on protecting investors and those aspects of private 
investment funds which raise investor protection issues.
315
  Recent enforcement actions 
brought by the SEC have focussed on materially false or misleading statements regarding 
investment strategies the fund will pursue, the experience and credentials of the fund 
manager,
316
the risks associated with an investment in the fund, the performance of the funds 
advised by the fund manager,
317
the valuation of the fund, and practices the fund manager 
follows in the operation of its investment business, such as how the fund manager allocates 
investment opportunities.   
Although many private investments funds fail because they make poor investment decisions, a 
number of funds fall victim to intentional fraud committed by individuals associated with the 
fund manager, which may have started from the launch of the fund or may have begun later in 
an attempt to earn back or hide significant losses.  Often the frauds operate as “Ponzi 
schemes” 
318
in which further money is taken in from current or new investors which can be 
used to create the appearance of success and profitability.  
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An important characteristic in many cases is the great extent the violators go to conceal their 
fraud.  Fund managers may create false documentation in an effort to hide their fraud, 
including account statements and other reports to customers.  To the extent that fund investors 
are able to oversee more fully the activities of the fund manager, the possible scope for such 
concealment can decrease.  
The current financial turmoil unleashed by the current “credit crunch” and subsequent period of 
economic distress has served to increase and accelerate SEC enforcement action against 
hedge funds and other private investment funds.  These cases demonstrate a recurring pattern 
of fund managers engaging in fraudulent activities without adequate oversight by the fund 
investors.  Many recent claims involve misrepresentations by fund managers as to 
performance of their fund.
319
  In other cases, fund managers engaged in trading that was 
different from, and often riskier than, what had been disclosed to fund participants.
320
  In some 
instances, however, the cases involved nothing more complex than simple fraud and theft.
321
  
A common theme in a number of these enforcement actions has been false reporting and 
manipulated valuations.
322
  
One could argue that regulators can address some of the governance concerns identified 
above by regularly conducting a small number of very well publicized enforcement actions in 
order to address the more serious malfeasances that could result from governance failure, 
under the exceptional broad scope of either Section 206
323
or Rule 206(4)-8.
324
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However, there are significant limitations to “rulemaking” by enforcement actions.  Since the 
cases typically involve outlandish or egregious conduct, the remedies dispensed may be more 
onerous and inflexible then in cases of less extreme conduct.
325
  Also, since each enforcement 
action is tied to a very particular set of facts, any “rules” that are produced will often be 
incomplete or difficult to apply in other circumstances.
326
Moreover, where the decisions are 
made by regulators rather than courts, they can be of limited precedential value as regulators 
are not bound by the strict rules of precedent which apply to courts in common law jurisdictions 
in making their decisions.
3.8 Adequacy of the Private Law to Address the Governance Challenge
Underlying the financial regulatory system described above, which has become the primary 
focus of attention when debating what to do about problems which have arisen in the financial 
services industry, is a much older system of private law that addresses many aspects of the 
relationship between an investment manager and its clients.  Prior to the development of a 
more comprehensive system of financial services regulation, the private law provided the 
primary basis for resolving disputes when they arose.  The increased use of intermediary 
vehicles as private investment funds, however, has meant that in many circumstances these 
potential remedies have ceased to be sufficient to address the governance challenge. 
Investment managers owe legal duties to their clients arising under contract, tort, and as 
fiduciary duty from the provision of investment management services, subject to contractual 
limitations thereto.  Where the client is a private investment fund, participants in that vehicle 
must rely on the governance mechanisms therein in order for redress to be sought against a 
fund manager who has breached such duties.  Private law remedies which might be adequate 
in a bilateral relationship between a single client and a directly appointed investment manager 
pursuant to a negotiated agreement between the parties can be undermined by the complexity 
of the fund structure adopted by the fund manager, as well as the key fund documentation.  
The investment manager possesses discretion for day-to-day investment activity, portfolio 
construction, and risk management/control of the fund.  The nature of the relationship between 
a fund and its investment manager can be seen as analogous in many key respects to that of 
professional advisors, such as lawyers and accountants, where an element of trust and 
dependence sits at the core of the interactions.  Concepts of agency law frame this discourse, 
especially in the context of the broad discretion frequently exercised by the investment 
manager.
A sample of potential private law causes of action available to disgruntled investor in private 
investment funds can be seen in the various lawsuits emerging from the Madoff affair.
327
  For 
example, on 19 December, 2008, a class action lawsuit was filed in New York State Supreme 
Court in Manhattan against the funds-of-funds firm Fairfield Greenwich Group, one of the 
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largest investors in the Madoff scheme.
328
  The complainant alleged that the various 
defendants breached fiduciary duties owed to the plaintiffs and committed negligence in 
connection with their management of the plaintiff’s investments.  In connection with the 
fiduciary duties claims, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to act with loyalty and in 
good faith towards the plaintiffs, failed to take reasonable steps to oversee and preserve the 
plaintiff’s investments, failed to perform necessary due diligence and maintain oversight and 
transparency for investments, and failed to exercise generally the required degree of 
prudence, caution and good business practices.  In connection with the negligence claim, the 
plaintiff alleged similar failures amounting to a breach of the duty of care they were owed by 
the defendant in tort.  
Notably, litigation involving investment managers has been surprisingly rare in both the US and 
the UK,
329
leading to an unhelpful lack of decided cases involving the question of private law 
duties of investment managers.  Reasons suggested in the past for this anomaly include that 
the burden of proof is perceived to be high and that the time required to litigate such claims 
means that significant gains and losses could be experienced in the client’s portfolio before a 
final judgement is rendered.
330
  Perhaps a (minor) benefit of the Madoff litigation will be a more 
fuller analysis of how the general legal and equitable principles discussed below apply to 
investment managers generally and private fund managers specifically. 
3.9 The Duty of Care
Where a client relies on the expertise and skills of an investment manager, there will be a duty 
of care to manage the client’s investments as a reasonable investment manager would.
331
  An 
investment manager will thereafter be liable for acts of negligence where there is a duty of care 
(which may arise from a contractual relationship with the client), a breach of that duty and a 
loss that is reasonably foreseeable.
332
  Negligence is the failure by a person to observe a 
recognized duty of care to another party, resulting in damages to that party.  A duty of care 
arises where there exists:
(a) a risk of harm foreseeable to a reasonable person;
333
and
(b) a legally recognized relationship of proximity between the parties.
334
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A recent case involving an investment fund is particularly relevant to the latter element of 
proximity.  In Riyad Bank v Ahli United Bank (UK) plc,
335
the court held that, despite the lack to 
the latter element of proximity of a direct contractual relationship between the parties, an 
advisor can be liable to the ultimate recipient of the advice for such advice, dependant on the 
facts of the relationship.
The leading authority on the duty of care owed by persons acting as advisers is Hedley Byrne 
v Heller Partners.
336
  For determining the duty of care owed by a professional, the test of what 
could be expected by a reasonably competent professional will be based on a measure of 
competence that is dependent on:
337
(a) whether the professional had specialist expertise;
(b) the nature of the business; and
(c) field of practice of the individual.
Where the professional is regulated, such regulations may be relevant to these 
determinations.
338
An investment manager with discretion to implement its own recommendations for its client’s 
investment portfolio owes a particular duty of care to such client.
339
  Often, the agreed level of 
care will be explicitly described in the contract between the two parties.
340
  However, despite 
such qualifications, the investment manager retains an obligation to use reasonable care and 
skill in the course of its activities, creating the basis for a claim of negligence by a client who 
suffers a loss in circumstances where such care and skill were not used.
341
  A claim of 
negligence will require more than simply one or more poor investment decisions.
342
  In the 
financial services area, the legal standard against which an investment manager would be held 
is the level of care and prudence that the ordinary skilled person in that field would use in such 
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circumstances.
343
  An investment manager must possess and use the necessary skills required 
to perform its duties to its client.  Further, it must not act for a client where it does not possess 
such skill.
344
Although not necessarily conclusive, the common practice of practitioners in such a 
specialized field will serve as a significant factor to courts in determining the duty of care owed.  
A regulatory regime can also be relevant to the determination of a duty of care at common law, 
even where the duty of care owed by a regulated firm is not the same as the duties owed 
under the applicable regulatory regime.
345
  Regulations can provide evidence of what is 
expected of a regulated firm in many circumstances.
346
  
Since many claims against an investment manager will be for liability for pure economic loss in 
the absence of actual physical harm, a potential plaintiff will need to demonstrate that there is 
a special relationship between the parties which establishes a duty of care in relation to that 
particular type of loss.  The general rule in negligence is that pure economic loss is not 
recoverable for a variety of historical reasons, including concerns over unlimited liability and a 
desire to foster a competitive market with certainty for participants.  One significant exception 
has been made to this doctrine.  In Hedley Byrne, the House of Lords also extended the 
liability of professional advisers, including in the financial services industry, to include 
negligence in the provision of such services within a special relationship between the parties, 
even in the absence of physical damage.  As a result, the potential now exists for one party to 
bear the economic losses of another party where the relationship between them is such that 
there is a voluntary assumption of responsibility similar in some respects to contract.
In the US, however, pure economic loss is not recoverable in a common law tort claim for 
damages.  Under this approach, where there is a contract between two parties, and the only 
damages suffered is economic loss, then the courts do not seek to undo their agreement and 
recovery by the plaintiff must be sought under the contract.
347
  In the absence of personal 
injury or physical damage to property, the economic loss doctrine will prevent a client from 
recovering from an investment adviser for negligence.
348
  Courts have held that the loss of 
value in a security does not amount to property damage, and is pure economic loss.
349
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3.10 Fiduciary Duties
A fiduciary duty of loyalty is owed by an investment manager to the client, in addition to the 
duty of care,
350
based upon the legitimate expectation by the client that the investment 
manager will be loyal and faithful in its actions as agent in regards to the client’s portfolio.
351
  
Assumption of responsibility for the affairs of another person is a central requirement for the 
establishment of fiduciary obligations.
352
The purpose of these obligations is to provide a 
means to protect a client against conflicts of interest on the part of the investment manager, 
both as regards the investment manager’s own interests and the interests of other clients. This 
fiduciary duty sits alongside a growing array of regulatory measures addressing conflict 
management in the modern financial services firm.
353
3.10.1 The Nature and Scope of Fiduciary Duties
As a general rule, courts are reluctant to interfere with commercial arrangements between 
sophisticated parties of comparable bargaining power.
354
  The commercial world, in which the 
financial services industry and private investment funds reside, is governed predominantly by 
contract.  Commercial transactions often lack a fiduciary element not because the underlying 
transaction is commercial, but rather because the parties to that transaction each recognize 
that the other party is acting in its own self-interest.
355
As a result of the trust and dependence involved in the relationship between an investment 
manager and a client, however, the investment manager will be deemed a ‘fiduciary’ of the 
client, resulting in a duty of loyalty being owed.  Such duty could be the basis for a claim by the 
client
356
in addition to claims of negligence and/or breach of contract.
357
  Importantly, not every 
claim arising out of a fiduciary relationship will give rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty 
and a thorough examination of the full nature of legal and equitable relationships will be 
required.  
358
To identify an investment manager as a fiduciary, therefore, is simply the first step in a larger 
analytical process:
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To say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further 
enquiries.  To whom is he a fiduciary?  What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?  
In what respect does he fail to discharge his obligations?  And what are the 
consequences of his deviation from duty?
359
At general law under the rules of equity,
360
a fiduciary is a person who acts for another in 
situations that ‘give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence’, giving rise to ‘the obligation 
of loyalty’.
361
  The Law Commission
362
has provided a definition of fiduciary relationship that 
has particular resonance in the investment funds context: 
Broadly speaking a fiduciary relationship is one in which a person undertakes to act on 
behalf of or for the benefit of another, often as an intermediary with a discretionary 
power that affects the interest of the other who depends on a fiduciary for information 
and advice.
Further, they summarized the duties owed by a fiduciary
363
into the following four rules:
(a) the ‘no conflict’ rule, whereby a fiduciary must not place himself in a position 
where his interest conflicts with that of his customer;
364
(b) the ‘no profit’ rule, whereby a fiduciary must not profit from his position at the 
expense of his customer;
365
(c) the undivided loyalty rule, whereby a fiduciary owes a loyalty to his customer 
not to place himself in a position where his duty to one customer conflicts with 
his duty to another; and
(d) the duty of confidentiality, whereby a fiduciary must only use information 
obtained in confidence from his customer for the benefit of that customer.
366
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The fiduciary duties are owed by the investment manager to manage its clients in addition to 
the duty of care discussed above.  Cases such as Henderson and Bristol and West Building 
Society recognized the fundamental distinction between duty of care, on the one hand, and the 
duty of loyalty owed by a fiduciary, on the other hand.  Importantly, fiduciary duties stem from 
the ‘trustee-like’ relationship of trust that one party has with another. Even where the 
relationship is initiated and governed in part by a contract, a fiduciary obligation is of a different 
character from the obligations arising out of the underlying contract.
367
  A similar view is held 
under US law:
A fiduciary relationship ‘exists between two persons when one of them is under a duty 
to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of 
the relationship’. Such a relationship, necessarily fact-specific, is grounded in a higher 
level of trust than normally presented in the market place between those involved in 
arms-length business transactions.
368
Although the economic loss doctrine limits the potential claims against US investment 
managers in tort,  claims for breach of fiduciary duty are frequently successful in place of 
breach of contract claims under the various written agreements.  US courts have held that 
investment managers can be liable for breach of fiduciary duty claims, even where the same 
conduct in question would support a breach of contract claim.
369
3.10.2 Limitations on Fiduciary Duties
Fiduciary duties can be limited in effectiveness by either contractual or structural means.  
Contractual approaches include modifying the scope of fiduciary duties by agreement, either 
by exclusion clauses or disclosure and consent.  Structural approaches include organizing a 
business in such a way as to prevent the duties being breached, for example by using Chinese 
Walls.
370
  Where a fiduciary relationship is also governed by a contract, those terms may affect the 
scope of the fiduciary duties owed.
371
  In particular, a clearly drafted exclusion clause can 
successfully limit the scope of fiduciary duties.  The terms of the contract between the 
investment manager and the client, therefore, plays a central role in defining the boundaries of 
the fiduciary relationship.
372
  Pursuant to an investment management agreement,
373
the client 
will typically confer on the investment manager the discretion to buy and sell the clients assets 
at such prices and in such amounts as the investment manager will determine to be in the best 
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interests of the client.  Such discretions can serve as the basis for the relationship of ‘trust and 
confidence’ required of a fiduciary.
374
Where an investment vehicle intermediates the relationship between the investment manager 
and the client(s), the analysis becomes more multifaceted and nuanced.  To the extent that an 
investment manager contracts to provide services with respect to the assets of the participants 
in those vehicles, he will possess similar degrees of control and discretion over such assets as 
would be typically seen in bilateral client relationship.
In order to establish whether and to what extent a person is in a position of trust with regards 
to another, it must be determined what that person was retained to do and on what terms.
375
  
As first laid out in Hospital Products Ltd v US Surgical Corporation: 
376
That contractual and fiduciary relationships may co-exist between the same parties has 
never been doubted.  Indeed, the existence of a basic contractual relationship has in 
many situations provided a foundation for the erection of a fiduciary relationship.  In 
these situations it is the contractual foundation which is all important because it is the 
contract that regulates the basic rights and liabilities of the parties.  The fiduciary 
relationship, if it is to exist at all, must accommodate itself to the terms of the contract 
so that it is consistent with and conforms to them.  The fiduciary relationship cannot be 
superimposed upon the contract in such a way as to alter the operation which the 
contract was intended to have according to its true construction.
Alternatively, disclosure and consent can serve in place of specific contractual exclusions as a 
manner in which fiduciary duties can be limited.  As a result, obtaining informed consent (which 
is ultimately a question of fact) after disclosing a conflict of interest would allow a fiduciary to 
act in a manner that would not otherwise be in compliance with its fiduciary duties.
377
In sum, although fiduciary duties are imposed by law, rather than by agreement between the 
parties, courts consider all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the relationship, 
including the terms of any underlying contract (e.g., investment management agreement) in 
order to determine the scope of any fiduciary duties.
378
  There is a very close relationship 
between duties of care under a contract or at tort, which may be owed by a fiduciary, and 
fiduciary duties themselves, although the courts are now clear that there is not a fiduciary duty 
of care in its own right.
379
  However, although remedies for breach of contract and tort may well 
be available, as discussed below, remedies for breach of fiduciary duties are often more 
attractive, including rescission, equitable compensation or damages, account of profits, or an 
injunction.
380
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Fiduciary duties can thus be an effective means of recourse for clients to ensure that the 
investment manager providing them with professional services does so in fulfilment of certain 
recognized standards. Unfortunately, in the case of a private investment fund, the fund vehicle 
itself intermediates the relationship between the investment manager and the ultimate 
participants. The fund itself, whether a limited partnership or an offshore company, must take 
the steps required to enforce any such claims. 
The participants in the fund must therefore necessarily rely on the governance mechanisms of 
such vehicles in order for such actions to be commenced, bringing us back to the governance 
challenge.
3.11 Contract
Private investment funds are also regulated by the contractual arrangements between the fund 
vehicle and the fund manager (or an entity established and controlled by the fund managers).  
In practice, therefore, a frequent claim to be made against a fund manager will be for breach of 
an express or implied term in the investment management agreement.  Often, the fund 
manager may face concurrent liability in both tort (under a claim of negligence) and contract, 
as well as breach of fiduciary duty.
When considering a claim against a fund manager based on an express term, a key question 
will be whether the clause imposes an absolute obligation on the investment manager or an 
obligation to use best endeavours.  An investment management agreement will often be 
drafted, therefore, to ensure that no undertakings are given with regards to performance or 
result.  Further, the agreement will often contain a clause setting out clearly the duties of the 
investment manager and the level of care it is accepting. 
Importantly, a professional adviser  such as a fund manager  can have duties arising 
concurrently in contract and tort.
381
  As a result, an exclusion clause in an agreement between 
a fund manager and the fund can operate to exclude or modify a tort or other claim (such as 
fiduciary duties).  A key element of the contractual documentation entered into between the 
fund manager and the fund participants will be the standard of care applied to the manager in 
the fulfilment of its obligations under the agreements.  Often, an investment manager will seek 
to limit the standard of care owed to “wilful misconduct” or “gross negligence”.
382
  US courts 
have found that instances where an investment manager made improper or unsuitable 
investment decisions did not amount to “wilful misconduct” or “gross negligence” and therefore 
did not amount to breach of contract.
383
In addition, courts may take the view in certain instances that applicable regulatory 
requirements are implied terms of the investment management agreement between the 
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regulated fund manager and its client, the fund.  Where an authorized firm was subject to 
detailed requirements on ‘best advice’, a court has held that relevant regulatory rules were 
incorporated by reference to the terms of business letter entered into with the client.
384
  In the 
case of more abstract principles embodied in a regulatory regime, courts have been more 
reluctant to find implied contractual terms.
385
  
Claims against the investment manager can be limited by the inclusion of exclusion clauses in 
the contract.  However, such clauses must comply with public policy.  As a result, liability for 
fraud cannot be excluded. Clear prior contractual disclosure may be effective where the rights 
and duties of the parties are clearly defined and can serve to fulfil the obligation to make full 
disclosure.
386
  Exclusion clauses must be clear and unambiguous as they will generally be 
construed against those who see to rely on them.
387
  
A recent English case, Springwell Navigation Corporation v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,
388
casts 
an interesting light on questions of contractual estoppel that can arise in the private investment 
funds context.  In this case, the Court of Appeals held that a party could be barred, under the 
doctrine of contractual estoppel, from asserting that it had been induced to enter a transaction 
based on misrepresentations.  The effect of this decision was to reinforce the concept of 
freedom of contract, which benefits larger financial institutions, as well as fund managers, in 
their dealings with sophisticated investors.  To the extent that fund documentation includes 
terms which are based on premise that differ from the actual factual circumstances, but are 
included by the fund manager to secure additional commercial benefit, courts following 
Springwell would enforce such terms against the investors.
In light of the caution raised by Springwell, private monitoring solutions can be a useful means 
to redress potential overreaching by fund managers who seek to engage in such practices by 
improving the negotiation of fund documentation through facilitating the ongoing engagement 
of the fund participants with the monitoring of the legal duties that attach to the fund manager.  
In the absence of such negotiations, Springwell puts all potential fund investors on notice that 
courts will enforce fund documentation against them, where appropriate. 
3.12 Effectiveness of Private Litigation by Investors
Until recently, private investment funds differed from other financial investments, such as the 
security of public listed companies, by the relative lack of lawsuits by disgruntled investors.  In 
the United States particularly, the dictum “when investors lose money, they sue” has proved 
reliably constant for corporate shareholders, but surprisingly inapplicable to private fund 
participants.
389
  Recent events following the global financial crisis are changing this anomaly. 
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With the exception of the recent Springwell case,
390
there has been a noticeable absence of 
private litigation by disgruntled investors against fund managers in the UK, especially in 
comparison to the US.  In addition to being a larger market for private investment funds than all 
other countries (including the UK) combined, the US has been the source of the majority of 
litigation surrounding private investment funds.
391
  These cases provide a valuable insight into 
both the manner in which the legal rights of fund participants can be enforced and remedies 
obtained, and the extent to which the governance challenge could be better addressed through 
structural approaches.  
Civil lawsuits by investors and other creditors arising from hedge fund ‘blow-ups’
392
have also 
been a frequent event in US courts over recent years.  Similar to enforcement actions, civil 
cases have covered a range of claims against fund managers, including misrepresentation of 
performance, misleading disclosures, and improper valuations.  Such cases have frequently 
included charges against the fund management firm, although in many cases such firms often 
lack the necessary assets to make investors and creditors whole for their losses.  Alternatively, 
claims may be pursued against a fund’s auditors or administrators, or in certain circumstances 
either the independent directors of the fund or the funds lawyers.
393
However, even where a hedge fund collapses amid substantial allegations of fraud, the money 
available for recompensing investors will often not, in simple cases, be expanded by litigation.  
Where a US-based hedge fund manager has stepped over the line into criminality, the SEC 
can intervene and appoint a receiver to preserve remaining assets and oversee the orderly 
unwinding of the fund.  The ultimate goal of the receivership is to locate and preserve as much 
of the estate as possible for investors.  But if the fund manager and its principals are all 
insolvent themselves, as will often be the case in the wake of a fund’s collapse, and there were 
no third parties involved in the fraud, litigation may ultimately prove unsatisfying for the 
aggrieved fund investors. 
Litigation against private investment funds arises often out of the offering memorandum 
originally establishing the fund in question.
394
  The claims in such cases are rooted in 
allegations of misrepresentations made by the fund, focussing particularly on any divergence 
between the representations made to induce the original investment in the fund and the 
manner in which the fund was actually run.  Underlying claims may involve allegations that a 
fund misrepresented the risk that would be involved in pursuing its investment objective, 
departed from its investment strategy, failed adequately to diversify its investments or failed to 
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invest with prudence.  These causes of action may ultimately take the form of claims for fraud, 
fraudulent inducement, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, or gross 
negligence.
For example, in San Diego County Employees Retirement Association v Maounis,
395
a pension 
fund that had invested in the collapsed Amaranth fund claimed that the fund manager 
misrepresented the fund as “multi-strategy” when it actually allegedly operated as a highly 
concentrated single strategy fund that lacked basic internal risk management controls. 
Ultimately, however, all claims against the defendants were dismissed, since the investors had 
been fully informed of the risks.  
In Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v Silver,
396
a limited partner brought claims of breach of 
fiduciary duty against a fund’s general partner.  The basis of the claims were alleged 
misrepresentations made to the fund’s investors regarding the types of investments the funds 
would make and the use by the general partner of the fund’s assets to support unrelated 
investments made by a prior fund.  Lincoln National was successful at trial and received a 
judgment of $24 million, but shortly thereafter Ms. Silver filed bankruptcy.
Occasionally, where a fund that has lost a great deal of its value, a fund manager may direct 
money to favoured investors at the expense of less favoured investors.  In Re Manhattan Inv 
Fund Ltd,
397
the court found that a payment made to Bear Stearns in its capacity as prime 
broker shortly before the collapse of the Manhattan Investment Fund was a fraudulent transfer 
recoverable by the bankruptcy trustee.
398
In State v Forstmann Little & Co. Equity Partnership VI LP,
399
the State of Connecticut, a 
limited partner in a Forstmann Little private equity fund, claimed that the fund’s general partner 
had deviated from its agreed investment objectives and restrictions resulting in significant 
losses to the fund and to the State of Connecticut.  The legal claims were based on breach of 
contract and breach of fiduciary duty.  At issue was language in both the limited partnership  
agreement and the offering  memorandum establishing limits on  the general partner’s 
discretion, which the plaintiff alleged the defendant had violated by making impermissible 
investments to companies that eventually went bankrupt.  In addition the plaintiff alleged that 
the defendant took various actions that protected and advanced the interests of other funds 
managed by the defendant, but were not beneficial to the fund in which the plaintiff had 
invested.  Ultimately, however, the court found that the fund manager was not liable for 
damages to the plaintiff, despite finding that breaches of contract and of fiduciary did occur, on 
the grounds that the State of Connecticut knew about the wrongful conduct and acquiesced.
In Forsyth v GSC Fund Management Co. (US), Inc.,
400
limited partners in a “co-invest” fund 
established by Canadian Bank of Commerce alleged that the general partner had breached its 
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fiduciary duty in connection with a number of related party transactions at non-market prices.  
The court refused to dismiss the case on the basis that the allegations of wrongdoing made by 
the plaintiff were sufficient to serve as a basis for a claim that the general partners was grossly 
negligent in discharging its duties under the limited partnership agreement. 
As can be seen, recourse remains available to fund investors in the courts by way of civil 
claims, exerting their rights under the private law, although the effectiveness of such remedies 
in practice depends on whether there are any assets left which can be used to satisfy the 
claims.  Decades of expanding financial regulation have not eliminated these causes of actions 
as a means of obtaining remedy.  However, fund documentation, and the particular 
relationships between fund manager, fund and fund investors, must effectively establish the 
legal and equitable grounds for establishing these causes of actions.  Without implementing 
the private monitoring solutions, pro-fund manager agreements may prove to be a barrier to 
recover that is difficult to overcome.  As one commentator has warned:
[I]nvestors in a limited partnership who want to use the prospect of a lawsuit to 
intervene in the operation of the firm have to show extreme misconduct – a difficult task.  
Statutorily prescribed deference to management’s decision making also separates
investors in limited partnerships from managers of partnership funds.  It means that 
investors cannot credibly use the threat of a lawsuit as a check against agent 
misconduct or a bargaining tool to engage management regarding its decision 
making.
401
I will argue in the following chapters that the private monitoring solutions proposed herein will 
provide fund investors with the opportunity to create a clearer and firmer basis for potential 
legal action against miscreant managers.
3.13 Conclusions
The quality of investment advice, whether provided directly to a client or indirectly through a 
collective investment vehicle, is very important both to the financial markets generally as well 
as to each individual who benefits or suffers as a result.  There is a necessary element of 
market risk here:  every bad outcome suffered by a private investment fund is not necessarily 
proof of incompetence or malfeasance.   Similarly, not every superlative return generated by 
such fund is proof of excellence or fair dealings.  Nonetheless, as discussed above, investors 
should be able to protect themselves from certain types of “management risk”, including the 
malfeasance and negligence of the fund managers themselves.
The historic status of private investment funds as unregulated arrangements is based on the 
explicit assumption that their participants have adequate knowledge and negotiating leverage 
to protect their interests.  The regular occurrence of widespread investor protection failures 
raises the question of whether this assumption is correct in all cases.
402
  The issue that then 
must be addressed is whether the governance challenge in private investment funds can be 
satisfactorily addressed by changes in the regulatory regime or by privately-negotiated 
structural approaches, which can be implemented at the level of fund documentation by 
agreement between the fund participant(s) and the fund manager.  
The regulatory regime exists in parallel with the private law remedies that apply to the legal 
vehicles and relationships established by the fund documentation.  The same series of acts 
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and omissions may have consequences under both systems. As a result, the recourse to legal 
and equitable remedies is natural and necessary to ensure that such quality, when promised, 
is delivered. 
However, the private law rights and duties of fund participants and the fund manager can, and 
often are, modified in the documentation used to establish the fund.
403
  Traditionally, the 
sponsors and promoters of a private investment fund have sought to limit, or eliminate, the 
liability of the fund manager and individual principals to the greatest extent possible.   Subject 
to a certain core of prohibitions on such modifications, the private law in the UK and the US 
permits parties to extend or restrict legal and/or equitable duties and courts enforce these 
modifications when litigation occurs.  
In addition, fund documentation typically provides broad indemnification rights to the fund 
manager and principals.  Such provisions would customarily exclude wilful misconduct, 
recklessness and/or gross negligence.  Together, exclusion and indemnification provisions 
such as these serve to limit the scope of recourse - technically and procedurally - that fund 
participants can expect when disputes arise.  
As a result, the rights and duties of fund managers and principals can be eroded by the 
contracts themselves.  Duties exist at “default” levels within any legal entity, such as a 
partnership.  There is no fundamental limit on the ability of limited partners to decide to “raise 
the bar” in connection with the level of fiduciary and other duties owed to them by the general 
partner of their fund.  Partnerships
404
are creatures of contract law, and the terms can be 
negotiated to meet the commercial needs of the parties.  In the case of Company PIFs,
405
due 
to their creation under the laws of offshore jurisdictions, such as the Cayman Islands, where 
company law statutes have not been modernized, as has been the case in the UK with the 
Companies Act 2006, and the commercial tendency to mimic concepts and provisions from 
Partnership PIFs, there is also scope to adapt the constitutional documents where necessary 
to fit the requirements of the fund participants.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the ability of fund participants to engage in day-to-day 
management and monitoring is limited by the tax regime; as well as by practical matters such 
as the lack of time and specialist expertise.  However, even given these legal and practical 
parameters, fund participants have not consistently exercised their negotiating effectively to 
protect their interests through the contractual arrangements establishing the fund and its 
relationship with its fund manager.
In financial services, one customary approach to supplementing and augmenting the private 
law rights and duties of potential parties has been through the construction and imposition of a 
regulatory regime to cover those unique aspects of financial transactions and relationships that 
the court cases have not addressed with the specificity and completeness that these parties 
require.  In addition, private actors can demonstrate that they possess the regulatory capacity 
necessary to play a meaningful role in this regulatory regime, supplementing the top-down 
command-and-control authority of a financial regulator.  In the case of private investment funds 
and their managers, the regulatory regime in both the US and the UK currently focuses on 
regulation and oversight of the fund manager as an authorized firm, and not on the structure 
and operation of the fund itself.  A fund manager is liable to its regulator for violations of 
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conduct rules as and when they occur, but both the SEC and the FSA have made clear that 
this is where their effective jurisdiction ends.
406
In the following chapter, I will examine two recent regulatory reform packages that were 
adopted in the US and the EU as a reaction to the recent financial crisis to determine to what 
extent, if at all, they address the governance challenge, and supplant any need to consider and 
implement the private monitoring solutions.
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Chapter 4
Recent US and EU Regulatory Responses
4.1 Introduction
As has been frequently observed, after a financial crisis, legislators and regulators have an 
opportunity to adopt significant and potentially far reaching reforms, regardless of whether the 
reforms actually address the real causes of the immediate crisis.
407
  Although the 2007-08 
global financial meltdown was not a “hedge fund crisis” or a “private equity crisis”,
408
in 2010 
both the US and the EU adopted significant expansions of their regulatory regimes to address 
perceived short comings in how private investment funds and their managers are regulated.
409
  
The concerns underlying the new rules significantly pre-date the 2007-08 crisis and have been 
debated by industry members and commentators for some time.
The growth of private investment funds, and the debate over the appropriate response by 
financial regulators, had been a common feature of consultation papers and articles in the 
financial press for over a decade.  However, the regulatory regime on both sides of the Atlantic 
remained largely static during these years, despite regular pronouncements from international 
organizations such as IOSCO and the Financial Stability Forum.
410
Only in the aftermath of 2007-09 crisis was momentum permitted to build
411
in favour of new 
rules which would materially increase the ability of US and EU regulators to monitor and 
discipline private fund managers. Ultimately, persistent concern that private funds might 
comprise a “shadow banking system”
412
as well as the ramifications of the Madoff debacle, 
were sufficient to see the passage of Dodd-Frank in the US and AIFMD in the EU.
413
  The 
desire to “rein in” private funds, however, sits somewhat awkwardly in the academic debate 
over corporate governance.  As one commentator has argued:
The irony of the hedge fund regulation movement is that financial 
economists have, for over seventy years, been decrying, first, the 
lack of independent shareholder involvement in the management 
of public firms and, second, the lack of swift capital reallocation in 
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American industry.  Hedge funds do both, more effectively, than 
any financial institutions in American history perhaps, and we 
should not recoil in fear over the innovation.
414
Despite these perceived advantages, hedge funds and private equity funds have been subject 
to a fairly comprehensive review by both the public media and lawmakers.  In this Chapter, I 
will identify and examine the effectiveness of recent regulatory changes on both sides of the 
Atlantic to address concerns related to private investment funds.  In connection with Dodd-
Frank, I will discuss its impact on both US and non-US advisers, as well as assessing its future 
prospects.  In connection with AIFMD, I will analyze its jurisdictional scope, as well as 
governance, marketing and disclosure issues.
4.2 Dodd-Frank
As Andrew J. Donohue, Director of the Division of Investment Management of the SEC 
observed in 2010:
The U.S. securities laws have not kept pace with the growth and market significance of 
hedge funds and other private funds and, as a result, the Commission has very limited 
oversight authority over these vehicles . . . Consequently, advisers to private funds can 
“opt out” of Commission oversight.  This presents a significant regulatory gap in need of 
closing.
415
According to Donohue, requiring the managers of these funds to be registered with the SEC
416
would provide the regulator with the tools necessary to oversee the industry and protect 
investors.  This would be accomplished by the managers providing the SEC with reliable and 
complete data about the operations of private investment funds and their impact on U.S. 
securities markets, while allowing the funds to maintain flexibility with regard to their 
investment objectives and strategies.
Dodd-Frank can, therefore, be seen as simply the movement of the US towards the 
international consensus that private fund managers should be directly regulated by the national 
financial regulator.  The historic American position that “private” investment advisors who had 
only a limited number of clients were best left outside the supervision of the SEC had become 
an anomaly, especially in light of the billions in assets under management that such “private” 
advisors were able to amass. 
Many domestic and international fund managers previously exempt from registration under the 
Investment Advisers Act are now, as a result of passage of the Dodd-Frank, subject to
registration with the SEC.  Domestic investment advisers with assets under management of 
$100 million or more will need to register; however, if such advisers manage only “private 
funds”
417
that do not meet the definition of a “venture capital fund”, the threshold is raised to
$150 million or more of assets.  Advisers which pass these thresholds are required to register 
under the Investment Advisers Act.  The relatively low threshold of $150 million will ensnare 
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many previously unregistered investment advisers to private equity and hedge funds which 
benefited from the 14-or-fewer clients exemption now eliminated by Dodd-Frank.
Domestic advisers having less than $100 million (or $150 million where solely advisers to 
Private Funds) of assets will have to register under State “blue sky laws” rather than being able 
to register with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act, unless such an adviser would 
have to be registered in 15 or more states. An even lower threshold has been established 
“foreign private advisers” which will be required to register generally if they have $25 million or 
more of AUM and/or of investments in their sponsored funds attributable to US investors, or 
more than 15 clients domiciled in the United States.  
4.3 Domestic Advisers
Dodd-Frank repeals in its entirety the so-called “private adviser exemption”
418
previously found 
in the Investment Advisers Act.  Private equity, real estate opportunity and hedge funds have 
historically generally relied on this exemption to avoid registration under the Investment 
Advisers Act.
419
  Going forward, many of these advisers will need to register with the SEC and 
adopt appropriate compliance programs.
420
Dodd-Frank requires that the SEC provide an exemption from the registration requirements for 
domestic advisers to private funds, provided assets in the United States are less than $150 
million and such adviser is solely an adviser to “private funds”. Additionally, Dodd-Frank 
creates new exemptions from SEC registration, including advisers to “family offices” and 
advisers to “venture capital funds”.  As a result of Dodd-Frank, the number of potential SEC 
registrants is expected to increase significantly. The responsibility of the states for licensing, 
monitoring and overseeing all hedge funds and other alternative investment management firms 
has also been increased significantly from firms having less than $25 million in assets to firms 
having under $100 million in assets.  
This represents a substantial increase in the responsibility (and jurisdiction) of state securities 
departments and law enforcement officials.  But states will be taking on this increased 
responsibility at a time when many state coffers are empty and budgets are far from balanced.  
Where the extra monies for personnel and supervisory infrastructure will come from is unclear; 
if monies are not forthcoming, an inconsistent and largely nominal oversight of a large number 
of domestic advisers may result.
421
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4.4 Non-US Advisers
Extraterritoriality remains a key feature of the U.S. approach to financial regulations, and 
Dodd-Frank is no exception.
422
  Dodd-Frank exempts from registration any investment adviser 
that is a “foreign private adviser,” which is defined in Dodd-Frank as any investment adviser 
that:
(a) has no place of business in the United States; 
(b) has fewer than 15 clients
423
and investors domiciled in the United States in 
private funds advised by the  investment adviser;
(c) has aggregate assets under management attributable to clients in the United 
States and investors in the United States in Private Funds advised by the 
investment adviser of less than $25 million, (or such higher amount as the SEC 
may set by rulemaking); and
(d) neither holds itself out generally to the public in the United States as an 
investment adviser, nor acts as an investment adviser to any registered 
investment company.
The SEC has previously permitted a “regulation-lite” approach that registered non-US advisers 
may observe with respect to their non-US clients (including, non-US funds in which US
persons invest).  Under the “regulation-lite” approach, a non-US adviser is permitted to treat 
each non-US fund as its “client” for many purposes of the Investment Advisers Act.  As a 
result, most of the substantive provisions of the Investment Advisers Act would not apply to a 
non-US adviser’s dealings with a non-US fund, even if the investors in the fund included US
persons.
424
This has historically not been viewed as a significant loophole because non-US 
funds are not eligible for public distribution within the US to retail investors as a mutual fund.  
As a result, only non-retail accredited investors have access to these investments.
4.5 Other Compliance Requirements
Dodd-Frank modifies the reporting requirements for various types of advisers.  First, the SEC 
can require any registered adviser to comply with certain additional record-keeping and 
reporting obligations to the SEC.  Importantly, Dodd-Frank deems the reports of any “private 
fund” to which a registered adviser provides advice to be the records and reports of that 
adviser.  Among other things reports will have to be filed with the SEC on: 
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(a) the amount of assets under management and the use of leverage; 
(b) counterparty credit risk exposure;
(c) trading and investment positions;
(d) valuation policies and practices of the fund;
(e) types of assets held;
(f) any side arrangements whereby certain investors receive more favourable
terms than other investors; and
(g) any other information the SEC determines “is necessary and appropriate in the 
public interest and for protection of investors, or for the assessment of systemic 
risk.”
Also importantly, Dodd-Frank imposes new record-keeping and reporting obligations on 
advisers exempt from registration.  In particular, the SEC is mandated to issue rules requiring 
unregistered advisers to maintain and provide to the SEC such reports as the SEC deems 
“necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for protection of investors,” but does not 
otherwise define the requirements for these records and reports.
Dodd-Frank also authorizes the SEC to promulgate new rules that require a registered adviser 
to safeguard any client assets over which that adviser has custody.  These steps could include 
verification of the assets by an independent public accountant.  Section 206(4)-2 of the 
Investment Advisers Act and Rule 206(4)-2 already require examination of those assets by an 
independent public accountant unless an exemption applies to that adviser, so the Dodd-Frank 
requirement only provide incremental change.  
Additionally, non-US advisers previously exempted from registration will need to become 
familiar with Rule 204-3 under the Investment Advisers Act, commonly referred to as the 
‘brochure rule’.  The brochure rule generally requires every SEC-registered adviser to deliver 
to each prospective advisory client a written disclosure statement, or ‘brochure’, describing the 
adviser’s business practices and educational and business background.
425
  
In sum, the compliance requirements imposed on fund managers by Dodd-Frank are relatively 
limited and do not address the concerns discussed in early chapters about the governance 
challenge.  The blanket exemption for fund managers with 14 or fewer clients was always 
recognized as an anomaly when compared with the approach taken by other industrialized 
countries.
4.6 Future Outlook
Although Dodd-Frank represents the most significant attempt to reform US financial services 
regulation in over 70 years, the laws’ ultimate effectiveness remains unclear.  The SEC 
remains central to the US approach, but its limitations and recent shortcomings are 
acknowledged.
426
  Even before the 2007-09 financial crisis, questions concerning the 
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adequacy of the SEC’s resources to perform its required functions were being called into 
question.
427
  Since the financial crisis and the increase in its responsibilities under Dodd-Frank, 
the issues are even more noteworthy.
Perhaps most disappointing to many observers, Dodd-Frank does not attempt to rationalize or 
improve the US regulatory infrastructure.  As one commentator has observed:
Critically, the Act fails to reconfigure in any significant way the fragmented US 
regulatory structure, which currently encompasses 50 state-banking and securities 
regulators as well as multiple federal agencies.
428
With the recent political change in the control of the US House of Representatives, rumors 
have circulated about possible attempts by the Republicans to repeal certain elements of 
Dodd-Frank.
429
  Even if not repealed or significantly scaled back, its highly unlikely that further 
reform will be passed in the foreseeable future.
430
  
Ultimately, the changes brought by Dodd-Frank leave the governance of private investment 
outside their scope.  To the extent that definitive steps are to be taken to address deficiencies 
in the governance structure of such funds, they will need to be taken by the investors 
themselves.  As one commentator has observed:
There has been a growing consensus that there should be more regulation of hedge
funds and private equity funds, although there is a substantial difference between the 
USA and the EU as to what the scope and content of that regulation should be.  [Dodd-
Frank] takes a minimalist approach.
431
Europe, however, has decided on a more “maximalist” approach.
4.7 AIFMD
AIFMD attempts to harmonize regulatory requirements for sponsors and managers of 
alternative investment funds (AIFs) across the EU.  AIFs are broadly defined to cover all CISs 
not authorized under the UCITS directive.  As a result, hedge funds, private equity funds and a 
wide variety of other investment vehicles are AIFs and their management and administration 
fall within AIFMD.
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After over eighteen months of wrangling, AIFMD was finally passed in November 2010.  
AIFMD affects managers and promoters of AIFs and its reach extends to managers and 
advisers based outside as well as inside the EU (respectively EU managers and non-EU 
managers).  The road to AIFMD was not a straight one.  Instead it was filled with twists and 
turns due to the numerous power struggles that broke out along the way, both between the 
European Parliament and the European Commission, and between key member states.  
Criticisms of the legislative process that led to the final adopted test of AIFMD include (a) that 
the “one size fits all” approach failed to differentiate the different risks posed by different types 
of funds; (b) that the EU’s reaction was disproportionate to the industries’ actual significance; 
and (c) that protectionist preference were the primary motivation behind the directive.
432
Importantly, the AIFMD continues with the traditional regulatory approach followed on both 
sides of the Atlantic by regulating the fund manager and not the fund itself.
433
  In addition to the 
expansive definition of AIFs, the geographic scope of AIFMD is also particularly broad, with all 
fund managers based in the EU covered, as well as any non-EU managers who market their 
funds in the EU.  The AIFs themselves may be based either within the EU or outside of the EU.
The primary focus of AIFMD is on establishing consistent standards for the authorization and 
ongoing oversight of fund managers, including requirements related to conflicts of interest, risk 
management and liquidity.  As a result of such harmonization, a new pan-European 
passporting regime is now available, which serves as a “carrot” to complement the “stick” of 
further regulation.
AIFMD has not been without its critics.  As one commentator has observed:
The EU has failed to mount a persuasive case for why the Directive represents an 
improvement over existing national regulatory regimes or prevailing market practices in 
several key areas.  Furthermore, by attempting to shoehorn an economically, 
strategically and operationally diverse population of financial institutions into a single, 
artificial class of regulated actors, the EU has established what is in many respects a 
conceptually muddled regulatory regime.
434
Of possible relevance to the governance challenge is the inclusion of detailed disclosure 
requirements.  Investors are now entitled to receive additional information from managers on a 
periodic basis.
435
However, what AIFMD lacks is any attempt to address the manner in which private funds are 
governed.  No attempt was made as part of the AIFMD adoption process to better empower 
fund investors to effectively intervene in the operation of the funds in which they invest, in 
order to address concerns which may have arisen or restrict the ability of the fund manager to 
act in a particular way under particular circumstances.  
The effectiveness of AIFMD to address systemic risk concerns are outside the scope of this 
thesis.  Clearly, such concerns are a valid basis on which to adopt the identification and 
containment of new regulation or adapt existing regulation.  But systemic risk is fundamentally 
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separate from concerns relating to investor protection, and within those latter concerns, 
effective governance.
An additional layer of subordinate rules must be drafted and implemented before AIFMD 
becomes effective in 2013.  As a result, a comprehensive assessment and appraisal of the 
directive is perhaps only possible then.
436
  However, the lack of provisions addressing fund 
governance will not be remedied by any anticipated supplemental legislation.  
4.8 Jurisdictional Scope
As a general rule, the management of an AIF which is marketed within the EU must be 
conducted by a manager authorised under AIFMD by the appropriate regulators in its home 
member state.  Managers in the EU managing EU funds will have the “passport” to market 
those funds in the EU from early 2013.  No such passport will be introduced for non-EU funds 
until early 2015 at the earliest.  As a result, onshore EU funds will have a significant marketing 
advantage over offshore funds for at least two years.  
When the “passport” becomes available, allowing EU and non-EU managers to market non-EU 
funds throughout the EU, jurisdictions that would satisfy the criteria set out in the AIFMD to 
allow the fund to qualify for the “passport” will have an advantage over those that do not.  But 
to what extent this will result in a change in the domicile of funds from one overseas jurisdiction 
to another is difficult to say.  The main offshore jurisdictions (Cayman, Bermuda, Channel 
Islands) appear confident that they are well placed to benefit from the introduction of the 
AIFMD.  
437
Non-EU managers, such as US alternative fund managers, for example, will not be able to 
obtain passports until 2015.  Until then, they will need to market their funds in reliance on the 
private placement regimes that operate in individual EU member states.  From 2013, once 
AIFMD is implemented by EU member states, US managers will be required to comply with 
certain “transparency” provisions of AIFMD relating to the production by the fund of an annual 
report, disclosure requirements to investors, and periodic reporting to the local regulator 
covering such matters as the liquidity of the fund, risk management and leverage.  There will 
also need to be information-sharing arrangements in place between the SEC and the local EU 
regulator and (assuming the fund is not in the US) the supervisors of the fund, and the local 
EU regulator.  In addition, the US and (if different) the country where the fund is located must 
not be on the FATF “blacklist” of states which give rise to money laundering and terrorist 
financing concerns.  For example, a US manager marketing a Cayman fund to investors in the 
UK, all the requirements in the previous sentence are currently satisfied, so it will be up to the 
manager to ensure that the “transparency” provisions are satisfied also.
If the passport is made available to non-EU managers in 2015, a US manager who wishes to 
obtain it will need to comply with all the provisions of AIFMD (including those relating to 
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remuneration restrictions, capital requirements, depositaries and leverage).  It will also need to 
apply to an EU member state — the manager’s “member state of reference” for the purposes 
of AIFMD — and the regulator in that state will in effect become the US manager’s supervisor 
for compliance with AIFMD.  The US manager will also need to appoint a legal representative 
in the member state of reference” to act as its contact point with the local regulator.  In 
addition:
(a) there must be cooperation arrangements in place between the regulator in the 
“member state of reference” and the SEC covering information sharing; and
(b) the country where the fund is located must not be on the FATF “blacklist” (for 
which see above); and
(c) the country where the fund is located must have signed an agreement with the 
“member state of reference” and any other EU Member State where the fund is 
proposed to be marketed relating to the exchange of tax information and in 
compliance with OECD requirements.
438
  
For UK managers managing non-EU funds, such as Cayman funds, the marketing passport 
will also not be available until 2015.  Until then, UK managers must continue to market their 
non-EU funds in the EU through national private placement regimes.
439
  
AIFMD defines “marketing” as offering of funds at the initiative of or on behalf of the fund 
manager.
440
  That means that if an investor takes the initiative by approaching the fund 
manager, the fund manager will not be marketing his funds for the purposes of AIFMD.  As a 
result, a US fund manager, for example, will not be brought within the scope of AIFMD simply 
because he accepts investments from an EU pension fund manager.  The fund manager would 
need actively to market the fund to those investors for that to occur.
441
A US manager is likely to have a website that allows interested parties to access details of the 
funds.  Although the manager will in one sense have “taken the initiative” by making the 
material on the website available, this should not be “marketing” for the purposes of AIFMD
without some further act by the manager (for example, a separate e-mail directed at potential 
customers drawing attention to the existence of the site).  
AIFMD provides that if an EU manager has assets under management below certain 
thresholds (in general, €100 million or, for unleveraged funds with no redemption rights for five 
years (typically smaller private equity funds), €500 million), AIFMD will not apply.  In such 
cases, however, registration with the local regulator (along with disclosure of investment 
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strategies and trading information) will still be necessary, and AIFMD also allows the regulator 
to impose additional requirements.
4.9 Governance and Disclosure Issues  
AIFMD establishes duties of care and loyalty that fund managers must fulfil, which includes 
duties to act honestly and fairly, in the best interest of the fund and its investors, and to ensure 
that all fund investors are treated fairly.
442
Further, the directive imposes specific requirements 
on identifying and containing conflicts of interest, as well as implementing adequate risk 
management systems.
443
However, AIFMD does not prevent a fund manager from delegating 
its functions to third parties, although it does impose some restrictions.  In particular, the 
portfolio management and risk management function may be delegated only to entities that are 
authorized or registered to carry out such functions and subject to supervision (and where 
delegation is to an entity outside the EU, there must be cooperation between the third-country 
supervisors and the manager’s EU regulator), and cannot be delegated to the depositary or the 
depositary’s delegate.  The fund manager remains liable to the fund and investors in the fund 
for any acts of the delegate.
Most of the information required by AIFMD will already have been provided in a well-drafted 
offering memorandum.
444
  That said, AIFMD also requires certain disclosures that are unlikely 
to be made currently, such as:
(a) valuation procedure and methods used for valuing hard-to-value assets;
(b) the fund’s liquidity risk management;
(c) the type of investors who have the right to receive (or do receive) preferential 
treatment, and what that preferential treatment consists of;
(d) what steps the manager is taking to cover potential professional liability risks; 
and
(e) how and when the manager will disclose various liquidity and leverage 
information required by AIFMD (such as the percentage of assets of the fund 
that are subject to special arrangements because of their illiquidity and the total 
amount of leverage employed by the fund).
A strong argument can be made that increasing the information provided by managers of 
private investment funds justifies bringing managers within the scope of regulation.  However, 
the value of the information required by AIFMD is subject to question.  As one commentator 
has observed:
What is ultimately unclear, however, is the extent to which informational requirements 
embedded within the AIFM Directive will represent a marked improvement over existing 
national regulatory regimes or prevailing market practices.
445
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4.10 Conclusion
As a result of the 2007-09 financial crisis, widespread attention has been paid to the nature 
and scope of financial regulation.  This is an exception to the general rule, as one 
commentator has noted:
Regulation has been described as ‘low politics’ – the world of 
mundane technicalities far below the ‘high’ politics of 
international diplomacy or national party politics.  Yet regulation 
has recently taken political center stage, not least as the credit 
crunch has exposed the contradictory demands of regulated 
firms and others for both less and more regulation, and the limits 
of governmental capacity to provide either, or at least not in the 
right places and in the right ways.
446
Also at “centre stage” have been concerns over whether hedge funds and private equity funds 
are adequately supervised.  When evaluating government regulation, it is important to bear in 
mind three potential disadvantages:
(a) whether such regulation will be counter-productive, or simply redundant 
because of actions taken by market participants in reaction thereto;
(b) whether defects in the processes of adoption, implementation and/or 
enforcement undermine its effectiveness; and
(c) whether such regulation unduly restricts the rights and freedoms of persons 
affected thereby.
447
A comprehensive critique of Dodd-Frank and AIFMD, and their impact on private investment 
funds, is beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, these three disadvantages remind us that 
no piece of legislation or regulation can realistically hope to provide a complete solution to a 
problem.  There inevitably remains room for private actors who possess regulatory capacity
448
to evaluate and supplement the rules, with their own additional actions and precautions.  As 
commentators have observed:
Financial regulation is often reactive.  New regulation seals up 
leaks in the financial system – usually following a crisis, a shift in 
markets or other change that threatens financial stability.
449
In the US, for example, the modern financial regulatory system was created as a direct result 
of the Great Depression.  The Dodd Frank reforms, like numerous reforms preceding it, was 
born from the 2007-09 financial meltdown,
450
the most serious recession in the US since the 
Great Depression.
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Wide-ranging reforms were proposed and adopted in numerous countries to attempt, after the 
fact, to correct perceived shortcomings and omissions in their regulatory regimes.
451
  
Regardless of the financial regulatory model that a particular country follows,
452
there will 
always be a tension during a period of reform between making a fundamental change to 
country’s regulatory model, and simply making incremental changes within the current financial 
model.
453
Neither Dodd-Frank nor AIFMD attempt to directly address governance deficiencies in private 
investment funds or shift their regime away from the traditional “we regulate the managers, not 
the fund” approach.  Although each regulatory reform package makes significant changes to 
the scope and detail of existing rules, the focus is on different regulatory priorities such as 
systemic risk.  Even where concerns about investor protection are addressed, the new rules do 
so in a customary manner, in line with past approaches.  The recent reforms have introduced 
some incremental improvements in the regulatory regime, although as noted in this chapter, 
the extent to which they provide for greater protection of fund investors beyond that which 
would be provided by good market practice remains limited.  
Private funds carry with them inherently complex questions about jurisdictional reach and the 
effectiveness of regulation outside the country of origin.
454
  Importantly, even with increased 
coordination and harmonization at the international level, government regulators will be subject 
to de jure or de facto jurisdictional limitations on their effectiveness.  By contrast, private actors 
can pursue their interests across national boundaries as the need arises.
455
In addition, the enforcement centralized, top-down rules would still reveal a systemic 
disadvantage that the SEC, the FSA and all financial regulators face – namely, hiring and 
retaining adequate talent.  As one commentator has observed:
[I]n order to enhance their professional expertise, government 
agencies have to hire the best available specialists in relevant 
areas and offer these experts compensation high enough to lure 
them away from potentially lucrative employment at investment 
banks and hedge funds.  Competing with the private sector on 
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these terms is hardly a viable proposition for government 
agencies.
456
As a result, regulators must be realistic and pragmatic about what they seek to accomplish 
with their finite resources.  Despite much discussion and debate,
457
ultimately US and EU 
legislators and regulators decided to limit their reform efforts to a number of important changes 
involving the regulatory status of the fund manager and some potentially significant other 
claims in the applicable marketing instructions.  In doing so, they ultimately favoured reforms in 
line with the traditional regulatory approach that they have historically followed in this area.  
However, by default, they have sent a clear message to all investors in private investment 
funds – responsibility for establishing appropriate governance mechanisms within the fund 
rests with the investors.
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Chapter 5
Self-Regulation and Private Actors
5.1 Introduction
The first decade of the 21st Century witnessed a steady accretion of self-regulatory initiatives 
in the private investment funds industries.  In the hedge fund arena, trade associations 
promulgated their own best practice standards. In the private equity industry, guidance was 
regularly issued on a variety of topics that included valuation, transparency and ethics.  Critics 
contend that these developments were motivated primarily by a desire to avoid top-down 
regulation by national regulatory agencies.
458
  However, given the narrow and incomplete 
regulatory changes embodied in Dodd-Frank and AIFMD, the ability to utilize market discipline 
and private actors to obtain identifiable regulatory goals
459
remains an important means to 
address those issues involving private investment funds which remain unaddressed, such as 
adequate governance mechanisms.
Private investment funds have evolved largely outside the financial regulatory regime,
460
  
although often in ways directly related to how and where the regime had chosen to draw 
various lines of demarcation.  Such evolution continues to this day, spurred by the desire of 
fund managers and investors to innovate and pursue new opportunities in the financial 
markets.
461
  As such innovations continue and alternative approaches are adopted by fund 
investors, unique legal concerns may arise as a result, giving rise to new questions about how 
the structure effectively addresses the governance challenge. 
In practice, regulation extends beyond the mere issuance of rules and rulebooks, to include the 
entire risk-based framework used to determine the intensity of supervision to be provided to a 
particular sector within the financial services industry (e.g., private investment funds).
462
  To 
the extent that financial regulators, such as the FSA and the SEC, continue to assess private 
fund managers as ‘low impact’ relative to the other supervised entities for which they are 
responsible, such managers will be the subject of only limited or thematic reviews.
463
Industry guidelines and statements of best practice, promulgated either by specific trade 
association or by financial regulators (or groups of regulators) themselves, are increasingly
being voluntarily adopted by private investment funds and their managers to demonstrate that 
their policies and procedures are in line with recognised standards.  The promulgation of such 
guidelines both serves an educational effect on fund investors and counterparties and 
establishes a consistent baseline for analyzing the operational and structural elements of a 
fund manager and proposed fund.
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Due to the nature of private investment funds as historically unregulated financial 
arrangements between knowledgeable and sophisticated parties,
464
guidelines can be 
particularly effective in assisting the industry to continue to develop and respond to issues of 
common concern without the rigidity and delay associated with formal regulation.  In the 
context of the governance challenge, such guidelines can be used as a means to focus 
investors on issues that should be addressed either prior to their investment in a fund or during 
their period of investment or both.
465
As a result, there can exist a symbiotic relationship between the private monitoring solutions 
proposed herein and these guidelines and best practice statements.  Without some additional 
legal step taken by the parties to fund documentation, these guidelines and statements do not 
operate to create legally enforceable conduct standards.
466
  Their direct impact on a cause of 
action by a disgruntled investor is very limited.  Similarly, the private monitoring solutions are a 
means, and not an end in themselves.  They lack any particular normative content.
467
  
What precisely the procedure should be for a fund in a particular set of circumstances is not 
dictated by the monitoring solutions, whether side letters, board of directors composition or 
exchange listings are used.  Joining these two sets of concepts together could provide both the 
legal framework and the normative content necessary to address the governance challenge, 
while at the same time allowing adequate flexibility to permit private actors to react to changes 
in market practice.
In this Chapter, I describe the function of self-regulation in private investment funds and the 
role of private actors in addressing the governance challenge.  In particular, I analyze and 
compare the President’s Working Group’s Best Practices for Hedge Funds, the Managed 
Funds Association’s Sound Practices for Hedge Funds, the UK’s Hedge Funds Standards and 
the Institutional Limited Partners Association’s Guidelines.
5.2 The Role of Financial Regulation
As a result of the 2007-09 financial crisis, questions were again raised about the best 
approach to take in connection with financial regulation.
468
  Often, this consists of a debate on 
the relative merits of “principles-based” regulation and “rules-based” regulation,
469
with the 
former attributed to the UK and the latter to the US
470
  Both approaches have their advocates 
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and critics.  Dodd-Frank and AIFMD demonstrate elements of each approach, although overall 
the majority approach used is rule-based.  As one commentator has observed:
The classic example of the difference between rules and 
principles or “standards” (to use another term) involves speed 
limits, a rule will say, “Do not drive faster than 55 mph”; whereas 
a principle will say, “Do not drive faster than is reasonable and 
prudent in all circumstances.”  Put another way, a rule generally 
entails an advance determination of what conduct is permissible, 
leaving only factual issues to be determined by the frontline 
regulator or decision maker.  A principle may entail leaving both 
specification of what conduct is permissible and factual issues to 
the front line regulator.
471
Each approach, however, describes solely the manner in which the centralized power of the 
state is exercised in financial markets.  Neither approach necessarily provides for definitive 
answers about what private actors should do amongst themselves in areas not yet addressed 
by regulation.
472
  The frontier surrounding a rule-based regime is perhaps more clearly 
demarcated than a principles-based regime, but neither approach can purport to be completely 
comprehensive.  There will always be unanswered questions, especially concerning 
instruments or transactions that were either intentionally left outside the boundary line of 
regulations, or had sprung to life after the regulatory regime was last revised and updated.
Given the extensive responsibility that national financial regulators have, and the numerous 
priorities that have been set for them by their governments, it is unsurprising that attempts to 
regulate private investment funds have been largely limited to indirect regulation by way of 
their fund manager.
473
  These fund managers are already within the orbit of the regulators, or 
(in the case of the US) will join a regulatory regime that has been in place for 70 years.  
Additional requirements addressing private fund concerns can be added, albeit indirectly and 
often incompletely, by existing requirements applicable to fund managers.
Even with the recent changes effected by the passage of Dodd-Frank and the adoption of 
AIFMD, which were discussed in the previous chapter, many important questions concerning 
the structure and governance remain unanswered by the top-down financial regulatory regime.  
Realistically, if the 2007-09 financial crisis was insufficient to compel governments to consider 
and address all concerns they had about private funds, then it is unlikely that any further 
extension of the regulation will be forthcoming in either the near or the medium-term.
Accordingly, our attention must necessarily turn to the private actors themselves.
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5.3 The Limits of Financial Regulation
All attempts to address an identifiable problem in the financial markets with new regulation 
immediately opens the debate on the net effect of that regulation on the market itself.  On the 
one hand, additional regulation will often increase the cost of doing business for any affected 
firms.  As a result, such firms may be placed at a material disadvantage either to other 
categories of firms in that jurisdiction that are unaffected by the new rules, or to similar firms in 
other jurisdictions that are less regulated.  On the other hand, unresolved problems that exist 
in a regulatory gap can harm firms by making them less appealing to counterparties.  In either 
case, however, the outside reach of regulation exists, and cannot be eliminated.  Each new 
rule extends the scope of regulation incrementally, but does not eliminate the fact that certain 
parties, instruments and transactions inevitably remain beyond that outside reach.  Every 
regulatory system necessarily has a frontier.
474
Although financial regulation continues to evolve and adapt over time, significant extensions of 
regulation tend to occur in cycles, linked often to the rise of perceived abuses or shortcoming 
that are revealed as part of market crashes, whether large or small.
475
  The changes to the 
frontier between private investment funds and the US and EU regulatory regimes embodied in 
Dodd-Frank and AIFMD in all likelihood represent the high water mark of significant change for 
some time to come.  Other regulatory concerns, more directly related to the causes of, and 
continuing ramifications from, the recent global financial crisis, will take priority in the near 
term.
Debates about financial regulation often involve questions on how best to protect investors 
from new waves of financial innovation that lead to further complexities in the financial 
markets.
476
  Expectations of what regulatory regimes, and the individual regulators who police 
them, must be based on a realistic assessment of what they can accomplish in the real world.  
As commentators have observed:
If the crisis was a failure of regulation, and if regulators are 
lawyers, then it follows that lawyers in a complex world must 
have an awareness and basic knowledge of the nature of this 
complexity.  Explicitly, it is difficult to see how a lawyer regulator, 
from the most senior to the most junior rank and file, can purport 
to regulate complex financial instruments without having a 
detailed understanding of those matters beyond legal definitions, 
qualitative intuitions, and half guesses.
477
Since the trend towards ever-increasing complexity sees no signs of abating in the foreseeable 
future, financial market participants and commentators should acknowledge that there can 
often be a lag or gap between a new innovation in the market and the identification, 
deconstruction and categorization of that development by particular regulators with 
responsibility for that area.  
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The report ultimately produced by the Inspector General of the SEC documenting the pattern 
of failure within the financial regulator in connection with the Madoff debacle makes for 
sobering reading, especially in light of the number of investigations conducted which failed to 
uncover the massive fraud.
478
Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect was not the SEC’s 
failure to uncover the fraudulent activities of Madoff itself, by way of its reporting requirements 
and periodic on-site inspections, but rather the simple fact that when the SEC was provided 
detailed evidence of the crime that Madoff was committing, its personnel was unable to 
perceive and understand that a crime was even being committed.
479
5.4 A Role for Self-Regulation and Private Actors
Fortunately, however, where state-based regulation ends, fund managers and participants 
have developed detailed and elaborate private rules that govern the organization, 
remunerating, risk management and reporting activities of these funds by means of voluntary, 
contractual arrangements.
480
  As such, they can be productively analyzed and critiqued in the 
context of the theoretical literature regarding self-regulation.  As commentators have observed:
Industry self-regulators have two important potential advantages 
over both direct regulation of the financial services sector and 
pure market-based regulatory mechanisms.  One such potential 
advantage is the industry’s superior ability to access and assess, 
in a timely and efficient manner, the relevant market information . 
. . The other potential advantage of private industry actors over 
government regulators is their ability to monitor and regulate their 
own business operations on a truly global basis, without regard 
to national borders and jurisdictional limitations.
481
Numerous legal scholars, under the banner of the “New Governance” paradigm, are focusing 
wider attention on the fundamental inadequacies of relying solely on top-down, centralized 
state regulations of complex systems, such as the financial markets.
482
  Arguing that a state 
monopoly on the making and enforcing of rules is ultimately unsuccessful and inadequate, 
these commentators are exploring alternative approach that can overcome the challenges of 
informational asymmetry and expertise deficit, and which can complement and supplement 
command-and-control regulation. 
483
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Self-regulation has been championed by its supporters as “responsive, flexible, informed, 
targeted” and criticized by sceptics as “self-serving, self-interested . . . and simply a sham.”
484
Some critics have gone so far as to argue governments and financial regulators who seek to 
utilize self-regulation as a complement to other regulatory tools are abdicating their 
responsibility and creating a democratic gap in the exercise of their obligations to citizens.
485
  
In practice, however, there are a wide variety of arrangements and approaches that can be 
referred to as self-regulation,
486
and which undermine the traditional dichotomy between 
regulation on the one hand and self-regulation (in essence, deregulation) on the other.
487
   
In the context of private investment funds, we can identify in several recent examples of 
industry guidelines and best practice statements the potential for effective means of flexible 
and targeted self-regulation, which address current issues facing these funds that remain 
outside the regulatory frontier.  Below, I will discuss four such codes and describe certain key 
issues of each.  Three focus on hedge funds and just one addresses private equity funds.  
Each code prioritizes slightly different elements, although similarities and overlapping 
necessarily exist.
5.5 President’s Working Group’s Best Practices
On 22 February 2007, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (the PWG 
Committee) issued guidelines for the oversight of hedge funds, private equity funds and other 
private pools of capital, entitled ‘Agreement Among PWG And US Agency Principals On 
Principles And Guidelines Regarding Private Pools Of Capital’’.
488
  The guidelines were 
intended to guide US financial regulators as they address public policy issues associated with 
the rapid growth of private investment funds, and to serve as a framework for evaluating 
market developments, specifically concentrating on investor protection and systemic risk 
concerns.  The PWG Committee designed the guidelines to provide a flexible principles-based 
approach to address the issues presented by the growth and dynamism of these investment 
funds.  
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The PWG Committee, consisting of representatives from the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the SEC and the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission, was originally formed in 1988 to further the goals of enhancing the 
integrity, efficiency, orderliness, and competitiveness of financial markets and maintaining investor confidence.
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In summary, the guidelines lay out certain responsibilities that various participants should bear 
in mind when addressing the issues that currently face private investment funds in the financial 
markets:
(a) funds should maintain and enhance information, valuation, and risk 
management systems to provide market participants with accurate, sufficient, 
and timely information;
(b) investors should consider the suitability of investments in a private pool in light 
of investment objectives, risk tolerances, and the principle of portfolio 
diversification;
(c) counterparties and creditors should commit sufficient resources to maintain and 
enhance risk management practices; and
(d) regulators and supervisors should work together to communicate and use 
authority to ensure that supervisory expectations regarding counterparty risk 
management practices and market integrity are met.
The guidelines stress the importance of market mechanisms in addressing the challenges 
presented by the rapid growth of hedge funds and private equity funds, both to market 
participants and policy makers.  Importantly, the PWG Committee made no call for new laws or 
regulations to be adopted, on the basis that the current regulatory approach was sufficient to 
protect investors and the overall stability of the financial system.  The focus instead was with 
the funds themselves, as well as their principal counterparties, such as prime brokers, to 
adhere to certain non-binding ‘best practice’ principles for leading hedge funds and 
experienced investors.
On 15 April 2008, the private sector committees of the PWG Committee released two separate 
reports that recommend best practices and assess the accountability of the hedge fund 
industry. The Investors’ Committee and Asset Managers’ Committee were created to 
determine best practices so that market participants may enhance investor protection and 
systematic safeguards consistent with the PWG Committee’s principles and guidelines.
489
The 
best practices report for investors includes a Fiduciary’s Guide and an Investor’s Guide. The 
Fiduciary’s Guide provides recommendations to individuals charged with evaluating the 
appropriateness of hedge funds as a component of an investment portfolio.  The Investor’s 
Guide provides recommendations to those charged with executing and administering a hedge 
fund program once a hedge fund has been added to the investment portfolio.  The best 
practices report for the asset managers calls on hedge funds to adopt comprehensive best
practices in all aspects of their business, including the critical areas of disclosure, valuation of 
assets, risk management, business operations, compliance and conflicts of interest. 
The PWG Committee recommendations are intended to complement each other by 
encouraging market participants to hold other participants more accountable. Given the global 
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nature of the financial markets, the best practices were designed to be consistent with the 
recent work in the UK to improve hedge fund oversight.
490
With the goal of disclosing material information so that investors can determine if they should 
invest or redeem an investment and to be in a position to monitor such investment,
491
the Best 
Practices suggest the following types of disclosure:  private placement memorandum,
492
annual audited financial statements, periodic performance information, other investor 
communications, and other significant events.
493
With the goal of consistent valuations of assets based upon documented policies and 
segregation of duties between those who choose the investments and those who value the 
investments,
494
funds are encouraged to establish a valuation committee to set the valuation 
policies and procedures and to oversee their use in the fund.
495
  The valuation policies should 
include: the identity of the personnel involved in the process, the methodology for valuation of 
each type of investment, the supporting documentation required to be kept evidencing the 
valuations made, the pricing sources to be used in the valuation, guidelines for exceptions to 
the valuation policies, and controls over segregation of duties.
496
With the goal of creating guidance for the fund managers on the topics of compliance, conflicts 
of interest, ethical issues and regulatory issues and to create a culture of compliance within its 
organization, funds are encouraged to:
497
(a) prepare a code of ethics and a compliance manual;
498
(b) appoint a conflicts committee to oversee treatment of conflicts that arise;
499
and 
(c) inform its personnel of the foregoing procedures that are in place that include 
disciplinary measures and sanctions for failure to comply.
500
In sum, given the PWG’s focus on the immediate consequences of hedge fund failures on the 
broader financial markets, it is unsurprising that their focus here centred around general 
information flows and counterparty risks.  It is notable, however, that governance itself was not 
a direct topic of consideration.
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5.6 The Managed Fund Association’s Sound Practices
The MFA, a trade group for hedge fund industry based in the United States with the goal of 
enhancing the understanding of the alternative investments industry, published its fourth 
edition of Sound Practices
501
in November 2007.  The goals of Sound Practices range from 
improved market discipline and strengthening the US financial markets to enhancing investor 
protection. The goals of the PWG Committee, while aligned with the MFA, are broader to 
include a reduction of systemic risk and to foster investor protection.
502
Importantly, there is no mandate that all of the Best Practices and all of the Sound Practices be 
adopted by each and every fund.  The goal is that the publication of the Best Practices and the 
Sound Practices leads to voluntary adoption by hedge fund managers, even if only on a partial 
basis as applicable to the relevant hedge fund.
503
  The Sound Practices are structured as 
recommendations to, or a set of voluntary guidelines for, hedge fund managers focusing on the 
hedge fund’s operations as well as its primary constituents: the investors and clients of the 
hedge fund.
504
  
Fund managers should acknowledge their duties and responsibilities to the investors in the 
hedge fund.
505
  The MFA proposes practices intended to assist hedge fund managers in 
fulfilling these responsibilities, such as informative disclosure of objectives, investments, terms, 
risks, conflicts of interests, performance data, side letters, trade allocation policies, financial 
statements, valuation policies, code of ethics and soft dollar arrangements.
506
  Policies should 
be established to safeguard its trading information.
507
Since subscriptions and redemptions are usually based upon the current NAV, the hedge fund 
managers should establish policies for the determination of NAV that are fair, consistent and 
verifiable.
508
  These policies should cover tracking of the assets and investments from their 
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purchase and ongoing existence up to their sale and the validation and reconciliation of their 
valuation at fair value as compared to third parties’ valuation of the same asset.
509
  Inherent in 
this process is the need to keep supporting documentation to validate the amounts supporting 
the NAV.
510
With the goal of creating a strong regulatory compliance infrastructure at a hedge fund, the 
Sound Practices encourage hedge fund managers to create a culture of compliance within its 
organization.
511
  This involves monitoring compliance with all applicable laws in all jurisdictions 
in which the hedge fund operates, including all required regulatory filings
512
and having a 
document retention policy.
513
  A written code of ethical conduct should be prepared and 
distributed to all of the hedge fund managers’ employees as well as policies and procedures 
on anti-money laundering issues.
514
  Employees should attest to their understanding of all of 
the foregoing compliance policies.
515
Similar to the Best Practices, the focus of the Sound Practices on hedge funds was 
understandable and expected, given the MFA’s constituency.  Clearly, the two practice 
standards complement each other, differing unsurprisingly in the weight they give compliance 
in those areas where industry practitioners necessarily differ in their priorities from government 
regulators.  Importantly, the Sound Practices also avoids prolonged considerations of 
governance in favor of specific tasks and rules.
5.7 Sir Andrew Large’s Consultation on “Hedge Fund Standards”
In June 2007, Sir Andrew Large was appointed to lead a working group made up of hedge 
funds across Europe considering a voluntary code of practice for the sector.
516
  The industry 
working group, independent of the FSA or any other EU regulator, focussed on risk 
management, valuation and disclosure requirements for funds.  On 10 October 2007, Sir  
Andrew’s Hedge Fund Working Group (HFWG) issued its report entitled Hedge Fund 
Standards: Consultation Paper.
517
The report recognized that potential conflicts of interests can 
rise between hedge fund managers, the hedge funds which they manage and investors in 
those hedge funds.  Such conflicts can include manager remuneration and other related 
factors and the need to ensure fair treatment of multiple clients.  The report proposes best 
practice standards that seek to mitigate these conflicts of interests by requiring adequate 
governance mechanisms and oversight. 
The report recognized that there is a wide range of governance approaches within hedge 
funds.  Some adopt informal approaches, where the managers themselves are significant 
investors and know the other, sophisticated investors.  The report lists three particular drivers 
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that potentially lead to governance issues in hedge funds, requiring a reinforcement of 
oversight processes:
(a) increasing remoteness between ultimate investors and hedge fund managers;
(b) increasing institutionalisation, with investors looking for a higher degree of 
comfort; and
(c) increasing ‘retailisation’ of the ultimate investor base due to the entry of retail 
investors and investment by insurance companies and pensions plans owing 
ultimate duties to retail investors. 
Following this consultation paper, the HFWG, representing 14 leading hedge fund managers 
based mainly in the United Kingdom, published its final report on hedge fund standards on 22 
January 2008.  As a result of the feedback received,
518
the HFWG amended the proposed best 
practice standards (the Standards).
519
  The HFWG was replaced by the Hedge Fund 
Standards Board (HFSB), consisting of 12 trustees, who have responsibility for maintaining the 
Standards and updating them in future. 
Hedge fund managers wishing to become signatories to the Standards must apply to the 
HFSB and give an undertaking that, among other things, they will adopt the Standards on a 
“comply or explain” basis, and will contribute to the funding of the HFSB. In exchange, they are
able to include, in their marketing material, and elsewhere, a statement to the effect that they 
are signatories to the Standards.  The HFSB keeps a register of signatories and publishes an 
annual report on conformity with the Standards by the hedge fund industry.
520
The 28 Standards are grouped in following categories
(a) disclosure to investors and counterparties (1-4) - these Standards cover 
disclosure to investors of the hedge fund’s investment strategy and the risks 
associated with an investment in the fund; disclosure of the commercial terms 
on which the manager has agreed to manage the fund; performance 
measurement; and counterparty disclosures (such as to prime brokers);
(b) valuation (5-8) - these Standards cover separation of the valuation and portfolio 
management function; adoption of a valuation policy document covering all 
material aspects of the valuation process together with valuation procedures 
and controls; valuation of hard-to-value assets; and periodic disclosure of the 
percentage of the fund’s portfolio that is invested in hard-to-value assets;
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The report stresses that the HFSB will not act as a regulator, though it will have the power to remove a non-
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compliance.  
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(c) risk management (9-20) - these Standards are concerned with hedge fund 
managers establishing a risk framework and explaining their approach to 
managing risk, with specific Standards dealing with measuring the different 
sources of portfolio risk; establishing processes to ensure that the portfolio 
remains within its stated investment objectives, investment policy/strategy and 
other restrictions; and disclosure of the manager’s investment and risk 
management approach in marketing materials, fund offering documents and 
annual reports;  
(d) fund governance (21-22) - these Standards are designed to mitigate the 
potential conflicts of interest that can arise between hedge fund managers, the 
hedge funds which they manage, and investors in those funds, with specific
Standards providing that a suitable and robust fund governance structure 
should be established, under which a fund governing body with suitable 
experience and integrity acts with the appropriate level of independence; and 
that details of the fund governance structure should be disclosed in the fund’s 
offering documents; and
(e) shareholder conduct, including activism (23-28) - these Standards cover the 
prevention of market abuse through appropriate internal compliance 
arrangements; disclosure in the hedge fund manager’s marketing materials that 
it has a policy to prevent market abuse; adoption and disclosure of a proxy 
voting policy; and a prohibition of the borrowing of stock in order to vote.
The Standards acknowledge that the hedge fund manager and the fund governing body are 
different entities, and that the former cannot ensure that the latter follow the Standards. 
Accordingly, in many Standards or parts of Standards the obligation is on the hedge fund 
manager to “do what it reasonably can to enable and encourage” the fund governing body to 
follow the Standard.
521
  
The emphasis the Standards place on the ability to manage risk may further concentrate 
business in the hands of the larger firms, as being better able to devote the necessary 
resources to implementing appropriate systems and controls than smaller firms.   However, 
since the responses to the consultation paper indicated that managers of all sizes were 
comfortable with the disclosure-based “comply or explain” regime, the flexibility in the 
Standards may be sufficient to cater for the position of smaller managers without the need for 
a separate tier of standards expressly for them.  Furthermore, the fact that disclosure is at the 
root of all the HFWG’s recommendations is likely both to counter general criticism of the 
secrecy with which hedge fund management is conducted, and result in investors obtaining 
more information relevant to their investments. 
In many ways, the Sir Andrew and his Standards attempted a more intellectual integrated 
survey of hedge fund practices, and while still omitting other types of private funds, at least 
included a direct consideration of governance issues.  Unfortunately, the Standards, being UK 
focussed, have not seen the level of wide-spread uptake and acceptance that the MFA’s 
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Sound Practices have.  Perhaps it is notable that there was minimal input received from 
investors on the drafting of the Standards.
522
5.8 ILPA Guidelines
Since their initial release in September 2009, the Private Equity Principles (ILPA Principles) 
promulgated by the Institutional Limited Partners Association (ILPA) have attracted significant 
attention and comment from the industry.  Proponents of private equity funds frequently 
contend that every partnership agreement is bespoke, and the final result of heavy 
negotiations.  This situation is possible because only a relatively small number of investors 
participate in such funds, and the expectation is that they will remain as investors in the fund 
for significant periods of time.
The ILPA Principles attempt to outline, in connection with certain key issues, the consensus 
views of a large number of active private equity fund investors.  Some recommendations, 
however,  are currently followed by only a handful of general partners.
523
  As a result, the ILPA 
Principles can be seen as a statement of fund investors desired outcomes in these areas, even 
if not currently reflected by majority practice in the market.
524
  Ultimately, the practical benefit of 
the ILPA Principles is its ability to serve as a reference point for investors and fund managers, 
by which their negotiations can be more efficiently conducted, as well as serving as a means 
by which to compare numerous funds and their compliance or non-compliance on a particular 
point.
Limited partnership agreements are typical based on the presumptions that there will be a very 
close relationship between the practices involved.
525
  However, it is not possible to align the 
interests of general partners and limited partners in all circumstances.  As a result, conflicts will 
arise and steps must be taken to address them.  A general partner who has a clear duty to act 
in the best interest of his limited partners must be able to determine what those interests 
actually are, especially in light of any significant differences in opinion that certain limited 
partners might have.
526
  Importantly, the ILPA Principles address governance issues as well as 
economic concerns.  By laying the foundation for a meaningful dialogue between the general 
partner and the limited partners, those fund investors who are adequately prepared and 
motivated can influence the determination made by the general partner and monitor the 
implementation of such decisions.
In sum, the ILPA Principles address issues of particular relevance to private equity funds.  
Importantly, while the MFA’s Sound Practices and Sir Andrews’ Standards were prepared by 
fund managers and the PWG’s Best Practices were agreed upon by regulators, only the ILPA 
Standards entirely originated with fund participants.
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5.9 Comparisons and Criticisms of Guidelines and Standards
The four codes of conduct discussed above were each prepared by different industry groups, 
each answerable to a different constituency.  Regardless, there are many similarities between 
the codes.  Of most importance, none of these codes are legally binding.  As such, there is no 
formal sanction that can be applied to a particular fund manager who ceases to comply.  
Regulators, such as the SEC and FSA, were not directly involved in their formulation and these 
codes are not formally sanctioned under applicable rules and regulations.
However, the bodies that promulgated these codes retain the flexibility, outside of the 
traditional hindrances and delays due to lobbying and budget constraints that impact 
governmental rule-making, to continually revise and update their codes to ensure that they 
remain relevant to the rapidly evolving industry to which they relate.  Finally, each code 
focuses a substantial amount of its attention on improving information flows from the fund 
managers to the fund participants.  The private monitoring solutions, discussed in the following 
chapters, will take these themes and provide them with the mechanisms for legal enforceability 
which the codes, on their own, necessarily lack.
5.10 The Role of Investors in Investor Protection Failures 
There will always be a frontier at which the mandate of top-down, centralized financial 
regulation ends.
527
  It is not feasible in the real world for any financial regulatory system to 
anticipate all potential outcomes.  Inevitably, top-down systems will apply more detailed 
prescription to products and transactions involving retail investors, and less detailed 
prescriptions to larger, more sophisticated institutions.
528
  To attempt a one-size-fits-all 
approach could either expose retail investors to unacceptable risks or suffocate the wholesale
markets in red tape and unnecessary paperwork.
529
For that group of sophisticated investors who wish to participate in private investment funds,
530
they will require a framework in which to have their pre-investment and post-investment due 
diligence conducted.
531
  In the absence of public disclosure requirements imposed by the 
national regulator, it is ultimately left to the private actors themselves (fund investors and fund 
managers) to establish such framework.
Industry codes and best practice standards can be seen as an attempt to populate this gap for 
the benefit of the private actors who will remain active in these types of transactions.  
Ultimately, however, their lack of legal enforcement limits their effectiveness.  Investors, 
therefore, are left to fend for themselves, supported by whatever rights private law affords 
them.
532
  The central question that arises in connection with recent private investment fund 
enforcement actions
533
and legal cases
534
is to what extent did investors have access to 
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adequate information, both initially and on an ongoing basis, to monitor the actions of the fund 
manager and its key personnel, in order to detect and/or prevent the occurrence of fraudulent 
misconduct.
Frauds and other malfeasances involving private investment funds, whether structured as 
Partnership PIFs
535
or Company PIFs
536
, may occur because a fund was originally established 
with the intention of defrauding investors or, more likely, where the fund was initially launched 
with the intention of being a successful venture, but due to unexpected poor performance, 
engages in fraud to preserve an illusion of success.  In either case, underlying these incidents 
is the question of whether more effective governance mechanisms within the fund would have 
served to better protect investors, whether limited partners in a Partnership PIF or 
shareholders in a Company PIF, over time.
There are clearly limits to the extent which investors can protect themselves from outright fraud 
simply through reviewing documentation.  If the documentation is invalid, and those who are 
purporting to be independently verifying its accuracy are in on the fraud themselves, there may 
be little hope for an investors.  However, at the very least, investors need information which 
they could have independently reviewed and verified in order to make an initial investment 
decision and to review investment performance over the course of the relationship.  The best 
approach to following when considering a prospective investment, or when monitoring a 
current fund investment, is a multidisciplinary issue outside the scope of this thesis.  For these 
purposes, the focus will be not on particular data points that should be obtained or how to 
process such data points to generate a conclusion or recommendation.  Instead, this thesis 
focuses on how to put in place a framework, at the level of the legal entities which comprise 
the fund, outside the black-letter regulatory requirements that may be applicable to such fund, 
to obtain such information
537
at a time and in a manner that allows one or more fund investors 
to act upon it, in order to effectively protect their interests.  Obviously, there is no guarantee 
that investors will use such information.  
In the case of the Madoff scheme,
538
it appears unfortunately clear that many investors 
conducted little or no due diligence prior to handing over significant sums of money.
539
Importantly, several prospective investors who conducted due diligence on Madoff ultimately 
decided not to invest.
540
  This strengthens the argument that sophisticated investors who 
choose not to perform due diligence, but still invest in a private fund, should be left to suffer the 
consequence of their actions or inactions.
541
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The question of what constitutes sufficient due diligence, whether pre-investment or ongoing, 
is an important one, and involves financial analysis, risk measurement and old-fashion 
detective work.
542
  Such due diligence will often necessarily involve a review by lawyers of the 
constitutional documents and material legal agreements entered into by the fund, and a review 
by accountants of financial statements and trading records.  Nonetheless, due diligence prior 
to an investment typically includes a legal review of the fund’s constituent documents and 
offering documents and key service provider agreements (e.g., investment management 
agreement, administration agreement),
543
as well as a commercial analysis of the fund’s 
financial statements and trading records.  Often, key personnel within the fund manager will be 
interviewed, including the portfolio managers and the chief compliance officer, as well as those 
persons within the fund’s administrator who are responsible for the valuation of the fund’s 
assets.  Current and former investors may also be approached in order to see if any concerns 
exist.  On an ongoing basis, investors should have access (directly or indirectly) to sufficient 
information to determine whether or not the factors that led them to invest initially in the fund 
are still correct.  Due to the unregulated nature of private investment funds, such information 
would typically only be made available when the fund is compelled to provide it, either due to a 
contractual obligation to a particular investor (e.g., a side letter), or an obligation assumed by 
the fund to a third party (e.g., stock exchange listing), or due to the oversight obligation of its 
governance body (e.g., independent board of directors).  
For so long as the financial regulators maintain the position that the structure and operation of 
private investment funds, and consequently issues related to the governance challenge, will 
not be directly addressed by their regulatory regimes, the private monitoring solutions are three 
alternative approaches which informed and motivated private actors could consider.
5.11 Private Actors and Private Law
Once we begin to turn our attention towards private actors and the options available to them to 
address the governance challenge, the importance of the private law duties rises significantly.  
Although the wider interaction between financial regulatory regimes and the older, more 
generally applicable legal and equitable systems remains an area of some contention and 
debate
544
, where a particular product or service falls outside of financial regulation, it is natural 
that financial market participants begin to consider in detail their rights and obligations at law 
and equity.
Necessarily, questions regarding such rights and obligations, as well as claims for any 
breaches thereof, will be resolved in the civil courts.  In the context of private funds, the 
marketing restrictions excluding retail investors act to limit participation to those investors for 
whom civil litigation is not an outright impossibility.  The private monitoring solutions are 
underpinned by the private law, and it is to the private law that fund participants might look to 
enforce their rights under their side letters or to seek recourse against fund directors or 
securities exchanges who failed to fulfil their duties to them under contract or tort, or at equity.
Just as the private monitoring solutions are complemented by the normative content provided 
by industry best practices and guidelines, they are also made effective by the ability of fund 
participants to go to court and seek particular remedies.  As such, they are more than simply 
another means by which commercial parties can conduct initial or ongoing due diligence in 
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connection with an agreed transaction.  Instead, they are a means to actually change the 
constellation of potential liability that surrounds the fund manager and would provide the 
participant with legal or equitable relief.
5.12 Using Privately-Negotiated Structural Approaches to Address the Governance 
Challenge
The privately negotiated structural approaches proposed herein to address the governance 
challenge in private investment funds focus on improvements that can be made at the level of 
the fund documentation by agreement between the fund participant(s) and the fund manager. 
These improvements can be implemented with different breadth of coverage, either as 
regards:
(a) a single participant in a private investment fund (i.e., a “one-dimensional” 
solution);
545
(b) all participants in a single private investment fund (i.e., a “two-dimensional” 
solution);
546
or
(c) a collection of private investment funds who have voluntarily agreed to adhere 
to a legally binding set of requirements (i.e., a “three-dimensional” solution).
547
This thesis will propose and analyze the potential private monitoring solutions at each level. 
By monitoring, I mean the ability of a party, whether a governmental entity or a private actor
548
, 
to obtain relevant and timely information about a financial product or transaction - in this case, 
a private investment fund - in order to take such steps as the party may deem necessary to 
protect its interests.  Notably, onshore regulators have repeatedly taken the decision not to 
perform a monitoring role with regards to these funds.  As a result, fund participants must look 
to private monitoring solutions in order to address any concerns that they have.
Of course, the mere receipt of information is not sufficient in itself to eliminate fraud, 
malfeasance, negligence or error.  Much more is necessary in order for a fund participant to 
exercise its rights effectively.  Monitoring, therefore, also requires the ability to access the 
adequacy of the information received and to process it in such a manner that appropriate 
conclusions can be drawn.  Where a fund participant lacks such abilities, an agent could be 
selected who can accomplish these tasks.  Certain private actors will have these abilities, 
together with the time and resources required, while others will not.
549
  For the former, the 
private monitoring solutions provide a framework for conducting these exercises themselves.  
For the latter, the solutions although provide an approach for appointing agents who can 
supplement the vigilance of the fund participant.
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A client will expect that an investment manager who has undertaken to act for him in 
connection with the pursuit of delineated investment objectives is in a relationship of trust with 
him, 
550
whether that undertaking is directly made in a bilateral relationship or indirectly made 
through a variety of limited partnerships
551
and offshore companies
552
, as is commonly seen in 
private investment funds.  In the latter case, the client will rely on the governance structure of 
these vehicles to enforce the obligations of loyalty to which he is entitled. 
Investors appoint fund managers as their agents
553
to make investments on their behalf 
indirectly, through a private investment fund, rather than directly.  As noted above, there is an 
informational asymmetry between the active fund manager and the passive investors which 
drives the governance challenge.  The separation of ownership and control that is a recurring 
feature in the traditional corporate governance analysis is magnified in the case of private 
investment funds by their use of non-corporate and offshore vehicles, structured primarily for 
tax reasons.
554
  
Historically, the structures implemented and contractual documentation adopted for private 
investment funds have operated to limit the availability and effectiveness of legal, equitable 
and regulatory remedies for fund participants.
555
  By altering this practice, incrementally 
increasing the potential for such remedies, potential investors can take constructive steps 
towards addressing the governance challenge.  Investors in private investment funds with 
adequate knowledge about the potential risks associated with such funds and the variety of 
prior investor protection failures that have occurred can negotiate amendments or supplements 
to the fund documentation to better protect them against such outcomes, provided that they 
have adequate negotiating leverage with the fund manager and its principals.  Absent such 
leverage, fund investors face only the options of either participating in a fund structure without 
necessary amendments and improvements or declining the opportunity to invest.
Three potential solutions are discussed below which would enable fund investors to better 
address the problems arising from the governance challenge:
(a) side letters, which provide a particular investor with further information and/or legal 
standards with regard to the operation of the fund;
556
(b) improving the operation of the board of directors in either corporate-based funds or the 
general partner vehicle of limited partnership structures
557
; and
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(c) listings of private investment funds on securities exchanges as a means of adopting 
ongoing compliance oversight from an independent third party.
558
As noted above, each approach addresses the governance challenge redressing informational 
asymmetries and providing for legally enforceable conduct standards.
Further, each approach recognizes the commercial contexts in which private investment funds 
operate by emphasizing voluntary steps that fund managers and investors can take 
incrementally.  In addition, they each operate with a distinct scope of application  side letters 
as a “one-dimensional” solution involving only a single participant, board composition and 
operation as a “two-dimensional” solution involving all participants in a single fund and listings 
as a “three-dimensional” solution involving all participants in a number of different funds 
although they build in part on the key elements of the simpler approaches. However, as we 
move up levels, reliance on other parties increases, as does the distance from the fund 
participant to the prospective monitor, thereby potentially decreasing effectiveness.  
Accordingly, I will evaluate the agency issues that arise in the context of each monitoring 
solution.
5.13 Conclusions 
Any claims that further rules and regulations can in themselves serve as an adequate deterrent 
to the repeat of such incidents must be thoroughly reflected upon in light of the systemic failure 
of SEC personnel to take heed of any one of early indicators it received of Madoff’s pyramid 
scheme.
559
To the extent that sophisticated and experienced investors fail to conduct initial due diligence 
and ongoing monitoring of their participations in private investment funds  as appears to be 
the case for numerous individuals, charities and financial institutions that became ensnared in 
the Madoff scheme  their ability to obtain adequate compensation for the subsequent losses 
through private law remedies and/or regulatory actions is uncertain, at best.    
Investors who instead effectively negotiate private monitoring solutions to address the 
governance challenge, by providing themselves with adequate information and legally 
enforceable conduct standards, can in effect operate as “deputised regulators”
560
for their own 
benefit by seeking to better ensure that the fund manager is complying with its various 
obligations.  Assuming that actual regulatory and criminal enforcement personnel are not 
unlimited in number, time or attention
561
, then there will always be a counter-argument to 
regulatory expansion that unsophisticated and inexperienced investors should be the primary 
(but not necessarily exclusive) focus of such resources.
The various self-regulatory approaches that have developed around private investment funds 
in recent years have provided prospective fund investors with highly relevant parameters with 
which to analyze and judge the operational and legal risk of a fund and its manager.  By 
performing this role, private actors can make a meaningful contribution to the wider regulatory 
regime, by supplementing the top-down command-and-control authority of the financial 
regulator.  Disclosure is at the foundation of these best practice concerns.  A long-standing 
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criticism of private investment funds has been their proclivity for secrecy. However, what these 
approaches specifically, and intentionally, lack is direct legal enforceability.  Therefore, 
investors looking to use these tools to address the governance challenge must consider ways 
in which to create an enforceable legal obligation upon the fund manager to fulfil all, or part, of 
these practice standards.  
Although the “victims list” of the Madoff affairs makes for solemn reading, the individuals and 
institutions disclosed to date repeatedly fall into the category of prospective investors who 
financial regulators have consistently expected to be able to understand the risks they face 
and make the appropriate (and simple) decision of whether or not to invest in a particular 
fund.
562
The approach of both the SEC and the FSA has been, and remains, that their 
resources are focused on those elements of the financial system that pose the most risk to the 
most people.  Many would argue that wealthy citizens should not receive a greater allocation of 
scarce police personnel and assets to protect their belongings, and that if they believed they 
needed increased protection, then they should consider hiring their own private security 
personnel as needed.  And some could contend that the same analysis should apply to the 
regulation of private investment funds. 
Recognising that the negotiation position of such investors may differ from fund to fund, the 
following chapters lay out three different private monitoring solutions which operate at the level 
of the underlying legal documentation of the fund in order to address the concerns raised by 
the governance challenge.  
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Chapter 6
Side Letters as a Means of Mitigating the Governance Challenge
6.1 Introduction
The first means by which the governance challenge can be addressed is by an investor 
entering a side letter agreement with the fund and/or the fund manager whereby it is agreed 
that particular amendments are made to the fund documentation to address specific concerns. 
The law of contract
563
is central to the structuring and operation of private investment funds.  
As noted above, any successful attempt to address the governance challenge will need to take 
into account, directly or indirectly, the underlying contractual basis of these structures.  Side 
letters are an example of a direct amendment to those legal arrangements. 
It has become increasingly common for investors in private investment funds to seek special 
terms and conditions to govern their investments through such ‘side letter agreements’.  Side 
letters operate to amend or supplement particular terms within the fund documentation
564
in 
order to accommodate the particular commercial, legal and regulatory needs of the investors.  
Side letters can be used to overcome provisions in the constitutional documents of a 
Partnership PIF
565
or a Company PIF
566
that have been identified as problematic generally, as 
in circumstances, for example, where distribution or compensation provisions of a limited 
partnership agreement are believed to give rise to agency costs for fund investors.
567
  
Side letters have been used in connection with private equity funds for many years and are a 
more recent development with hedge funds.  Institutional investors (such as funds of funds, 
pension plans, and government plans) frequently obtain side letters in connection with their 
participation in private investment funds.  This can be driven both by their internal investment 
guidelines, which establish numerous requirements that they must fulfil in connection with their 
participation in a given fund (including, for example, tax related issues), and by the relative 
bargaining power that arises as a result of their ability and willingness to invest large sums of 
money. 
As a side letter operates to effect an amendment to the arrangements between the fund, the 
fund manager, and the particular investor, any provisions in the side letter that operate to 
agree between the parties a different set of rights and obligations between the parties will be 
directly relevant to determining the contractual and fiduciary duties owed.  Courts routinely 
have regard to the terms of any contracts establishing the relationship between an advisor and 
his client in determining both the fiduciary nature of the relationship and the scope of such 
duties.
568
  Investors with sufficient negotiating leverage are able to ensure that they benefit 
from fuller recourse against the fund manager for any breaches that may occur.
As discussed in Chapter 3, courts have in certain instances found that, based on the business 
relationship between an adviser and the recipient of advice, a duty of care was owed where 
the business relationships were structured in a manner that sought to remove such a 
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relationship.  However, a fund investor can, in a side letter, make explicit whether affiliates of 
the fund manager, or companies directly or indirectly related to one or more principals of the 
fund manager, clearly undertake all agreed duties of care to the fund and/or the investor.  This 
can be important in situations where an investor may be entitled to damages upon a 
successful claim, but the legal entity against which they have direct legal recourse has 
insufficient assets to fulfil the judgement, as noted in Chapter 2. If the current approach to 
modifying private law duties
569
has focused primarily on the fund manager’s perceived need to
provide certainty and minimize litigation exposure, then side letters that contain particularly 
negotiated amendments which swing the pendulum back to the default private law positions (or 
further) are worth examining in detail. 
In this chapter, I will discuss general issues related to the negotiation and use of side letters in 
private investment funds, as well as key specific terms.  Next, I will analyze the role that side 
letters can play in addressing the governance challenge. Finally, I will examine practical 
issues that arise in their use, including the impact of directors duties and possible limitations on 
their effectiveness.
6.2 General Issues
Private fund documentation
570
, as traditionally drafted by fund manager’s counsel, is not 
beyond criticism.  As one commentator has observed in the case of private equity funds 
specifically:
[I]n the private equity fund, the importance of many contract 
design features has been vastly overstated.  Although the design 
features of these agreements may appear on their face to 
provide some protection to investors, there is still significant 
reason for investors to worry about a fund manager’s abuse of 
discretion.  The implication is that contract design is an 
unsatisfactory solution to the agency costs in private equity.
571
  
However, this commentator goes on to acknowledge that different private enforcement 
mechanism might provide a solution that provides for “increased, ongoing monitoring of fund 
manager conduct.” 
572
A side letter is a written agreement between a fund and an investor, or between a fund 
manager and an investor, which supplements the fund’s offering documents, subscription 
documents and constitutional documents.
573
  The purpose of a side letter is to give one
particular investor more preferential terms than those offered to other investors.  The effect of 
entering into a side letter, therefore, is to customize in some manner the legal and commercial 
relationships in one case, without effecting those relationships with other fund participants. 
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As a general rule, the documentation will clearly provide for side letters to be entered into with 
fund investors,
574
although in many instances other fund investors may not be aware of what 
variations have been so agreed. The terms contained in a side letter can vary greatly from 
investor to investor, based on the particular needs that they have in the context of participating 
in a certain fund.  Some investors may have template side letters that they will use in each 
fund investment they undertake, thereby providing a measure of consistency and uniformity 
across potentially disparate sets of relationships with fund managers.  In other circumstances, 
particular impediments identified by a prospective investor will be addressed by way of a 
specific provision in a side letter, rather than revisions to be underlying documentation.  
Which parties should enter into the side letter depends on the particular issue which is covered 
by the side letter.  Some issues will require the fund’s directors to sign (e.g., capacity 
undertakings or more favourable redemption terms) and others may be signed only by the fund 
manager (e.g., fee rebates and additional portfolio information).  In particular, when looking at 
extending the scope of legal duties owed to the fund and its investors, as well as the parties 
against whom recourse may be sought, it will often be necessary to consider joining as parties 
to the side letter entitles beneficially owned or controlled by the principals of the fund manager, 
which may not otherwise have a legal relationship to the fund, but were established for tax 
planning or other reasons. 
6.3 Side Letter Terms
Additional information requests are a common side letter term.
575
  Such request could cover 
details about the investments underlying the fund, the decision-making process with regards to 
the investment process and bespoke reporting requirements.  In addition, investors may 
request special notices of significant events that arise, such as threatened legal or regulatory 
action, a drop in the fund’s NAV above a certain threshold, or the departure of key individuals 
within the fund manager.
576
The value of increased information in the hands of fund investors underpins all three 
monitoring solutions discussed herein, together with the belief that sophisticated investors can 
have an advantage over government officials in what they can with such information.  As one 
commentator has observed:
With respect to access to market information, private actors have a significant potential 
advantage over government regulators in terms of their ability to identify, analyze and 
evaluate potential systemic implications of the underlying trends in global financial 
markets, particularly with respect to complex financial products and transactions.  As a 
general matter, private investors and financial institutions are better equipped to access 
the key market data in real time and to process that information intelligently and 
efficiently.
577
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Liquidity-driven terms are also common.  These may take the form of relaxing or eliminating 
lock-up periods or redemption limits that would otherwise apply.  Liquidity provisions are 
intended to ensure that the fund manager has the ability to effectively manage the underlying 
portfolio without the threat of a potential ‘run on the bank’, which could occur if the fund is 
forced to sell increasingly illiquid and/or undervalued positions in order to provide money to
redeeming investors.  Waivers of such limits for a single investor, or small group of investors, 
could potentially impede the ability of other investors to protect themselves in times of crisis.
578
  
Importantly, increased redemption rights may be directly exercised as a result of additional 
information received as described above.
579
Economic terms are frequently varied by side letters as well.  This may be accomplished either 
by way of management fee rebates or performance fee waivers from the fund manager or the 
waiving of sales charges and redemption fees by the fund.  Historically, this has been one of 
the primary driver for side letters, and have been justified commercially by the 
acknowledgement that the role of the fund vehicle is primarily to administer the collectivized 
relationships between investment manager and clients in an efficient manner.  Differences in 
fees that would be justifiable in a bilateral context have been accommodated in fund 
documentation.
The issuance of side letters may present administrative burdens to the fund manager in 
relation to complying fully with the terms during the life of the fund.  Also, they raise concerns 
by the other fund investors about any special deals that may have been struck by one or more 
of their fellow investors.  As a result, so-called ‘most favoured nations’ (MFN) provisions are 
frequently included in side letters so as to ensure that an investor is given the right to receive 
the benefit of any terms contained in side letters entered into with any subsequent investors.  
Unfortunately, one consequence of using such clauses is that they can serve to multiply 
significantly the obligations of a fund manager beyond the original scope negotiated, 
increasing the possibility of inadvertent breach. 
6.4 Addressing the Governance Challenge
Side letters provide the opportunity for a single investor in a private investment fund to 
implement bilaterally with the fund and/or the manager contractual mechanisms that can 
mitigate the impact of the governance challenge.  This can be accomplished by:  
(a) providing an investor access to further information on an ongoing basis to better 
monitor the fund manager’s compliance with its legal and regulatory obligations; 
and  
(b) agreeing different legal standards to which the fund manager will be subject in 
connection with his activities with regards to the fund.
To the extent that the underlying documentation
580
of one private investment fund possess 
unique aspects not previously encountered by the investor, the required side letter provisions 
could be revised to respond to these particularities.  Also, as an investors negotiating leverage 
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will potentially differ materially in relation to different funds, the scope and effectiveness of side 
letters will vary from one fund to another, as a result of the level of success in negotiations with 
the fund manager.  Consequently, there is necessarily a wide scope of variance in the level of 
protection any one fund investor will obtain across all of the fund investments in its portfolio, as 
well as in the level of protection that the fund investors in any one fund will enjoy.
6.4.1 Information
Where an investor has the time and resources to make adequate use of further information on 
the day-to-day operation of a private investment fund, a side letter can include terms that give 
such investor a wider flow of information from the fund manager than is provided to the other 
fund investors.  Such information can be provided to the investor on a confidential basis to be 
analyzed either on its own or by comparison to other funds in which there are similar 
investments.
Bespoke reporting arrangements can be put in place where an investor receives information 
on the change in value in all, or certain, investments, as well as insight into the internal 
decision-making process of the fund manager with regards to the underlying investment 
portfolio.  As a result of such information, questions may be raised with the fund manager 
regarding actions or omissions that may be symptomatic of, or precursors to, improper 
valuations or misrepresented portfolio performance, for example. 
Provisions can also be included in side letters whereby the fund manager is contractually 
bound to notify the investor of certain non-investment related events with regards to the fund or 
the fund manager, such as a threatened lawsuit, a pending regulatory action, or the departure 
of one or more senior professionals within the fund manager.  Information such as this could 
provide a fund investor with a sufficient factual foundation to detect, at an earlier stage than 
otherwise might be possible, an underlying breach by the fund manager of legal and/or 
regulatory duties owed either to the fund or the investor directly.
Certain significant investors in a private investment fund may also be in a position to negotiate 
in their side letter a term that would entitle them to provide a member, or an observer, to either 
a board of directors or the advisory committee of the fund.  Such participation can provide an 
investor with further access to relevant information about the extent to which the fund manager 
is fulfilling its duties to the fund.  Frequently seen in private equity funds  (and potentially of use 
in a wider variety of private investment funds), an advisory committee is composed of senior 
personnel from the fund manager as well as investor representatives.
581
  The committee can 
function as an approval mechanism for potential investments that would otherwise be outside 
the scope of the fund or resolving potential conflicts of interest.  In the case of Partnership 
PIFs, adequate steps should be taken to ensure that any involvement in an advisory 
committee does not lead to a loss of limited liability for such investor.
6.4.2 Legal Duties
In a side letter, a fund manager can agree with an investor that it will be subject to higher or 
lower levels of duty to such investor in particular circumstances.  In this manner, the applicable 
legal obligations owed by the fund manager can be expanded, restricted or clarified to further 
protect the investor.
582
  The terms of any contracts between a fund manager, the fund, and an 
investor in the fund will play a crucial role in defining the boundaries of any fiduciary 
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relationship with the fund manager.   In order to establish whether and to what extent the fund 
manager is in a position of trust with regard to the fund (and, therefore, the investor), courts will 
look at what the fund manager was retained to do and on what terms.
583
Courts have regard to the terms of any contracts establishing the relationship between an 
advisor and his client in determining both the fiduciary nature of the relationship and the scope 
of such duties.
584
  Courts have in certain instances found that, based on the business 
relationship between an adviser and the recipient of advice, a duty of care was owed where 
the business relationships were structured in a manner that sought to remove such a 
relationship.
585
A fund investor can, however, make explicit whether affiliates of the fund 
manager, or companies directly or indirectly related to one or more principals of the fund 
manager, clearly undertake all agreed duty of care to the fund and/or the investor.  
As discussed earlier, the default private law rights and duties of fund participants and the fund 
manager can, and often are, modified in the documentation used to establish the fund.  
Traditionally, the sponsors and promoters of a private investment fund have sought to limit, or 
eliminate, the liability of the fund manager and individual principals to the greatest extent 
possible.  Subject to a certain core of prohibitions on such modifications, the private law in the 
UK and the US permits parties to extend or restrict legal and/or equitable duties and courts 
enforce these modifications when litigation occurs.  
6.5 Practical Issues
In assessing the potential effectiveness of side letters as a private monitoring solution to the 
governance challenge, it is necessary to identify and evaluate the practical issues that arise in 
connection with negotiating and implementing them.  Although side letters are a convenient 
means to amend the standard terms already in place in the fund documentation, and where 
necessary address the problems resulting from the governance challenge, they also present 
potential practical and legal problems that must be recognized and addressed by prospective 
investors. Failure to adequately address these issues may materially limit the effectiveness in 
addressing the governance challenge.
6.5.1 The Fund’s Prospectus and Constitutional Documents
The first consideration when a side letter is requested by an investor is whether the fund’s 
prospectus and constitutional documents
586
permits the fund to enter into a side letter in 
respect of the relevant special terms and conditions.  In order to treat one partner or 
shareholder  materially different from the others, it will often be necessary to have clear 
provisions in the partnership agreement, in the case of a Partnership PIF
587
, or the articles of 
association, in the case of a Company PIF
588
, stating that this is permissible.  Without such 
language, there may be a risk that such disparate treatment would be illegal and voidable
under either partnership law or company law, as applicable. In addition, other fund participants 
may claim that the offering memorandum used to market the fund interests contained a 
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material misstatement or omission if the different treatment provided to certain participants was 
not adequately disclosed.  
Therefore, the fund manager must ensure that existing investors have received adequate 
disclosure that other investors in the same class of shares or interests may be permitted to 
invest on more favourable terms in order for the directors to fulfil their directors’ duties and the 
fund manager to fulfil its common law fiduciary duties.  If, for example, the fund is listed on the 
Irish Stock Exchange (ISE)
589
, the applicable listing rule will require the fund to ensure equality of 
treatment for all shareholders who are in the same position.  Side letters can, therefore, cause 
difficulties for a listed fund in terms of complying with its listing obligations.
In light of these general concerns over the impact of side letters on the other fund investors, 
the UK Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA) issued a guidance note on 
hedge fund side letters (the Guidance),
590
which was reviewed by the FSA prior to its 
issuance.
591
  Pursuant to the Guidance, UK hedge fund managers should disclose the 
existence of any side letters containing ‘material terms’ entered into with investors in their 
funds.  A material term would be: 
Any term the effect of which might reasonably be expected to provide an investor with 
more favourable treatment than other holders of the same class of share or interest 
which enhances that investors ability either:
(i) to redeem shares or interests of that class; or
(ii) to make a determination as to whether to redeem shares or interests of that 
class, and which in either case might, therefore, reasonably be expected to put 
other holders of shares or interests of that class who are in the same position, 
at a material disadvantage in connection with the exercise of their redemption 
rights.
592
The Guidance states that keyman provisions, redemption limit waivers, and portfolio 
transparency rights as ‘material terms’.  Although no similar guidance has been issued by US 
trade associations,
593
similar concerns can arise in funds subject to US law.  In the absence of 
such guidance, the AIMA Guidance has become an international point of reference for dealing 
with side letter disclosures and related issues.
In addition, there are unanswered questions involving the content of some side letters.  
Arguments have been made that where a side letter term purports to alter the terms of the 
partnership agreement, in the case of a Partnership PIF, then such side letter term might not 
be enforceable, if instead a formal amendment, including a note of the other partners, would 
be required.
594
  Although the answer to this question may vary from one jurisdiction to another, 
side letter terms which are limited to either simply clarifying the language of the limited 
partnership agreement, or extracting a contractual commitment from the fund manager that 
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any discretion granted to them will be exercised in a particular way under certain 
circumstances, should be safe from most challenges. However, more aggressive side letter 
terms that attempt to go so far as to materially alter a contractual term that applies as between 
limited partners, in addition to between a limited partner and the general partner, such as, for 
example, the contribution provisions which support an indemnity provision, may be open to 
challenge.
6.6 Directors’ Duties
Side letters are used to make different legal arrangements with individual fund participants 
outside the constitutional or contractual arrangements of a private investment fund that apply 
to other investors.  As discussed above, the terms contained in the fund documentation are 
generally intended to apply equally to investors who participate in the fund.  However, as these 
vehicles operate as a means to collectivise bilateral investment management relationships, 
funds often reserve the right for the board of directors, in the case of Company PIFs
595
, to 
enter into a side letter, on request by an investor, changing certain terms and conditions, such 
as those relating to subscriptions and redemptions.
596
As directors owe their duties to the fund as a whole, and not the fund manager of any 
particular group of shareholders
597
, when entering into a side letter the directors will need to 
determine that, in doing so, the interests of existing investors are not being compromised.  The 
problems posed by side letters, which are given on a case by case basis in reference to 
particular factual situations, are multiplied when investors are giving special contractual terms 
in side letters that waive such terms and conditions in advance.
The legal position with regard to the use of side letters by funds domiciled in the Cayman 
Islands funds and the implication in terms of their corporate governance are particularly 
relevant in the current environment.
598
Under Cayman Islands law, if a director, acting within 
his authority, is not negligent or fraudulent and complies with his fiduciary duties, the fact that a 
decision to enter a side letter with a prospective shareholder turns out to cause loss to the 
company and the other shareholders is unlikely to result in personal liability for the director.  To 
the extent that terms of the fund documentation are to be varied, directors need to analyze and 
understand the reasoning for the proposed changes and its impact on the other investors in 
the fund prior to agreeing the amendments.
599
  
A Cayman Islands private investment fund would fall within a lightly regulated category of 
funds of the Mutual Fund Law (MFL).  As a result, the regulatory authority generally does not 
perform any form of oversight or compliance review of such funds.  Directors will therefore be 
in the position of having to balance commercial considerations for private investment funds, 
with a duty to act in the best interests of the fund’s shareholders, without the reference to 
imposed regulatory parameters.   The Companies Law contains provisions which to protect 
third parties entering into transactions with the company from such transactions being deemed 
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invalid or by reason of the company’s lack of capacity or lack of corporate benefit.
600
  In 
negotiating a side letter, it is important to understand any limitations that such terms will 
impose on the fund’s future actions. Under the MFL,
601
directors of hedge funds regulated by 
the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority (CIMA) must prepare offering documents in respect of 
equity interests which
(a) describe the equity interests in all material respects; and
(b) contain such other information as is necessary to enable a prospective investor 
in the fund to make an informed decision as to whether or not to subscribe for or 
purchase the equity interests.
The issue of whether the fiduciary duties of a director require the disclosure of side letters as 
‘necessary to enable a prospective investor in the fund to make an informed decision as to 
whether or not to subscribe for or purchase the equity interests’ is therefore also relevant to the 
process of entering into side letters.  Funds that use side letters can include clear and 
unambiguous disclosure of the fund’s intention to use such arrangements in the offering 
documents and specific enumerated powers in the constitutional documents enabling the 
directors to enter side letters on behalf of the company.
602
Many larger investors, who are often themselves fiduciaries, seek to use side letters as risk 
reduction tools for their own investments.  However, their risk reduction exercise can have a 
corresponding risk enhancement on the part of other investors in the fund.  Further, by 
establishing different economic and commercial interests among a fund’s investors, the 
governance challenge is increased as such investors may find that their ability to establish and 
maintain common positions vis à vis the fund manager is limited.
The directors must also consider their fiduciary duties as directors, which include a duty to act 
in what they consider to be the best interests of the fund.
603
  This duty is owed to the fund 
itself, and as a result, the directors are not entitled to consider solely the interests of a specific 
shareholder or the fund manager in determining whether or not to enter into a side letter. 
The effect of providing a special term to one investor can act to put the other investors at a 
significant disadvantage.  For example, where greater portfolio transparency rights are 
requested by an investor, the directors should consider whether this would confer a material 
advantage over other investors, should such information better prepare them to redeem out of 
a fund at an earlier stage during times of market turbulence.  In certain instances, directors 
may decide that their duties require that the same transparency should be provided or offered 
to all investors.  
Directors concerned over their potential liabilities will also want to ensure that the use of side 
letters is monitored on a regular basis for any actions that are needed.  MFN clauses, which 
seek to obtain for an investor the best terms that the fund or fund manager has granted to any 
other investor in the fund, often require close oversight to ensure inadvertent breaches to not 
                                               
600
See Section 28 of the Companies Law (2010 Revision).
601
See Section 4(6) of the Mutual Funds Law (2009 Revision).
602
See Section 3.10 above.
603
See Section 2.4 above.
121
occur.  A mistake made in connection with a side letter could also mean that the fund manager 
or the fund could be liable to an investor for breach of contract.
604
  
6.7 Limitations on Effectiveness
A side letter between a fund investor and a fund manager is an example of private rule-making 
by industry actors, which exists in addition to the financial regulatory regime in which the 
parties are operating.
605
  However, to be effective the provisions of the side letter must be 
complied with, and information provided pursuant to it must be analyzed and acted upon.  As 
one commentator has noted:
[I]nformation disclosure regimes can be seen as augmenting the pre-conditions of a 
competitive marketplace and enhancing consumer sovereignty, in turn promoting 
competitive and market efficiency.  Similarly, such regimes don’t restrict or impede 
consumer choice, or impede producer/supplier flexibility and are therefore consistent 
with notions of market freedom and the superior ability of the markets to distribute the 
greatest good to society through product competition.
606
   
Underlying this argument is a belief that investors make poor investment decisions because 
they do not possess adequate information about the investment in question and its risks.
607
   
While a centrally mandated information disclosure regime imposed by a financial regulator can 
implement disclosure requirements in connection with particular investment products or 
transactions,
608
in their absence, investors must seek to obtain that information on their own, or 
elect to forgo the investment opportunity in its entirety.
609
  As one commentator has observed:
There is a temptation in the modern “information society” to view information as 
communication.  Disseminating information becomes equaled with creating knowledge 
and understanding.  But effective communication is a two-way process and requires the 
reflexive monitoring of each recipient’s response.  Information dissemination on the 
other hand is a contextual, nonreflexive and impersonal, it requires interpretation to 
give meaning.
610
No matter how extensive and detailed the information disclosure requirements are in a side 
letter, the investor (or his agent) must analyze the information provided in a critical and 
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comprehensive way in order to draw the appropriate conclusion.  If an investor is unable
611
or 
unwilling to do this, the value of the side letter is limited.
612
  Such an investor, or investors, will 
need to look to others in order to process this information.  In the case of Company PIFs,
613
or 
where companies are used as general parties for Partnership PIFs,
614
the fund investors may 
look to the independent directors to perform this role.
Although many observers have argued that disclosure can be a very effective regulatory 
tool,
615
there are those who criticise its real utility.
616
  As discussed above, behavioural finance 
argues that cognitive biases cause individuals to process disclosures incompletely or 
ineffectively.
617
  While acknowledging the real contribution that this growing literature has 
made, it is important to recognize that in the context of private investment funds the 
prospective investors will be non-retail.  As a result, even if they are unable to process the 
disclosures efficiently and effectively, they will have the means to retain an agent who will be 
able to provide that service.  In the case of a retail investor who cannot afford such expense, 
the issues about the limitations of disclosure, and the risks of distraction and processing, are 
more credible.
618
It is also important at this juncture to acknowledge that there are circumstances where certain 
side letter terms can actually operate to exacerbate the governance challenge within private 
funds, rather than address it.  For example, where some investors are given preferential rights 
over other investors to withdraw their assets from an open-end fund, such as a hedge fund, the 
governance of the fund is improved, if at all, in the favour of the former only at the potential 
expense of the latter.
Importantly, however, preferential redemption terms are not proposed in this thesis as one of 
the terms that would be included in the side letters be used as private monitoring solutions.  
Instead, such side letters would focus on heightening the information flow between the fund 
manager and the particular investor, or increasing the standard for the legal and equitable 
duties owed by the fund manager to the particular investor.  As a private monitoring solution, a 
side letter would not be used to alter or undermine the relative rights and obligations among 
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the various fund participants.  In this regard, the extensive use of side letters in private equity 
funds, which by their very structure have no need for preferential liquidity terms, is perhaps a 
better point of reference than hedge fund side letters.
Invariably, different investors in a private fund will have varying levels of expertise and 
experience in relation to participating in funds of a particular type or asset class.  As a result, 
such investors will react to any particular information flow in potentially different ways.  
Solutions to the governance challenge in private funds, therefore, cannot be measured against 
the same standards of homogeneity and fungibility that apply to retail investors participating in 
a mutual fund.  In a private fund, by contrast, each sophisticated non-retail investor knows that, 
in the absence of uniform product-level regulations and mandatory disclosure regimes, each 
fund participant must make certain important decisions independently and to the best of their 
abilities.
Further, there may be jurisdictional issues involving choice of law that need to be resolved in 
order to evaluate the effectiveness.  As noted above, it is not uncommon to fund vehicles to be 
established in various different domiciles (e.g., Delaware, England, Cayman Islands) and 
relevant fund manager entities to be located elsewhere (e.g., London, New York).  Therefore, 
questions will be raised as to which law should govern the side letter in order to maximize its 
chances of being enforceable when needed.  In the case of side letter provisions to be 
enforced against the fund manager directly, the law of the jurisdiction where it is located would 
be advantageous, although selecting the law of the jurisdiction where the relevant fund vehicle 
is located would provide synergies with the interpretation of the constitutional documents of 
such vehicle.
619
In addition, side letters operate to increase the potential inequalities between fund participants 
by limiting the circumstances in which their rights and interests in the fund vehicle are pari
passu.  Given that the alternative to investing in a fund with a manager is giving it a sum of 
money directly to invest on a separate, segregated basis, the concern over disparate rights 
and obligations can be acknowledged but recognized as similar to other commercial difference 
that may exist between investors, such as different fees or being excused from certain types of 
investments (e.g., gambling, armaments).  Ultimately, the purpose of the fund vehicle is to 
provide access to the fund manager’s talent and abilities in circumstances where a directly-
negotiated, bilateral contract is not available.  A fund is not an end in itself.
Finally, there may be legal limitations that impact the effectiveness of side letters based on the 
type of legal vehicle used for the fund.  In the case of a Partnership PIF, the use of side letters 
may raise concerns about individual parties actually engaging in management activities, and 
thereby putting their limited liability at risk.  As one commentator has observed:
[T]he legal default rule of limited liability for investors also reinforces the separation of 
ownership and management and, again, creates the potential for agent misconduct.  
The implications of the liability rules reaffirm the notion that the general partner controls 
the operation of the business and is personally liable for partnership debts.  The limited 
partners protection from liability has been traditionally tied to the idea that they avoid 
excessive intervention in managerial decision making.  When private equity investors 
participate in management, they create a small chance that they too may be exposed 
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to potential liability under the control rule and other legal principles that tie liability to 
conduct.
620
Side letters, therefore, can be subject to certain practical limits on their effectiveness due to 
issues that are in their negotiation and implementation.  Further, not all fund investors will find 
that they are able to obtain the levels of protection that they require in all the funds with which 
they would like to invest.  Finally, entering a side letter is often the first step of an ongoing 
process of monitoring and oversight that rests fundamentally with the investors who requested 
the side letter.
621
Regardless of these limitations, however, where a side letter can be entered into effectively, 
such investors could materially improve the governance of the fund, at least to the extents of 
its own participation in the fund.  In the absence of any other means to address the 
governance challenge in that particular fund, something is clearly better than nothing, 
especially if the only other alternatives available to the prospective investor is to participate in
the fund without attempting to address the governance issues, or to simply not invest at all.
6.8 Conclusion
Side letters provide a meaningful means for a fund participant, acting bilaterally with the fund 
manager,  to take steps to address the governance challenge, in whole or in part.   However, 
the ultimate weakness of side letters, that they undermine the equal treatment of fund investors 
who would otherwise presume would be on a pari passu basis with each other, are at the source 
of the FSA’s and ISE’s concern over them.
622
  
Although they may be a potential solution to the governance challenge for one or more fund 
investors, they run the risk of setting the interests of different investors against each other and 
thereby amplifying the governance challenge facing the remaining investors.  As a result, the 
ultimate effectiveness of the unilateral use of side letter is potentially less appealing than 
alternative approaches which could address the governance challenge for all investors in a 
particular fund.  Such an approach would necessarily need to focus on the central governance 
mechanisms within the fund vehicle itself.  In the next chapter, therefore, I will look at the 
manner in which the operation of a board of directors can be improved to better address the 
governance challenge.
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Chapter 7
Board of Directors Composition as a Means to Mitigating the Governance Challenge
7.1 Introduction
The second means by which the governance challenge can be addressed is by having 
independent directors on the boards of fund vehicles  either in connection with a Company 
PIF or the general partner vehicle of a Partnership PIF  with the necessary skills and 
experience to act credibly and independently in making decisions for the fund.  Much value in 
many private investment funds has been destroyed since the commencement of the recent 
global financial crisis.  Legitimate questions are being asked about the adequacy of directors in 
fulfilling their obligation to “direct” their companies, rather than merely “observing” the fund 
manager.  As one commentator has observed:
Boards must play two roles:  advisors and supervisors to their CEO and their 
corporation.  These two roles are usually combined and draw on each other.  Boards 
do not, however, have the tools necessary to perform either function well.  To advise 
well, one must know what is going on in the corporation.  To supervise well, one must 
know what is going on in the corporation and take some advisory action as well . . . 
Thus, in both roles Boards must receive sufficient and adequate information . . .
623
A private investment fund’s dependence on the fund manager for information is a key driver 
underlying the governance challenge.
624
  Directors of the fund vehicle must ensure that their 
fiduciary duties are adequately fulfilled, especially in circumstances that find them in direct 
conflict with the fund manager.
625
The inclusion of directors who are independent of the fund 
manager can serve to better address the governance challenge for all participants in a 
particular investment fund.
As discussed above, recent scandals involving hedge funds have shown a lack of effective 
oversight of corporate accounting and financial reporting and failures in managing conflicts of 
interest by those involved.
626
  A common theme raised in discussions of these scandals, and 
the accompanying proposals for new reforms to prevent their recurrence, is the substantial 
enhancement of the independence and oversight responsibilities of boards of directors.
In particular, questions have arisen about increasing the roles and responsibilities of 
independent directors in the context of fund governance. Independent directors have the 
potential to act as watchdogs for investors over the fund manager and other service providers 
to the fund, by bringing impartiality and experience to a fund’s board and its oversight of the 
fund’s affairs and activities.  In light of the governance challenge faced by private investment 
funds, independence has become an essential element of a fund’s board, not only from a 
listing rule compliance perspective
627
but also from an investor expectation perspective.
Notably, independent directors in US-regulated public investment companies play a critical role 
in protecting the interest of fund shareholders, by their oversight of fund operations and their 
monitoring of conflicts of interest with the fund manager.  They seek to ensure that fund 
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shareholders receive the benefits to which they are entitled, pursuant to the fund’s 
documentation and at law and equity.  Explicit regulatory obligations imposed by the SEC on 
independent directors supplement and extend the fiduciary and other duties that they owe 
under the state law where the fund was established.  Adopting voluntarily a similar approach 
for private investment funds would provide an additional means for addressing the governance 
challenge. 
Investment funds are different from operating companies in a number of important ways.  As a 
result, the question of the manner in which a board of directors can operate to address 
governance issues is potentially different.  As one critic has noted:
The transliteration of traditional corporate governance norms to the mutual fund context 
is simplistic – and misplaced.  Unlike their counterparts in operating companies, fund 
directors are not subject to the threat of shareholder insurgencies or takeover 
pressures; they lack the realistic power to replace fund management, and they 
generally rely on the management firm for information, direction and compensation.
628
Consequently, any analysis of the role of independent directors in the particular case of private 
investment funds must recognize the commercial realities of the manner in which such funds 
are operated, in order to ensure that the anticipated benefits are ultimately delivered to the 
fund investors.
In this Chapter, I will discuss the role of an independent director, both generally and in the 
context of investment funds, either public or private.  Next, I will analyze the duties of 
independent directors and the effectiveness of boards.  Then, I will describe the role of 
directors in general partner vehicles, and the intersection between limited company law and 
partnership law.  Finally, I will critique the effectiveness of independent directors and evaluate 
their role as a private monitoring solution.
7.2 Role of an Independent Director
The term ‘independent director’, in the case of a traditional operating company, refers to a 
director who is independent of the company’s internal management. In the case of a fund, the 
term refers to the director’s independence from the company’s external fund manager, rather 
than from its executive management, which are rarely seen in most fund structures.
Directors of investment funds can be categorised as either ‘interested’ or ‘independent’.  An 
‘independent’ director can be defined as one who is independent of management and free 
from any business or other relationships which could significantly interfere with the director’s 
ability to act with a view to the best interests of the company.  Interested directors are 
employees of the fund’s investment manager. Independent directors in contrast will not have 
any significant relationship with the fund’s manager.
Independent directors can perform two complementary functions:  (a) providing specialized 
advice and expertise to the executive directors and (b) monitoring executive decision 
making.
629
  Financial incentives are traditionally not a primary factor in motivating individuals to 
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serve in such capacity.
630
  The return he or she receives for services rendered will be relatively 
modest compared to, for example, the portfolio manager in charge of the fund.  However, the 
risks that independent directors face are significant and growing, whether from legal actions or 
reputational risk.
631
The effectiveness of independent directors has many critics.
632
  Limitations on their ability to 
influence the affairs of their companies include:  (a) the desire not to antagonize management, 
(b) time constraints, (c) lack of adequate information and (d) inability to coordinate their actions 
with other independent directors.
633
  However, they also have their champions.
634
  For 
example, independent directors of registered mutual funds in the US are felt by many 
commentators to serve a vital role in the process of securing the regulatory goals of the SEC.  
Of particular importance is the continued confidence of mutual fund investors in the vehicles in 
which they entrust their savings, as well as the benefit to the financial markets generally of the 
liquidity provided by this money being directed to, and utilized by, other market participants.
635
The US Investment Company Act of 1940 establishes a detailed regime for independent 
directors of retail mutual funds, providing a central role for them in resolving potential conflicts 
of interests and serving as a means for “checks and balances” within the governance structure.  
Individuals who are “interested persons”
636
are not eligible to serve as independent directors.  
A director will be “interested” under the Investment Company  Act - and therefore not 
independent - if the person is affiliated with the investment company or its fund manager, or is 
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Ibid. at 103-104.
632
See Gilson and Kraakman at 873 (“The justification for relying on outside directors as a monitoring mechanism 
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Cheffin at 105.  See Section 7.3 below.
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See, e.g., Victor Brudney, “The Independent Director - Heavenly City or Potemkin Village,” 95 Harvard Law 
Review 597 (1982).
635
See Larry D. Barnett, “The Regulation of Mutual Fund Board of Directors: Financial Protection or Social 
Productivity?” 16 J.L. & Policy 489, 480 (2007-2008) (“Given the current importance of mutual funds, instances 
of exploitation of fund shareholders may damage the economic welfare of individuals and reduce investments 
in securities by the public.”).  Similar concerns could be raised in support of private investment funds as well.
636
Section 2(a)(19) of the Act outlines those individuals who should be deemed “interested persons” and 
including the following:  
(A) When used with respect to an investment company— (i) any affiliated person of such company; (ii) any 
member of the immediate family of any natural person who is an affiliated person of such company;  (iii) any 
interested person of any investment adviser of or principal underwriter for such company; (iv) any person or 
partner or employee of any person who at any time since the beginning of the last two completed fiscal years 
of such company has acted as legal counsel for such company...
(B) When used with respect to an investment adviser of or principal underwriter for any investment company—
(i) any affiliated person of such investment adviser or principal underwriter; (ii) any member of the immediate 
family of any natural persons who is an affiliated person of such investment adviser or principal underwriter; 
(iii) any person who knowingly has any direct or indirect beneficial interest in, or who is designated as trustee, 
executor, or guardian of any legal interest in, any security issued either by such investment adviser or principal 
underwriter or by a controlling person of such investment adviser or principal underwriter; (iv) any person or 
partner or employee of any person who at any time since the beginning of the last two completed fiscal years of 
such investment company has acted as legal counsel for such investment adviser or principal underwriter...
128
a family member of such a person.
637
  The Investment Company Act was unique at the time of 
its adoption in its attempt to construct a financial regulation regime directly on top of the pre-
existing board of directors role in corporations,
638
rather than simply rely on further disclosure 
requirements.
The two principal functions of a mutual fund’s board of directors are negotiating the investment 
management agreement with the fund manager and supervising the compliance of the fund, 
the fund manager and other service providers with the legal and regulatory requirements to 
which they are subject.
639
In the US, numerous provisions of the Investment Company Act 
promote the use of independent directors in retail mutual funds.  This is accomplished by 
making a number of exemptive rules available only if sufficient directors are independent.
640
  
The SEC views fund director independence as an important tool to limit conflicts of interest and 
improve governance at the fund level.
641
  The independent directors are anticipated to perform 
a “watch-dog” role 
642
and the SEC has increased their reliance on these individuals over the 
years.
Similar to private investment funds, and unlike most other operating business, a mutual fund 
will not employ its own internal management and staff.  Instead, they will appoint third-party, 
such as investment management firms, to provide the services that they require.  As a result, 
the ability of the board to effectively oversee the actions of the external fund manager is 
imperative.  In certain instances, the independent directors may be required to vote separately 
to approve certain actions. 
643
   
According to the US Supreme Court:
[T]he structure and purpose of the Investment Company Act indicate[s] that Congress 
entrusted to the independent directors of investment companies ... the primary 
responsibility of looking after the interest of the fund’s shareholders.
644
Independent directors, therefore, must take adequate steps to ensure that they are fulfilling this 
important responsibility.  However, questions still remained about how boards, and the 
independent directors serving on them, could operate most effectively.  In 1999, the US-based 
Investment Company Institute (ICI) issued its best practices recommendations for boards of 
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641
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http://sec.gov/news/speech/spch 120403hjg.htm.
642
See Moses v Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1
st
Cir. 1971).
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See, for example, Rule 12b -1.
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Burks v Lasker, 441 US 471, 486 (1979).  See also SEC Division of Investment Management,  Protecting 
Investors : A Half Century of Investment Company Regulation (May 1992).
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directors of retail mutual funds,
645
many of which have the potential for direct application in the 
context of private investment funds. The recommendations included the following:
(a) at least two-thirds (2/3) of a fund’s directors should be independent;
(b) former officers or directors of the fund manager should not qualify as 
independent directors;
(c) independent directors should nominate and select any new independent 
directors;
(d) the compensation of directors should be determined by the independent 
directors, not the fund manager;
(e) fund directors should have investments in their funds;
(f) independent directors have access to independent legal advice; and
(g) independent directors should meet separately when considering issues directly 
related to the fund manager (e.g. advisory contracts).
Each of these recommendations can work towards maintaining a fuller and more 
comprehensive oversight function in connection with the fund managers ongoing compliance 
with its legal and regulatory obligations to fund participants.  
Importantly, the requirements imposed by the independent directors rules sit on top of the 
corporation law which governs the establishment and operations of the legal entities.
646
  In the 
US, such entities are creatures of state law, and the jurisprudence and case law which applies 
to them varies from state to state.  This, however, is complemented and expanded by 
independent director requirements in a “top-down” manner by federal law. 
The fundamental requirement, in most instances, is that at least 40% of the members of a 
board of a registered investment company not be “interested persons”,
647
in addition, a series 
of so-called “exemptive rules” will only be available to registered investment companies if a 
majority of the directors are independent.
648
Over the last decade, the SEC has sought to 
reinvigorate the composition of fund boards and the role of independent directors.
649
  Central to 
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dealer is a member of the underwriting syndicate); Rue 12b-1 (permitting the use of fund assets to pay for 
distributions); Rule 15a-4(b)(2) (permitting approval of an interim advisory contract without shareholder 
approval following a change in control of the adviser); Rule 17a-7 (permitting cross-transactions with affiliates); 
Rule 17a-8 (permitting mergers between affiliated funds); Rule 17d-1(d)(7) (permitting funds and affiliates to 
participate in joint liability insurance policies); Rule 17e-1 (permitting payment of commissions to affiliated 
brokers); Rule 17g-1(j) (permitting funds and affiliates to maintain a joint fidelity bond); Rule 18f-3 (permitting 
funds to issue multiple classes of shares); and Rule 23c-3 (permitting the operation of closed-end funds that 
periodically repurchase shares from investors).  
649
See, e.g., “Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies”, Investment Company Act Release No. 
IC-24816 (Jan. 16, 2001).
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the reasoning behind using independent directors to fulfil a regulatory or public policy goal is 
the belief that interested directors, despite the fiduciary duties that they owe to a company, will 
not be consistently fair to fund investors in their decision making.
This lack of confidence in interested directors has been a recurrent theme of SEC regulation 
since its initial adoption in 1940.  These concerns centre around the risk that on the occurrence 
of a potential conflict of interest, such individuals will be unable (or be seen to be unable) to 
take a decision on the merits in light of the best interest of the fund participants.
650
  The SEC 
has stated plainly:
The role of independent fund directors in policing conflicts of 
interest is central to the Investment Company Act.
651
The definition of “interested” covers a wide variety of people who might be subject to influence 
and conflicts of interest which would impede their ability to make decisions in the best interest 
of mutual fund shareholders.  Importantly, the status of a director as “interested” or 
“independent” does not in itself impact his or her liability to exposure.
Interestingly, an independent directors’ regime also exists in the UK in the context of listed 
investment trusts.  In the UK, directors of closed-end and listed investment companies are 
subject to the requirements and recommendations of the UK Code on Corporate Governance.  
The Association of Investment Companies’ (AIC) Code of Corporate Governance (AIC Code) 
and the UKLA Listing Rules.  Because of their unique structure, not all of the provisions of the 
UK Code on Corporate Governance are appropriate.
652
Under these principles, a majority of the board of the investment company (including the 
chairman) should be independent of the fund manager.  In addition, detailed requirements are 
established for addressing full disclosure of information to the board and its role in overseeing 
overall strategy and investment performance. 
Determining the full extent to which mutual fund investors and investment trust shareholders 
have economically benefited from independent directors is an open question.
653
  It is worth 
noting that in the mutual fund context, academic support for independent directors is more 
common.
654
  However, the presence or absence of additional incremental gains in financial 
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performance is only one measure of the benefit of independent directors.  Further, a 
meaningful distinction can and should be made between the impact of independent directors in 
publicly listed companies and their impact in private companies and private investment funds.  
In the latter, for example, the role that the independent director would play in overcoming 
informational asymmetry would be much greater.
The absence of perceived conflicts or inconsistent goals and motivations in an independent 
director would seem to strengthen the case for fuller and favour consideration of particularly 
troublesome topics, such as a potential dispute with the fund manager.  As a result, 
independent directors have been a common solution to potential corporate governances 
problems in many countries (and in many different contexts),
655
even while the underlying 
rationale for their use remains under-theorized.
656
7.3 Duties of Independent Directors
In legal terms, the distinction between ‘interested’ and the term ‘independent’ directors can be 
a potentially misleading one.  All directors must act independently of any other outside 
interests they may have.
657
  A director, regardless of who appoints him, has a duty to act 
honestly and in good faith in the best interests of the fund, owing his duties to the fund as a 
whole and not to any individual shareholder or service provider, as well as having a duty to act 
with the care, diligence and skill which would be displayed by a reasonable man with his 
knowledge and experience in the circumstances.
658
  
When the interests of the fund and the fund manager conflict, a director appointed by the  
manager will be in a position where he has a conflict of interests.
659
Any director will have a 
duty, arising from his position as a fiduciary, not to put himself in a position where he has a 
conflict of interest between the business of the fund and his other business interests. 
Contracts in which a director is interested (e.g., the fund’s investment management 
agreement) are typically voidable at the option of the company. The director may also be
liable to account for any profits made unless permitted by the constitutional documents, typical 
by means of disclosure.
660
  Even upon disclosing a potential conflict of interests, however, a 
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director is still required to consider only what is in the best interests of the fund in making a 
decision.
661
  However, a director may represent the interests of a particular party (e.g., the fund 
manager) at board meetings as long as he does not contract to vote in a particular way on a 
particular issue and, as his primary duty, he acts in the interests of the fund in all respects.  
Therefore, although in theory the duties of directors should be uniform and consistent across 
all of a fund’s directors, whether manager appointed or independent, in practice the objectivity 
of an independent director can operate to impact the actual functioning of a board.  
A robust and experienced board of directors can provide effective checks and balances on a 
fund manager.  However, independent directors can adequately address the governance 
challenge only if the fund, and its fund manager, provide them with appropriate, useful, and 
timely information.
662
  
Fund participants concerned about the governance challenge can take steps to monitor and 
confirm that the independent directors have access to, and make effective use of, such 
information.  Importantly, US courts have held that management (non-independent) directors 
have a special duty to provide the independent directors with “sufficient information so as to 
enable [the independent directors] to participate effectively in the management of the 
investment company.”
663
  Accordingly, each of the independent directors should be provided, 
upon the launch of the fund, with a full set of the fund’s constitutional documents including its 
offering memorandum, its constitutional documentation, and all agreements with service 
providers.
664
On an ongoing basis, the independent director should receive regular reports, 
from the fund manager, the custodian and the administrator about the activities of the fund.
665
The fund manager can then advise as to why the breach occurred and how and when the 
breach will be rectified.  
The independent directors should have direct access to senior staff of the fund manager, the 
custodian and the administrator. They should query any aspects of the valuations that cause 
them concern, such as specific investment transactions and unusual expense items, and on 
any items in the reports to investors which conflict with the detailed valuation reports or the 
fund’s investment policies and guidelines.
7.4 Effectiveness of Directors
In order to address the governance challenge, directors must have the background and 
resources necessary to perform their monitoring function.  Otherwise, they will be unable to 
operate as an effective check on the fund manager.  Further, the operation of the board of 
directors must be conducted in a manner conducive to its effectiveness.
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a side letter.  See Chapter 6 above.
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The literature on what constitutes an effective director, whether popular
666
or academic
667
, is 
extensive.
668
  Accordingly, only a few observations are included below in the context of private 
investment funds.  Without effective directors, any attempt to base a private monitoring 
solution on them would be undermined.  The directors of a private investment fund must have 
the necessary collective expertise to understand the fund’s trading and the risk profile and 
liquidity of the underlying investments.  They will need to have the ability and experience to 
evaluate the fund’s performance and the performance of key service providers.
669
A director 
should also be able to devote sufficient time to carry out those duties, which should be 
reflected in his remuneration.  When the primary driver of directorships is simply to secure the 
offshore taxation treatment of a fund vehicle, then it is unsurprising that the customary 
remuneration of such directors has been low.  However, in light of the increasing demands 
being placed on independent directors, the requisite remuneration has begun trending
upwards.
670
  Individuals with the necessary experience are not plentiful and such individuals 
will often have other professional options available to them. 
Fund investors seeking to rely on board composition and oversight to address the governance 
challenge should consider not only the experience and expertise of a potential independent 
director, but also the number of other directorships and commitments which the candidate has, 
and assess whether he will have the time available to perform his duties with regard to this 
particular fund properly.
671
  Trophy directors who are too busy to contribute effectively should 
be avoided as this undermines the overall effectiveness of the board of directors.
Another problem faced by directors in private investment funds arises from the same individual 
sitting on multiple boards for different funds, either managed by the same fund manager or 
different fund managers.
672
A director who sits on the boards of multiple funds with similar 
investment strategies has a duty to ensure that confidential information obtained in his capacity 
as a director of one fund manager is not disclosed to the directors or investment manager of 
the other fund unless such information is already in the public domain.
Although each of the above can be limiting factors on the ability of directors to perform their 
monitoring function, steps could be taken prior to their appointment to assess each candidate’s 
experience and available time commitment to determine their suitability prior to their 
appointment.  In order to preserve their independence, the position of independent directors 
can be strengthened by enabling the directors themselves to:
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(a) set their own compensation,
673
to avoid potential conflicts in having it set by the 
fund manager they oversee; and
(b) have the power, in appropriate circumstances, to hire their own lawyer to advise 
them, which should be paid out of the fund’s assets.
674
The board is ultimately responsible to the investors in the fund for ensuring that the fund 
conducts its business effectively.  Generally, the directors acting on a collective basis at a 
properly constituted board meeting is the preferred method for exercising the board’s authority. 
Boards must, however, decide how its oversight and authority is to be exercised in between 
board meetings, as it is unrealistic to expect all governance decisions to be made only at 
quarterly board meetings.  Directors can delegate decision making to sub-committees or 
individual directors, but they cannot avoid responsibility for such decisions.  The directors 
should define in advance those more routine items of business that can be delegated to a sub-
committee or a service provider.  
Where a board generally consists of both independent and non-independent directors, the 
composition of a sub-committee can be set in such a way as to enable the independent 
directors to be in the majority.  All sub-committees should be formally created with written 
terms of reference ratified by the board in order to provide effective oversight, all proceedings 
and decisions of sub-committees should be formally reported to the board and fully ratified by 
resolution. Without directors of adequate calibre and commitment, or without effective 
operation of the board, either at formal meetings or during the interim period, the benefits 
sought as a private monitoring solution cannot be obtained.
7.5 The Role of Directors in General Partner Vehicles
Given the limitations on the involvement of limited partners in the management of a 
partnership, as discussed above,
675
the mutual duties of partners to each other play an 
important role in the governance arrangements of Partnership PIFs.  The scope and extent of 
these duties can operate to protect participants from over-reaching and self-dealing by the 
general partner. 
General partners often have a wide range of commercial relationships with the limited 
partnership.  A general partner will receive fees directly from the partnership, may earn 
compensation from the partnership or third parties in transactions by the partnership, and may 
engage in transactions directly with the partnership.  ‘Interested transactions’ between the 
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partnership and the general partner, or entities affiliated with the general partner, are fertile 
ground for disputes.  As a result, partnership agreements
676
typically attempt to define very 
precisely the scope of the general partner’s fiduciary duty
677
to the partnership.
When there is conflict between the limited partners and a corporate general partner,
678
the 
limited partners may look to the directors and officers of the corporate general partner as being 
responsible for the actions of the general partner.  However, these directors and officers will 
seek to remove themselves from the conflict by insisting that their duties of care and of loyalty 
are to their corporation,
679
and not to the partnership of which they are general partner.
This tension is illustrative of the impact of multiple vehicles within a fund structure on potential 
claims that can be made at law and equity by aggrieved fund participants.  I will start by 
analyzing a particular concern that was raised under Delaware law, discuss how it was 
addressed ultimately, and conclude with an observation of how the question would have been 
addressed under English law.
7.5.1 Fiduciary Duty in Delaware Partnerships
As partners are agents of the partnership for purposes of the partnership’s business, a 
fiduciary relationship is established among the partners.
680
  As a result, a partner cannot use 
the partnership assets for his own benefit, cannot take a secret profit for himself or carry on a 
business in competition with the partnership, cannot secure for himself that which is duty to 
secure for the partnership, and cannot avail himself of knowledge or information which is 
properly regarded as property of the partnership.
681
For limited partnerships formed under Delaware law, there is a statutory framework imposing 
various duties and allowing for those duties to be shaped and adjusted by agreement.  Such 
duties, if unmodified by agreement, may be inconsistent with the goals of private investment 
fund sponsors and investors.  Section 17-1101(d) of DRULPA explicitly provides that the 
fiduciary duties of a partner may be expanded or limited in a limited partnership agreement.  
The Delaware courts have consistently upheld the right of partners to modify themselves 
traditional aspects of fiduciary duty, thereby promoting predictability in the enforcement of 
limited partnership agreements in Delaware. 
The nature of the fiduciary obligations among partners, in the absence of agreement to the 
contrary, is rigid and absolute.
682
  The Delaware Court of Chancery, in Boxer v Husky Oil 
Company,
683
held that:
the duty of the general partner in a limited partnership to exercise the utmost good 
faith, fairness, and loyalty is required both by statute and common law.  This fiduciary 
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duty of partners is often compared to that of corporate directors.  .  .  .  ‘The form of the 
enterprise does not diminish the duty of fair dealing by those in control of the 
investments’.
684
While DRULPA does not mandate the absolute standard of undivided loyalty, the laws 
assume, in the absence of agreement by the parties to the contrary, a high degree of duty.  
The parties must make clear their intention to contractually limit a general partner’s fiduciary 
duties, and the burden is on them to demonstrate that the default fiduciary duty rules that 
would otherwise govern as pre-empted.
685
A sponsor of a private investment fund structured as a Partnership PIF will often seek to 
insulate itself from personal liability to third parties by using a structure which has a newly 
incorporated, wholly-owned special purpose vehicle limited partnership as the general partner 
of a limited partnership.  One advantage of this structure is that if there were to be a breach of 
fiduciary duty by the general partner, the party directly liable for breach would be the special 
purpose entity, whose net worth is relatively small, and not its shareholder, the sponsoring 
fund manager.
A Delaware court has demonstrated a willingness to go beyond the general partner itself and 
impose, in favour of the limited partners, a fiduciary duty on the directors of the corporate 
general partner, even though those directors were not in privity with the limited partners.  In 
USA Cafes, LP litigation
686
(USA Cafes) discussed below, the court held that the directors had 
a fiduciary duty to the corporation and used the double fiduciary duty as a basis for imposing 
liability on the directors to the limited partners.
7.5.2 The USA Cafes Decision
Historically, a director of a corporate general partner
687
owed no fiduciary duties to a limited 
partner.  Rather, the director instead owed his or her duties to the corporation itself, while the 
corporation, as general partner, owed fiduciary duties to the limited partners.  In USA Cafes, 
however, the court held that the directors of the general partner owed a fiduciary duty to the 
partnership and the limited partners.
688
  The court relied on a line of cases in the trust area,
689
  
noting that in instances in which the directors or officers of a corporate trustee have been 
personally at fault and have violated a duty owed to a beneficiary,
690
some courts have held 
that trustee directors or officers are in a fiduciary relation not merely to the corporation but to 
the beneficiaries of the trust administered by the corporation and have imposed personal 
liability on such individuals.  The court concluded that imposing a fiduciary duty on a director of 
a corporate general partner of a limited partnership was only a recognition of the fiduciary 
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obligations inherent in the role of a director who sits on the board of an entity that is itself a 
fiduciary.
691
  Given that the duty had been recognized in directors of trustees, the court held 
that it was appropriate to extend the general partner directors’ duty in an analogous manner.
692
Under traditional analysis, a director’s fiduciary duty is one of undivided loyalty to the company 
on whose board he or she sits, which includes all of the elements of loyalty, care, and fair 
dealing implicit in a fiduciary relationship.
693
  To the extent that the corporate general partner 
must operate in accordance with certain restrictions, such as its fiduciary obligations to the 
limited partnership, the directors must make their decisions in light of such restrictions.  Under 
a pre-USA Cafes analysis, this cause of action against the directors belonged to the general 
partner, not to a third party harmed by the general partner.  Under the USA Cafes analysis, 
however, the limited partners also were brought within the zone of persons to whom the 
directors owe a duty and potentially possess a cause of action.
7.5.3 Developments Following USA Cafes
In 1994, the DRULPA was amended to confirm that the duties and liabilities of persons other 
than partners, such as agents or employees of a limited partnership or general partner, may 
also be set forth in the partnership agreement, and that such persons are not liable to the 
limited partnership or the partners if such persons rely in good faith on the provisions of a 
partnership agreement.
694
  The amendment was significant for expressly permitting the 
partners in a limited partnership to define the scope of the duties owed by officers and 
directors of a corporate general partner. 
On 20 August 2001, the Delaware Chancery Court in Brickell Partners v Wise
695
enforced a 
partnership provision that limited the fiduciary duties of directors of corporate general partners.  
In Brickell the court stated that ‘by definition, [directors of corporate general partners] find 
themselves in a position of on-going conflict because they owe fiduciary duties to the corporate 
general partner (on whose board they serve) and fiduciary duties to the limited partnership 
governed by the corporate general partner’.
696
  In dismissing the action brought by the limited 
partners, the court emphasized the amendments of DRULPA.
The USA Cafes decision significantly altered the traditional fiduciary relationships of directors 
of corporate general partners to limited partners of a limited partnership.  It recognized that the 
directors of corporate general partners are obliged to cause the general partner to satisfy its 
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duty to the limited partners
697
and that limited partners should have remedies against them if 
they fail to do so.  The Brickell, court has made clear, however, that well-drafted partnership 
agreements can limit the fiduciary duties of the officers and directors of corporate general 
partners, and can provide their own standards for the balancing of the interests of the general 
partner and the partnership.
Corporate general partners, therefore, can negotiate to include in partnership agreements 
mechanisms that address conflicts between the general partner and the partnership in 
compliance with Section 17-1101(d) of DRULPA.  Conversely, however, limited partners could 
require that such liability carve out not be included and, as a result, the USA Cafes rule would 
govern.  Allowing the fiduciary duty to extend to limited partners would promote the private 
monitoring solutions advocated herein by placing the limited partners within the category of 
persons to which the general partner directors owe their duties.
7.5.4 English Law
There has been no similar case to USA Cafes under English law.  As a result, the position of 
English courts should be similar to the position in Delaware prior to that decision, namely that a 
director of a corporate general partner owed no duties to the limited partners, although this 
proposition has not yet been tested in court.  As with Delaware post-Brickell, a partnership 
agreement could be prepared that clearly state that the limited partners are owed a fiduciary 
duty by the directors of the corporate general partner.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the primary argument in favour of using limited partnerships a fund 
vehicles has primarily been the benefits of tax transparency, not cutting off fiduciary duties.  As 
a result, limited partners in either Delaware or English partnerships could argue strongly in 
favour of a clear statement that directors of corporate general partners owe limited partners 
such fiduciaries, without compromising the desired tax treatment, thereby supporting the 
enrolment of private monitoring solutions to address the governance challenge.
7.6 Limitation on the Effectiveness of Independent Directors
As one commentator has remarked:
[T]he whole purpose of having independent directors is surprisingly under-theorized, 
leading to inconsistent rules, in particular regarding the effect of director shareholdings 
both across countries and within the United States.
698
Academic critiques of independent directors in the public company context should not be 
overextended reflexively to the realm of privately held vehicles, such as private funds.  Two 
non-economic effects of independent directors which are of particular importance in the private 
vehicle context are that they enhance the fidelity of management to the objectives of the 
shareholders, while also increasing the reliability of information provided to shareholders.
699
With the full weight of rigorous ongoing disclosure requirements and the bright light of stock 
analysts and business media bearing down on a public company, the marginal impact of 
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independent directors on economic returns in a mature stock market may be explained by the 
presence of only incremental benefits which fail to rise above the “noise” of share price 
volatility and fluctuations.  However, in the private vehicle context, these contributions would 
have a larger impact.  Unfortunately, to date, rigorous social science research on the impact of 
independent directors in private companies has not been published.
US courts, following the lead of the SEC, have repeatedly relied on the presence of 
independent directors on mutual fund boards to lower the judicial scrutiny applied to cases 
involving claims related to breach of fiduciary duty.
700
  However, it is important to bear in mind 
the important differences between investment funds and other types of business corporations, 
and address governance issues accordingly.  Unlike a traditional business, the product being 
sold by an investment fund is its own security.  As a result, the market for its product and the 
market for its capital are one and the same.
701
  Also, external management is typical in the 
case of investment funds, with a broad delegation of authority to the fund manager who acts as 
“sponsor” and “promoter” of the fund.
702
Accordingly, the critique can be made that analogizing investment funds to business 
corporations is an incorrect, or at least incomplete, analogy.
703
  For example, there is no 
external market for corporate control in the case of investment funds,
704
due to lack of a 
meaningful secondary market in most fund interests.  However, the counter-argument can be 
made that the negotiation, involvement and liquidity of fund investors in various types of funds 
can provide more discipline than in the case of business corporations, rather than less.
705
The choice of individual directors is a subjective one, as is the manner in which each of them 
may define their particular role.  As opposed to mutual funds and other public investment 
funds, which give their participants the opportunity to vote with their feet by redeeming out 
when they disagree with a manager,
706
illiquid private investment funds will need directors 
more willing to act aggressively on behalf of fund investors.
Importantly, even the recognition that independent directors have some positive impact on the 
governance of private investment funds demonstrates that they can fulfil a useful, and 
pragmatic, strategy as part of a wider solution to the governance challenge.
707
  Although at the 
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time of the formation of the fund, the directors will be those identified and appointed by the 
fund manager, 
708
an initial review and ongoing monitoring of the composition of the board and 
the calibre of individual directors can be undertaken by fund investors as a prerequisite to their 
investment.
709
Critics have argued that, in the case of public investment funds, referring to a fund investor as 
a “shareholder” and attributing to him or her to the rights and influence typically associated 
therewith is inappropriate.
710
  However, private investment funds can be distinguished on this 
point by the sophisticated nature of their investors and the negotiations that occur as part of 
the investment process.
711
In the past, the primary consideration in appointing independent directors to fund vehicles has 
been to maintain the offshore tax status of the fund or to assist in the tax planning of the fund 
manager.
712
The calibre and experience of the director could be a secondary concern.  As the 
fund manager typically arranges for the appointment of the fund’s initial directors, an 
independent director will often be personally or professionally acquainted with the principals of 
the fund manager prior to their involvement with the fund.  However, recent litigation has 
resulted in increased scrutiny of private investment funds.
713
  Investors are increasingly 
expecting a higher level of sophistication and expertise from the independent director.  
Investors, through their due diligence exercise prior to their investment
714
and their preliminary 
negotiations with the fund manager, can make clear that prospective directors must have the 
skills necessary to adequately oversee the fund.
The view of the mutual fund industry on the use independent directors has been positive and 
supportive.  As the Advisory Group on Best Practices for Fund Directors, established by the 
Investment Company Institute, observed in 1999:
The regulatory requirements governing investment company 
boards of directors are unique in the world of American business.  
Independent directors of investment companies in particular play 
a critical role in overseeing fund operation and policy conflicts of 
interest between the fund and its investment adviser or other 
service providers.  In fulfilling this role, independent directors act 
as “watchdogs”, protecting the interests of fund shareholders.  
There is broad consensus that this governance system has 
worked well for investment companies and their shareholders.
715
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However, as Cheffins has stated:
To the extent that the board is acting as a ‘watch dog’, logically 
the directors need to be able to evaluate management’s 
performance in an impartial and detached manner.  Directors 
who are also full-time executives are not well-suited to do this 
since they will in essence be reviewing their own conduct.  Non-
executive directors are much more likely to have the required 
objectivity since they do not have managerial duties.  They 
should be even better positioned to act in a dispassionate 
fashion if they are independent in the sense that they never had 
any connection with the company other than their seats on the 
board.
716
Failures at the level of the board of directors
717
have been linked to two categories of failures at 
the corporate level:
(a) directors who have failed to detect and/or remedy imprudent behavior by 
managers,
718
and
(b) directors who have failed to act as adequate limits on managers who have “lost 
their way” and lend their companies into dramatic financial collapse.
719
Fund directors do not function like directors of more typical operating companies.  They do not 
participate in decisions concerning the strategy or investment activities of the fund, nor do they 
have direct supervision over the separate firms that provide them vital services, such as the 
fund manager or any distributors.
720
A critique of the effectiveness of independent directors would include the observation that even 
if accurate, current information were to be provided to them, many would not be able to spend 
sufficient time analyzing it in order to take necessary actions.  As Cheffins further observed:
A typical outside director will not have the time to become fully 
conversant with what is going on since he will only devote 
between one and two days a month to company business and a
considerable portion of this will be spent in the boardroom or at 
committee meetings.
721
However, the role of independent directors is not to conduct forensic audits on the data and 
information they are provided.  Their role, properly conceived, is to monitor the performance of 
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the management function which has been delegated to third parties and act as an “early 
warning system” to identify and resolve potential problems at an early stage.
722
Importantly, the “curious institution”
723
of the mutual fund board has not been without critics.  
As one commentator has argued:
Fund boards have been weak and even reckless protectors of 
fund investors, their deficiencies exacerbated as mutual funds 
have grown into the leading investment vehicle for private 
retirement savings in the United States.
724
  
Critics have accused the SEC of over-relying on independent directors as a regulatory 
solution,
725
and have focused particular attention on the metric of management fees and fund 
expense ratios, which have continued to grow significantly in recent decades.
726
Rather than see the independent directors as “watch dogs”, these critics instead focus on the 
“empty ritual” of part-time directors who lack independent sources of information and real 
negotiating leverage.
727
  The capabilities and calibre of independent directors has also been 
challenged,
728
  noting that there are no qualification standards for such directors and that these 
individuals are typically securities industry professionals who may be affiliated, or have been 
affiliates, with businesses which currently, or may in the future, provide services to either the 
fund or its manager.
729
Interestingly, since the adoption of the Investment Company Act over seven decades ago, no 
mutual fund directors have ever been proposed by fund investors to oppose the manager-
selected slate.
730
  As a result, critics question whether they can ever be more than mere rubber 
stamps.  However, it is unfair to claim, as some critics have,
731
that the independent director 
approach insulates the fund manager from oversight and liability, and that the SEC lacks, 
therefore, the means to supervise fund managers directly.  In fact, the SEC has direct 
regulatory responsibility for every mutual fund manager pursuant to the Investment Advisers 
Act, and oversees a detailed product regulatory regime pursuant to the Investment Company 
Act.  
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The role of the board, and the independent directors, supplements these approaches by 
establishing a role for individuals associated with the oversight of the fund vehicle (e.g., 
corporate directors) to also serve in a regulatory capacity.  Further, to become overly fixated 
on management fees and expense ratios as the sole measure for determining the 
effectiveness of independent directors is to deny the larger role, and wider responsibilities, that 
these directors have in connection with regulatory compliance generally.
Although some have argued that the compliance role played by the board is largely 
ministerial,
732
the directors still perform a role in reviewing the operation of the fund and its 
adherence to SEC requirements that the SEC itself couldn’t accomplish, given any reasonably 
foreseeable staffing and funding levels.  The directors perform their role at no cost to the U.S. 
government, or ultimately U.S. taxpayers.  Their costs are borne by the fund and its investors, 
who ultimately benefit from the services that they provide.
It is important to recognize that the mere involvement of the board of directors in the regulatory 
process on a polycentric basis
733
is not, in itself, a complete and final solution to the underlying 
problems and risks that original drove the need to regulate in this area.
734
  The enrolment of 
directors provides an addition nexus of oversight which can complement the efforts of other 
parts of the regulatory apparatus.
Finally, it is unclear what, if anything, is gained from reducing the roles and responsibilities of 
the board of directors.  Perhaps the only meaningful result of such action would be to more 
explicit demarcate that the responsibility for the governance of the fund lies exclusively with the 
national financial regulator.
735
  In such case, only public monitoring solutions (e.g., product 
regulation) are available to address the governance challenge.  Where, however, the 
government has decided not to implement product level regulation, as is the case with private 
funds, or where regulatory resources are inadequate to internalize the formerly “outsourced” 
oversight functions, undermining or excluding directors from the regulatory process achieves 
little.
Critics will correctly point out that independent directors, in and of themselves, do not function 
as an absolute bar on fraud or malfeasance.  During the recent global financial crisis, there 
were frequent incidents of governance failures in firms that possessed one or more 
independent directors.  However, since no regulation or enforcement mechanism or structural 
solution would pass such demanding scrutiny, it would be unproductive to dismiss independent 
directors out of hand simply because they do not offer a perfect solution.
Instead, their limitations must be recognized and addressed as part of implementing this 
private monitoring solution.  If there is a concern about the time constraints on independent 
directors, then steps must be taken to insure that compensation for serving in that role is 
sufficient to cover the anticipated duties expected.  If there is concern over lack of adequate 
information being provided, then independent directors with sufficient credentials and 
experience should be selected in order to ensure that proper and timely requests are being 
made of the fund manager and other service providers.  One particularly effective way to 
                                               
732
Ibid. at 176.
733
See Section 1.9 and 5.2 above.
734
See Clarke 75 (“Board independence does not, of course, guarantee corporate success”).
735
See Ibid. at 208 (“The ‘product’ structure, compared to the ‘board’ structure, of mutual fund regulation makes 
clear that investors are purchasing services from an investment management firm.  The buck stops with the 
government regulator . . . “).
144
coordinate and reinforce the actions of independent directors is to have them select and retain 
their own independent counsel, who could provide them with legal advice independently of the 
law firm advising the fund and the fund manager.
736
  Having addressed these shortcomings, 
tasks that could otherwise prove too challenging, such as valuing “hard to value” assets, would 
be easier for boards to oversee.  
7.7 Conclusion
The fundamental responsibility of fund directors, whether in a Company PIF or as the board of 
directors of a corporate general partner of a Partnership PIF, is to ensure that fund participants 
receive the benefits that they are entitled to as investors.  The fund documentation creates 
binding obligations on the fund manager,
737
and reasonable expectations that the fund will be 
operated in a particular way.  The ongoing performance of the fund, as well as any proposals 
put forward by the fund manager to change or alter some aspect of the fund’s policies or 
procedures, must be evaluated by fund directors in light of these benefits to which the 
investors are entitled. 
An independent and responsive board of directors can be an effective means of addressing 
the governance challenge by ensuring that the fund manager is subject to regular monitoring 
and oversight.  Unlike a side letter,  which serves to protect only the investor who was able to 
obtain those contractual concessions,
738
the benefits of an effective board are enjoyed by all 
fund participants.  
Independent directors can provide specialized advice and expertise to the manager-appointed 
directors, while also monitoring the decisions made by the manager.  Although the role of 
independent directors has not been without its critics, the absence of conflicts in an 
independent director can facilitate a fuller consideration of complex or troublesome critics.  
Further, the extent of the criticism is notably only that perhaps independent directors do not 
provide quite all of the benefits that their most committed supporters claim.  No critic has 
argued that, in fact, their presence actually undermines corporate governance.
Importantly, in order to accomplish and enhance the governance process, independent 
directors need their fund’s managers to provide them with full and adequate information about 
the state of the fund and the presence of potential conflicts. By serving effectively in their 
“watch dog” role, independent directors can, in turn, provide fund managers with a more 
responsible alternative than detailed, prescriptive regulations. 
In addition, the proper operation of a board of directors can have equal relevance to 
Partnership PIF, with a corporation established to serve as the general partner.
739
  Section 17-
1101(0) of DRUPLA permits the provisions of a limited partnership agreement to expand or 
restrict a partner’s, or other person’s, duties (including fiduciary duties).  As a result, parties to 
a limited partnership can agree to modify the default rules concerning fiduciary duties that 
would otherwise apply.
                                               
736
US mutual funds have benefited significantly in recent years from the use of independent counsel by 
independent directors.  See, e.g., Geoffrey Hazard and Edward Rock, “A New Player in the Boardroom: The 
emergence of the Independent Directors’ Counsel,” Scholarship at Penn Law, Paper 6 (2004) available at 
lsr.nellco.org/upenn_uws/6; and James D Cox, “Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering 
the Outside Directors with Independent Counsel,” 48 Villanova Law Review 1077 (2003).
737
See Section 2.2 above.
738
See Chapter 6 above.
739
See Section 2.7.2 above. 
145
For example, a partnership agreement could instead contain a specific acknowledgement by 
the limited partners that the officers and directors of the corporate general partner owe duties 
both to the partnership and to the general partner, together with an agreement that those 
individuals will not be liable to the partnership for actions that they took in the good faith belief 
that the corporate general partner was acting in a manner consistent with its duties to the 
partnership.  As discussed above, a similar approach should also work in the case of English 
limited partnerships.
Unfortunately, the most that strengthening the role of independent directors on a fund’s board 
can accomplish is an attempt to address the governance challenge in that particular fund.  
Fund investors will still need to consider the unresolved governance issues of each 
prospective fund separately, to determine whether there is adequate independence at board 
level or, alternatively, that a side letter can be negotiated to provide sufficient protection.  
Accordingly, in the next chapter I will examine the manner in which the admission to listing of 
private investment funds on a recognized exchange can provide a means to address the 
governance challenge in a similar way across a significant number of funds.
146
Chapter 8
Listings of Private Investment Funds as Means of Mitigating the Governance Challenge
8.1 Introduction
The third means by which the governance challenge can be addressed is by the listing of one 
or more fund vehicles on a regulated exchange.  This can allow fund participants to harness 
the regulatory power of a private securities exchange, and indirectly the state-based regulator 
that oversees it, for the purpose of enforcing certain rules that would be applicable to the fund 
upon listing.  Although such oversight and monitoring can still be subject to the practical 
limitations of motivation, expertise and resources noted in earlier chapters, regulating a fund’s 
corporate governance through adherence to listing rules (rather than through further bespoke 
legislation such as AIFMD, as discussed earlier
740
) can be an effective means by which to 
overcome the governance challenge, subjecting the fund to a detailed initial and ongoing 
compliance obligations. 
At first sight, it might appear that this solution is limited to those funds that require the liquidity 
provided by secondary trading.  The central function of a stock exchange is to serve as a 
means by which securities can be converted into cash.
741
  However, liquidity is not its only 
function.  Appraising the value of a security necessarily requires a flow of adequate and 
current information about the security and its issuer.  As a result, exchanges have developed 
requirements that certain information is made public at the initial listing of the security, as well 
as ongoing disclosure by the issuer for the duration of the period that it is listed.  Academic 
research has demonstrated that issuers gain valuation premium from listing in markets and on 
exchanges with superior regulatory functions.
742
Private investment funds have recognized for many years the advantages that listings can 
provide investors beyond liquidity.  Many funds which do not require secondary liquidity, either 
because the funds are open-ended or because the investors view the funds as part of a long 
term investment strategy whereby their proceeds will be distributed to them when the 
underlying portfolio companies are realised, still obtain listings on exchanges in order to 
voluntarily submit themselves to limited oversight by a third party.  As a result of certain legal 
or regulatory limitations, some investors may be prohibited from investing in a private 
investment fund if those securities (e.g., shares) are not listed on regulated and recognized 
exchange.  Even if not subject to formal restrictions, some investors value the oversight 
provided by the regulated stock exchange and the access to more regular announcements and 
information from listed funds. 
As Berle and Means originally pointed out several decades ago:
[T]he ideal situation – that of constant running disclosure of all information 
bearing on value being of course necessarily unattainable.  It can, however, be 
approximated . . .
743
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The disclosure requirements imposed by an exchange on the issuer relate to information which 
it has in its possession that would not otherwise be readily uncovered by current or prospective 
investors.
744
  Such disclosures cannot be presumed to provide all of the information necessary 
for any decisions which need to be made.  However, the information adds to the mix of fact 
and opinion already available and can function as a means to “level the playing field” between 
different parties with different levels of access to such information.
By creating a “market in information,” stock exchanges can serve as informational 
intermediaries, and facilitate the creation of a more substantive relationship between issuer 
and security holder.
745
  The role of any informational intermediary cannot be a total solution, as 
they cannot serve as a guarantor of the completeness of the information that they receive and 
circulate.  However, they can increase the amount of accurate information in investors’ hands 
over time.
746
Upon listing, both the fund itself and the fund’s directors will be responsible for ensuring that 
the fund complies with the continuing obligations imposed by the rules of that stock exchange.  
In essence, such funds “opt in” voluntarily to a regulatory and oversight regime that subjects 
them to a higher standard of behaviour that they would subject to operating on their own.  
Importantly, the benefit of such higher standard is shared pari passu among the fund’s 
investors, unlike the case of side letters, which primarily benefit only the investor who obtains 
such letter agreement.   Also, the listing requirements can provide for a consistent basis of 
comparison across a number of private investment funds, rather than requiring a fund 
participant to analyze, for example, status and operation of each particular fund separately. 
Breaches of the listing rules can lead to the exchange imposing sanctions on the fund or the 
fund’s directors, such as financial penalties, or a public statement censuring the fund, such as 
a temporary or even a permanent de-listing of the fund’s shares.  Fund investors may take 
comfort from the increased information flow that results from such oversight. 
In this Chapter, I will analyze the role that exchanges could play in addressing the governance 
challenge.  I will describe several key aspects of the listing regime for funds on the Irish Stock 
Exchange (ISE), the leading exchange for hedge fund listings, including general obligations of 
disclosure and communications with fund participants.  Finally, I will examine other exchanges 
and the approach they have taken towards private investment funds.
8.2 Regulatory Functions of Exchanges
The regulatory function of securities exchanges, in addition to their ability to set prices and 
provide liquidity, has long been recognized.
747
  The scope of such regulation can include 
disclosure requirements and standards of conduct.  In recent decades, we have increasingly 
witnessed the regulatory function of exchange shift towards government regulators, whether in 
the name of harmonization or increased effectiveness.
748
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Importantly, in the absence of uniform, top-down regulations, independent exchanges, 
developing and implementing their own rules, can potentially respond more efficiently to new 
development and update their rules accordingly.  As one commentator noted:
Given the difficulty of determining optimal rules, a system of 
competing markets should do a better job of furthering investor 
welfare than a system in which a regulator creates and enforces 
uniform rules.
749
And where a regulator has not adopted any rules, such as with the case of private investment 
funds, securities exchanges would be the only institutional alternative for attempting to 
determine optimal rules.  In adopting the rules for the exchange, the exchange’s members will 
look to promulgate and enforce rules that are most attractive to investors.  Without investors 
willing to support the issuers listed on an exchange, the exchange would find itself with few 
issuers wishing to be listed.
750
  As a result, listing rules promulgated by exchanges historically 
included provisions that provided protection against fraud, manipulation and other similar 
risks.
751
Ultimately, state regulation, such as the Securities Act of 1933 in the US and the Prospectus 
Directive in the EU, supplanted exchange listing rules as the primary basis for the oversight of 
listed companies and replaced them with top-down, centrally mandated listing rules.  But the 
ISE’s listing rules on investment funds provides a unique alternative to state regulation, which 
is largely absent for private investment funds.  But can an exchange’s rules be effective 
without the overt involvement of the state?  As one commentator observed:
Exchanges have strong incentives to provide rules of market 
structure that their investors want and to compel adherence by 
their members to contractual and fiduciary obligations.
752
When an exchange admits a security, it signals to prospective investors that such security is 
worthy of investment.  This was supported by placing initial and ongoing disclosure 
requirements on issuers in order to assure investors that there would be a regular flow of 
information to term regarding each issuer and their securities.
753
Historically, enforcement of these rules and regulations was primarily through contract, and 
termination of the listing was the strongest sanction.
754
  Over recent decades this private, 
contractual sanction has been supplemented by detailed financial regulation.  An exchange, 
therefore, could establish a reputation among investors and issuers for particularly high 
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standards for its listings of certain securities or certain types of companies,
755
as, for example, 
the ISE has done over the past two decades in the area of hedge funds. 
Since private investment funds sit outside most state-based financial services regime (e.g., the 
Prospectus Directive), to the extent that an exchange, such as the ISE, decides to establish its 
own regime for admission to listing, that private regime will be analogous in many important 
respects to the historic self-regulatory position that many exchanges had previously enjoyed.
756
Clearly, over the years a number of examples have arisen where self-regulatory organizations 
(SROs), such as exchanges, have failed in their supervisory mission.
757
  However, as 
discussed above,
758
not all self-regulation is equal, and there are different approaches to the 
enrolment of private actors into a regulatory function that can be considered.
759
  In light of the 
highly technical nature of many private investment funds’ investment objectives, and their non-
retail investor basis, exchanges could have an increased role
760
in providing oversight for such 
funds, in the absence of direct state-based regulation.
Importantly, when private investment funds are admitted to an exchange such as the ISE, 
there is no trading of fund shares, units or interests on the exchange.  As such, one of the 
largest concerns that can arise about the regulation of exchanges, whether by the state or by a 
SRO, does not arise in this context.  Since the exchange does not provide for secondary 
trading, and therefore provide for liquidity and price-setting for the issuer and the market, 
concerns over insider trading,
761
for example, do not exist.  To date, the ISE has played a 
largely unique role in providing “no trading” listings for hedge funds and certain other similar 
investment vehicles.  There is a proven market-based desire for the regulatory services that it 
provides.  As a result, it is worth examining in more detail, the nature and scope of the ISE’s 
approach to private investments before analyzing how that role might be expanded and 
updated to better address the governance challenge.
8.3 Irish Stock Exchange
The ISE has become a leading platform for listing investment funds structured as offshore 
companies.
762
  The popularity of the ISE as a listing venue for private investment funds, 
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especially considering that such listings do not provide for a liquid secondary trading market for 
a fund’s shares or units, can be seen in part as a means by which investors and fund 
managers have found a regulatory ‘half-way house’ between the full breadth of freedoms 
inherent in forming fund vehicles in lightly regulated offshore jurisdictions and the demanding 
rigours of being registered as a public mutual fund in most onshore jurisdictions.
763
  The fact 
that fund managers and fund participants have engaged, on their own initiative, the ISE to play 
a quasi-regulatory role means that the underlying viability of this private monitoring solution 
has been validated and it is worth exploring in greater detail.
An ISE listing provides private investment funds with a predetermined scope of regulatory 
oversight that can satisfy the desires of fund investors for increased procedural safeguards. 
As noted above, what is unique about an ISE listing for a hedge fund is that no trading will 
typically occur through the exchange for the fund’s units.  Such transactions would remain off 
exchange, primarily through the mechanism of subscription and redemption with the fund itself.  
By contrast, the current listing rules on many established exchanges, such as the LSE and the 
NYSE for primary listed investment entities have historically contained numerous provisions 
which act as barriers to the listing of certain private investment (e.g. private equity funds), such 
as the prohibition on exercising control over portfolio companies and requiring the board of 
directors of listed vehicles to be independent of the fund manager.
764
  
Obtaining a listing for a private investment fund on the ISE delivers two key benefits to the 
sponsors of such funds:
(a) increasing a fund’s potential investor base, where legal or regulatory constraints 
applicable to certain institutional investors can mean that they are prohibited 
from investing in “unlisted securities”; or
(b) providing publicly available information for investors, as announcements made 
by listed funds are reported through the ISE information service.
In 1998, the ISE codified its rules for listing investment funds and published ‘Investment Funds: 
Listing Requirements and Procedures’ (the ‘ISE Listing Rules’).  The ISE Listing Rules provide 
for a number of fund structures to be listed, such as hedge funds, funds of funds, feeder funds, 
property funds, and venture capital funds. The most common legal structure for listed funds is 
a limited company, although unit trusts and limited partnerships may also be listed.
An over-arching theme of the ISE Listing Rules, which particularly resonates when considering 
the governance challenge in private investment funds, is the equal treatment of investors.  
Accordingly, the general requirements
765
which must be addressed in order to be listed on the 
ISE include:
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(a) all shareholders within the same listed share class must be treated equally 
(e.g., be charged the same fees and have the same voting rights and 
entitlement to dividends);
(b) shares of a listed fund must be freely transferable and may not be subject to 
compulsory redemption provisions except where the holding of the shares may 
result in regulatory, legal, taxation, or other material disadvantage to the fund or 
its shareholders as a whole; and
(c) a listed fund is required to have at least two directors who are independent of 
the investment manager and the directors must collectively have appropriate 
and relevant experience and must take responsibility for the information 
contained in the listing particulars/prospectus.
Importantly, these requirements build upon, and expand the scope of benefit of, the previous 
structural approaches to addressing the governance challenge discussed above. 
As the ISE has historically been the exchange of choice for listing hedge funds, an 
examination of its rules can provide an introduction to the types of obligations that can be 
readily imposed on private investment funds.  Observance of the continuing obligations ensure 
that holders of listed units (unitholders) have simultaneous access to the same information and 
are kept informed of developments in the nature and conduct of the activities of the listed fund.   
The continuing obligations requirements cover a number of subjects relevant to the 
governance challenge faced by private investment funds:
(a) general obligations of disclosure;
(b) notification of interests and key developments; and
(c) communications with unitholders.
Each will be discussed separately below.
8.4 General Obligation of Disclosure
The ISE Listing Rules contain a series of rules that provide for a broad obligation on the part of 
a listed fund to provide information to the ISE and to fund participants.  These rules apply to 
any fund listed on the ISE and are in addition to both the law governing the legal vehicle 
constituting the fund (e.g., Cayman company law)
766
and the law and regulations applicable to 
the fund manager (e.g., for a manager located in London, the FSA’s enforcement of European 
directives such as MiFID and AIFMD).
767
  
Generally, a listed fund must promptly notify the ISE of any information which is necessary for 
the unitholders and the public to appraise its financial position.  No information provided to the 
ISE may be passed on to a third party until the ISE has been notified, except in limited 
circumstances.
768
  A listed fund must notify the ISE of any major new developments in its 
activities which are not public knowledge and which may lead to a substantial movement in the 
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price or net asset of its units.
769
  Any change of which the directors are aware in the financial 
position, performance, or the expected performance of the listed fund where knowledge of the 
change would lead to a substantial movement in the price or net asset of the units must 
similarly be notified to the ISE.
770
Since a listed fund must ensure equality of treatment for all 
unitholders who are in the same position,
771
a listed fund must notify the ISE of any proposal 
to, or development which may, vary the class rights of unitholders.
772
Certain narrow exceptions to these strict disclosure rules are permitted in limited 
circumstances.  Where the directors of a listed fund consider that notification of such 
information required might prejudice a listed fund’s legitimate commercial interests, the ISE 
may, upon application, grant a dispensation from the relevant requirement.
773
  A listed fund 
may give information, without notifying the ISE, in strict confidence to the advisers to a listed 
fund, to parties with whom a listed fund is dealing, to persons with whom it is negotiating any 
commercial, financial, or investment transaction, or to any regulatory or statutory body.
774
  A 
regular flow of information from the fund and the fund manager to all fund investors on a 
predetermined basis (rather than ad hoc under a collection of disparate side letters)
775
can 
serve to better ensure that investors have the relevant basis to make any necessary decisions 
concerning their participation in the fund. 
8.5 Notification of Interests and Key Developments
A fund participant’s ability to monitor the actions and decision-making process of the fund 
manager is an important element of effectively addressing the governance challenge.  The ISE 
Listing Rules establish several requirements which support and foster this flow of information. 
The extent to which either the fund manager or directors of the fund or any related parties 
thereto owns shares of fund will often be relevant to investors’ views on the fund and its 
prospects. Accordingly, a listed fund must notify the ISE of certain information relating to 
interests in listed units, of which the listed fund, its directors, or fund manager are aware, 
including:
(a) any interest of any director of a listed fund, including any connected person in 
the units of a listed fund; and
(b) any interest of the investment manager in the units of a listed fund.
776
Fund investors will also frequently desire notification of key operational developments of the 
fund, in order to better understand the full extent of and changes to the fund’s investment 
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activities.  As a result, the ISE Listing Rules require that a listed fund notify the ISE of the 
following information relating to the operation of a listed fund:
(a) any proposed or actual material change in the general character or nature of the 
operation of the listed fund, including changes to the investment policy or 
investment, borrowing and leverage restrictions; 
(b) any material change in tax status;
(c) any general suspension of redemptions, transfers, or calculations of net asset 
value;
(d) any change in fund manager, custodian, administrator, registrar, or transfer 
agent;
(e) in the case of a company, any change in directors or material change in any 
director’s function;
(f) any change in the minimum subscription;
(g) any change in the valuation policy;
(h) any material change in the listed fund’s constitutive documents;
(i) any proposal to change the open or closed ended status of the listed fund;
(j) notice of any annual general meeting or extraordinary general meeting; and 
(k) any change in the financial year end of the listed fund.
777
The information supplied to the ISE above covers numerous topics that would be of interest to 
an investor concerned about addressing the governance challenge.  Such notifications  are 
similar in many respects to the information provisions often obtained by significant institutional 
investors in their side letters,
778
and could serve as an early warning of investor protections 
concerns in development.  Although many of these notification events can be requested in 
individual client side letters, the benefit of having them in listing rules would be that notification 
is made to all fund investors simultaneously, thereby decreasing the likelihood that certain 
investors may be disadvantaged against other investors.  Certain of the above matters must be 
referred to the ISE for prior approval.
779
  In addition, in exceptional circumstances, where any 
action proposed by or for a listed fund may lead to a substantial change in the nature and 
substance of a listed fund, the ISE may require that the proposal be approved by unitholders in 
advance.
780
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8.6 Communication with Unitholders
For the governance rights of a fund participant to be effectively exercised, he or she needs to 
receive adequate information about the choices he or she is expected to make.  Accordingly, 
the manner in which his or her consent is solicited and obtained is the final step in exercising 
oversight in connection with addressing the governance challenge, and the ISE Listing Rules 
establish a detailed procedure for such communications. In order to obtain the approval of 
unitholders, the ISE Listing Rules mandate that a listed fund must send a circular to 
unitholders in a prescribed form. 
781
Any circular must be sent to the unitholders at least 15 
business days before the date upon which it is proposed or scheduled that unitholders will vote 
or otherwise take action in respect of the proposals outlined in that circular.
782
  A listed fund 
must ensure that all the necessary information are available to enable unitholders to exercise 
their rights.  In particular, the fund must:
(a) inform unitholders of meetings which they are entitled to attend;
(b) enable them to exercise their right to vote, where applicable; and
(c) notify the ISE or distribute circulars to unit holders providing information on key 
issues of concern to them, such as the allocation and payment of dividends, or 
the issue of new units.
783
A proxy form must be sent with the notice convening a meeting of unitholders to each 
unitholder entitled to vote at the meeting, and such proxy must provide for two-way voting on 
all resolutions intended to be proposed at the meeting.
784
  A listed fund must forward to the ISE 
a copy of all circulars and reports to unitholders, as well as all resolutions passed by 
unitholders other than resolutions concerning ordinary business at an annual general meeting, 
without delay after the relevant general meeting.
785
8.7 Addressing the Governance Challenge
By operating on a non-compulsory, “opt-in” basis, an ISE listing provides a potential market 
oriented solution to the governance challenge by giving prospective investors and fund 
managers the ability to obtain more effectively a complete package of disclosure and 
notification requirements. Exchange listing rules can utilize a “comply or explain” model
786
that 
would enable listed companies greater flexibility that traditional, mandatory regimes, which 
encourage a “box-ticking” mentality that can undermine the ultimate effectiveness of the rules.  
Further, “comply or explain” acknowledges and accepts that one size does not fit all.
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A key role of the ISE is to provide all fund investors with relevant information about the fund, its 
performance, and its service providers.
787
   Such information can empower some or all of the 
fund investors to monitor the fund manager’s ongoing performance, notably in terms of 
whether or not the investment strategy being pursued is successful, but also for early warning 
signals that the fund manager may be in breach of duties owed to the fund.  Where indications 
arise that raise questions over the full compliance of the fund manager with such duties, steps 
can be taken to ensure that the board of directors of the fund, or the general partner of the 
fund where the fund is organized as a limited partnership,
788
are adequately informed of, and 
focused on, the developments in light of the fiduciary and other duties that they owe as 
directors.
Obtaining a regulated listing on an exchange such as the ISE can be seen as a more efficient 
means of obtaining a type of ‘multilateral side letter’,
789
whereby additional requirements are 
brought to bear on the fund and the fund manager outside of the fund’s constituent documents 
for the benefit of all investors.  In addition, as they ultimately benefit all investors in the fund 
equally, the continuing obligations of the fund can be used as a basis for providing the 
independent directors with adequate information on which to act when needed to protect the 
rights of shareholders. 
By voluntarily including a neutral third party  such as a securities exchange  in the overall 
fund structure and tasking that person to perform a pre-identified set of regulator-like functions, 
adequate monitoring of the fund manager by the fund investors is supported and weakness in 
the governance structure of the underlying fund vehicles can be addressed.  Although the ISE 
has demonstrated the most success to date in fulfilling this adopted role, there is no reason 
that other securities exchanges could not implement one or more competing regimes and, in 
the process, address some of the ISE’s current shortcomings (e.g. no effective regime 
governing private equity funds). 
However, listing on a regulated exchange such as the ISE, in addition to addressing the 
governance challenge, will impose procedural burdens on the fund and the fund manager.
Traditionally, though, one advantage that private investment funds have benefited from has 
been the ability to take actions quickly in response to recent developments.  A listing of the 
funds units significantly limits that ability.  Under the rules of many regulated stock exchanges, 
including the ISE, certain issues must be voted on by the shareholders before a fund may take 
any action.   If the approval of shareholders is required on any matter, a fund must send a circular 
to shareholders.  Both fund managers and fund investors will need to have adequate comfort 
that the gains made with respect to addressing the governance challenge by way of an 
optional listing do not result in restrictions being imposed on the fund that impede its ability to 
be commercially successful. 
8.8 Developments with the London Stock Exchange
Although the ISE has maintained a leading position in the listing of hedge funds over the past 
two decades, other exchanges can and have taken steps to better address the needs of fund 
participants and fund managers in connection with obtaining listing for private investment 
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funds. In 2007, the LSE launched a dedicated new market for both UK and non-UK domiciled 
specialized investment funds known as the Specialist Fund Market (SFM).
790
  A ‘Specialized 
Investment Fund’ (SIF) is defined by the LSE to include single strategy funds, feeder funds, 
specialist sector funds, limited partnership structures, specialist geographic funds, and funds 
with specialist corporate governance structures. The SFM is, however, only be available to 
issuers of SIFs targeted at institutional, professional, and highly knowledgeable investors. 
Investment entities considering a transfer from the Main Market will generally be required to 
comply with any delisting requirements applicable in respect of the relevant market.
791
  Issuers 
that wish to market such funds to a wider audience, including retail investors, continue to have 
access to the LSE’s Main Market, and to the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), which has 
been successful in attracting investment entities, primarily property funds or other conventional 
investment funds.
792
In order to be eligible for listing on the SFM an applicant must follow the initial and ongoing 
obligations as laid down in the LSE’s Admission and Disclosure Standards and the FSA 
Conduct of Business Rules, which require that any applicant to the SFM:
(a) be categorized as a SIF targeted at institutional, professional, and highly 
knowledgeable investors;
(b) have its prospectus approved by the applicant’s EEA Competent Authority, 
which will be the FSA (through the UKLA) for applicants whose home Member 
State is in the UK; 
(c) apply to the LSE
793
for admission to trading on the SFM, which application must:
(i) include a demonstration that the securities to be listed will be freely 
transferable and negotiable; and
(ii) highlight relevant risk factors in any prospectus.
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The SFM provides a potential competitor to the ISE in terms of its appeal to investors and 
managers of private investment funds. The SFM can accept a variety of sophisticated legal 
structures including limited partnership interests and non-voting share structures, allowing the 
flexibility to create structures that can comply with home country tax or securities laws while 
also allowing access to permanent capital.  
Some institutional investors seeking to satisfy their concerns about the governance challenge 
may require issuers to apply additional elements of governance and regulation.  Where this is 
the case, funds are able to provide additional tailored disclosures in their prospectuses.  As 
with the ISE listing rules, the SFM rules foster a flow of information which concerned investors 
may use to better address the governance challenge, by detecting investor protection 
concerns at an earlier stage of development than otherwise might be possible. To date, 
however, there has only been a limited number of funds who have listed on SFM.
794
  Its future, 
as a result, remains unclear.
8.9 Limitations on Effectiveness
A key element to any evaluation on the effectiveness of exchange listings as a possible 
solution to the governance challenge must include analysis of whether the exchange can 
enforce its rules and sanctions those parties who fail to comply.  A review of the publicly 
available information from each of the ISE and the Central Bank of Ireland suggests that no 
enforcement actions or disciplinary proceedings were taken by either the exchange or the 
financial regulator during the period 2007-2010.  Further, some critics have asserted that lax 
corporate governance in Ireland was a contributing factor to its recent economic unravelling.
795
We must therefore consider whether such lack of internal limits on most proceedings reflects a 
monitoring failure on behalf of the ISE of such a degree as to deny them the credibility required 
to fulfil the role laid out for it in this chapter.
As noted earlier, however, the 2007-2009 financial crisis was not, at its core, a crisis 
emanating out of private investment funds, but rather other elements of the global financial 
system.  Accordingly, it not necessary that there be any particular number of enforcement 
actions as involving ISE listed funds as a result of the crisis itself.  Another potential criticism is 
that as the investors distance from a monitor (in this case, the exchange) increases, the power 
of the monitor increases as a result of the agency issues involved.  In the case of independent 
board directors,
796
the independent director performs that role for that particular fund.  Once we 
arrive at an exchange, we have a large organization performing a regulatory function for a 
large number of funds, and a very large number of investors.  The governance of any one 
particular fund is necessarily going to be a smaller portion of an individuals’ concern than in the 
case of either the fund participant with a side letter or the independent director.
However, we should consider the effects of regulatory competition between exchanges as a 
means to limit these concerns.  Regulatory competition has occasionally been cast as 
providing either a “race to the bottom” or a “race to the top.”  Importantly, investors can, and 
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do, identify the added value that good governance and effective oversight provides to an issuer 
of security, and adjust their investment decisions accordingly.
797
An exchange will benefit from having a reputation for a strong regulation, and other exchanges 
who are competing for listings will necessarily need to consider whether they should increase 
their standards in order to give prospective fund investors the level of protection they require.  
A useful place for such exchanges to look when considering possible changes to their listings 
rules would be the best practices statements and industry guidelines discussed earlier in 
Chapter 5.  Notably, in the case of private fund listings, the exchanges compete solely by 
reference to the regulatory function, since the listing is not intended to create a trading market.  
As a result, effective oversight is centre stage in the decision-making process.
Also, it is worth noting that enforcement actions are just a single option, among many, that a 
regulator has.  As one commentator noted when contrasting the low level of UK enforcement 
actions to the significantly higher level of US actions.
[T]he FSA would no doubt counter that formal enforcement 
action is only one of the regulatory tools available to the FSA to 
deal with contraventions.  Alternatives, which focus more on ex 
ante rather than an ex post approach to dealing with 
contraventions include supervisory action, team work and the 
policy consultation process. . .   It would be rash to conclude, for 
example, that the low level of enforcement in the UK results in a 
lower level of compliance.
798
No doubt the ISE would make a similar argument in its favour.
Importantly, the key factor that has lead to the prevelance of partnerships and offshore 
companies among private fund structures is their tax treatment.  They have been selected for 
their use in spite of, not because of, their governance inadequacies.  The ability to design a 
fund in order to best suit the commercial needs of fund managers and investors does not 
require as a prerequisite poor or inadequate governance mechanisms.  
The tremendous success of the ISE as a listing venue for hedge funds demonstrates a proven 
desire among many market participants for heightened third party oversight that is not 
constrained by a one-size-fits-all, top-down regulatory mandate.  The reputational capital of 
other exchanges could also be put to use performing this private monitoring role if demand 
were to sufficiently build.  In the meantime, the ISE provides such services to the market.
8.10 Conclusion
Rather than requiring a prospective investor to “start from scratch” when examining a particular 
private investment fund to identify sources of governance risk and, thereafter, to adequately 
bespoke solutions to address that risk, the listing of such fund on an exchange can provide a 
consistent basis of comparison across funds of similar structures on domiciles or investment 
objectives.  To the extent that the listings rules of such an exchange promote the equal 
treatment of investors and fosters the dissemination of accurate and timely information about 
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the fund, fund investors will be better able to exercise their rights as equity-holders to protect 
their interests.  
By voluntarily including a securities exchange in the overall fund structure and tasking that 
exchange to perform regulator-like functions, adequate monitoring of the fund manager by the 
fund investors is supported.  Historically, however, many exchanges (e.g., NYSE) have not 
anticipated the listing of legal entities other than corporations, such as limited partnerships.  As 
a result, governance standards drafted with corporate shareholders of operating businesses in 
mind will be inadequate to address the needs of investors in private investment funds.  Such 
shortcomings will need to be addressed as, and when, more exchanges provide meaningful 
competition to the ISE.
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Chapter 9
Evaluating and Implementing Private Monitoring Solutions
9.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has acted as an important catalyst for recognizing and prioritizing 
concerns about adequate governance structures in private investment funds.  These concerns
over the manner in which these funds are directed and controlled warrant a vibrant debate by 
academics and practitioners.  This thesis establishes a conceptual framework with which to 
address such concerns to the extent that, and for so long as, they remain outside the scope of 
current financial regulatory regimes.
Raising new funds has become more difficult, and fund managers face more demanding 
investors,
799
with vivid memories of how many fund managers made free use of their broad 
powers into fund documentation to restrict investors options to either suspend investment
activities or redeem/withdraw from the fund.  Investors are increasingly willing to use whatever 
contractual and other rights are available to them in order to protect their interests.
800
  
Threatening and pursuing litigation against fund managers is now a ready tool for the 
disgruntled investor.
801
  
Investors in private investment funds, and their agents serving either as directors on the 
boards of various fund vehicles or as the securities exchange on which the fund’s shares or 
units have been admitted to listing, can address the governance challenge when adequately 
empowered with the information necessary to monitor the ongoing compliance of the fund 
manager with its duties and obligations to the fund and the effective means through the 
governance mechanisms of the fund to ensure that any breaches that may occur are 
remedied.   In light of the current commercial realities of the industry, however, any success 
proposals made to address the governance challenge must be both pragmatic to adopt and 
practical to implement. 
Prospective fund participants must overcome any remaining inertia or apathy, and 
acknowledge their obligation to themselves and their ultimate beneficiaries to fully negotiate 
their investments in these funds.  Accepting terms offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis will 
leave these problems unsolved.
802
Fund participants must also realize that the traditional 
mechanism for voicing displeasure towards a fund manager - refusal to participate in the next 
fund - is often an inadequate solution.  
In sum, the three potential solutions identified herein would enable fund investors to better 
address the problems arising from the governance challenge by facilitating a better flow of 
information from the fund manager to the investors and their agents, while at the same time 
reinforcing the legally enforceable conduct standards applicable to the fund manager.  
Importantly, each private monitoring solution could be used either independently or 
cumulatively.  An investor can agree side letter terms that are effective until such time as the 
fund is listed on an agreed exchange.  Alternatively, an exchange could include a requirement 
in its listing rules that all listed funds must have a certain number of independent directors.  
Interwoven throughout each of these solutions is the ability to make reference to, or integrate 
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key features of, the industry guidelines and best practice documents that continue to evolve 
and develop in the marketplace.
Each private monitoring solution recognizes the commercial contexts in which private 
investment funds operate by emphasizing voluntary steps that fund managers and investors 
can take incrementally.  They operate on an open-ended basis that facilitates learning and 
adaptation.  Further, each focuses on the provision of accurate and timely information as the 
means to overcome the investment protection concerns that arise due to the collectivized 
nature of the private investment fund.  Finally, each co-exists with the regime of direct 
government regulation within which private funds, their managers and their investors currently 
reside.
803
Receipt of material new information provided through the private monitoring solutions
discussed above must be acted upon by way of the rights embedded in the constituent 
documents of the fund, which may include special redemption rights, rights to suspend 
investments by the fund or other mechanisms to induce a full or partial “stand-still” on the fund 
manager.  The reputational risk that some fund investors fear that will result from them being 
seen as “troublesome” must be measured against the obligations they have to their own 
beneficiaries to monitor and oversee the investments that they make. 
Finally, it is important not only that the governance challenge be addressed, but also that good 
governance in private investment funds be visible and demonstrable.  Such visibility is vital not 
only to the fund manager and its principals and agents, who may need to be able to 
demonstrated when called upon that they have fulfilled the legal and regulatory duties owed to 
the fund, but also to the investors in private investment funds and the financial markets as a 
whole.  However, the private monitoring solutions are open to the criticisms that in order to be 
successful, these self-regulatory solutions must actually be adopted and implemented by the 
potential beneficiaries, which is not assured given that some fund participants have been 
disengaged from the monitoring role.
804
In this chapter, I will provide critiques of the private monitoring solutions discussed above, as 
well as a critique of the recent regulatory reform’s failure to address the governance challenge.  
Next, I will discuss the role that private actors, such as fund participants, can play in 
conducting pre-investment and post-investment due diligence on the fund and the fund 
manager to better establish a foundation for ongoing monitoring.
805
  Finally, I conclude with an 
analysis of how the private monitoring solutions can be implemented in order to address 
potential criticisms.
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9.2 A Critique of Private Monitoring Solutions
In addition to the particular criticisms that might be made against each of the private monitoring 
solutions individually, which are discussed above in each chapter, more general critiques may 
also be made, which are discussed below.  These criticisms will argue that private actors lack 
the ability or the means to protect their own interests, and as a result government regulation is 
the only feasible alternative if these issues are to be adequately addressed.
9.2.1 Regulation is More Effective than Private Action
A potential criticism of the private monitoring approaches will be that top-down regulatory 
changes are best positioned to remedy the principal by-products of the governance challenge 
directly, thereby making the ability for investors to resolve these concerns themselves 
redundant.  The renewed momentum for increasing the level and scope of regulation 
applicable to private investment funds and their managers would appear difficult to rebut.  For 
example, after the G20 issued their joint communiqué at their April 2009 meeting, calling for 
greater oversight of large hedge funds, various legislatures and regulators duly followed on 
with white papers and detailed proposals.
806
Critics will claim that the private monitoring solutions proposed herein do not guarantee a 
successful outcome in all circumstance.  For example, the effectiveness of independent 
directors and direct oversight by shareholders have been challenged.
807
  Further, it may be 
claimed that fund participants are insufficiently motivated or incentivized to negotiate adequate 
protections for themselves.
808
  As one commentator has observed:
The financial crisis is partly a story about the fallibility of industry actors in safeguarding 
their own enlightened self-interest, behaving rationally, and responding to (or perhaps 
even grasping) the systemic risk their conduct was generating.  Considerable human 
experience in fact suggests that in the face of uncertainty, bounded human rationality 
has considerable presence.
809
However, as national and international financial regulators debate comprehensive and far 
reaching changes to the global financial architecture, the adequacy of governance structures 
of private investment funds is not consistently prioritized as agenda item. 
As discussed above, we are witnessing a renewed drive for comprehensive regulatory reform 
in the financial services industry,
810
while at the same time industry trade associations and 
other interested parties are continuing to develop anthologies of “best practices” which can be 
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promoted among fund managers and other informed parties as a form of non-compulsory self-
regulation.
811
Unfortunately, neither Dodd-Frank nor AIFMD, nor any other pending regulatory 
reforms on either side of the Atlantic, has attempted to directly address governance issues.
812
In the absence of legislative or regulatory actions, we must look to private actors, private law 
and the private monitoring solutions proposed herein.
813
  The private law endeavours to 
provide aggrieved fund participants with causes of action which may be pursued through legal 
proceedings after such fraud or malfeasance comes to light.
814
  By implementing one or more 
of the private monitoring solutions discussed in the prior chapters, investors can seek to 
solidify both (i) their potential causes of action against a fund manager should the need arise 
and (ii) their ability to better detect any “red flags”
815
at a stage early enough to effectively react 
and intervene to protect their financial interest.
The recent US and EU regulatory reforms clearly sought to close perceived gaps in the 
manner in which private investment funds and their managers are regulated.
816
  However, 
private monitoring solutions, which can be implemented by agreement between the fund 
participants and the fund manager, will remain a practical and effecting means of addressing 
these concerns to the extent that further regulation is not introduced to directly resolve 
governance issues. Even if addressing governance issue in private investment funds were to 
become a priority policy goal of regulators, there are still practical issues that would potentially 
impede their implementation.  Any policy decision to increase the amount or scope of 
regulation applicable to private investment funds contains within it an implicit, but equally 
important, practical decision to re-allocate staff and expertise away from other parts of the 
financial landscape (e.g. retail funds, mortgage lending) to private investment funds.  Just as 
doubling the “cops on the beat” in Mayfair and Belgravia, at the expense of Bermondsey or 
Brixton, would prove highly controversial, so should similarly motivated decisions in the 
financial services industry.
Finally, this analysis of private monitoring solutions occurs in the context of a wider social and 
political debate about the appropriateness of shifting responsibility for longer-term financial 
security from the government to individual citizens.
817
  In this light, a financial regulator can 
elect to focus its attention on regulating products or regulating processes.  While the former 
can potentially limit the ability of firms to innovate and compete in a rapidly changing market, 
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the latter would allow for a framework of rules that would co-exist with, rather than replace, 
market forces, leaving flexibility for product providers and consumers to make choices based 
on their evaluation of their needs and risks.
818
  As a result, there will continue to be a space in 
the current legal and regulatory framework for private actors to use the private monitoring 
solutions to bolster and reinforce their private law rights.
9.2.2 Non-Retail Investors Cannot Protect Their Own Interests
Another criticism of the private monitoring solutions would be that many so-called 
“sophisticated” investors, who may satisfy certain objective or subjective requirements 
necessary to be distinguished from retail investors,
819
still lack the ability to negotiate adequate 
protections and utilize effectively the information provided to them.
820
  As a result, the private 
monitoring solutions may not be consistently effective in all circumstances.
Notably, however, this is in fact a larger critique of the basis upon which certain financial 
market participants are exempted from regulation.  Of course, the alternative would be to have 
a single standard (i.e., retail) applicable to everyone in the financial markets at all times, 
regardless of their size or sophistication, and regardless of the nature of the product or service 
being transacted.  And in such a regulatory scheme, the financial regulator would be less 
capable of prioritizing its limited resources to address the needs of the most vulnerable 
because all investors would rightly assume that, given their categorization as “retail” investors, 
the regulator would be policing their transactions and/or counterparties.
The decision to exempt certain individuals and institutions precedes the question of how such 
exempt persons should address the lack of regulatory oversight.  Once that decision has been 
made, as it has in the US, the UK, across Europe and in industrialized countries around the 
world, the merits of the private monitoring solution can then be assessed.
9.2.3 Private Monitoring Solutions Lack Normative Content
Another potential criticism of the private monitoring solutions is that they lack of normative 
content - in other words, they are a means and not an end.  The private monitoring solutions
provide alternate mechanisms for addressing the concerns that arise from disparate ownership 
of fund vehicles structured to resolve other, more pecuniary, issues, but do not themselves 
provide direction as to how best to exercise the grievance powers regained.
The same concerns that underline the governance challenges have led to appearances in 
recent years of sets of “best practices” or similar standards adopted by trade associations or 
ad hoc working groups rather than financial regulators, as discussed in Chapter 5.  In part, the 
goal of these drafting committees has been to forestall more intrusive regulation on the private 
investment fund industry.
Importantly, the establishment and promotion of “best practices” standards can support and 
promote these private monitoring solutions by providing the private actors associated with 
these funds with more commonly understood “frames of reference”, enabling the process of 
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implementing the private monitoring solutions to be accomplished more efficiently.  Of course, 
the mere publication of a document purporting to be industry best practice has only limited 
legal effect.   Some further steps must be taken to give fund participants the necessary legal 
and equitable rights. 
Unless these standards are adopted by fund managers in a binding manner, and fund 
participants have rights, directly or indirectly, against them for failure to comply,
821
where 
appropriate, these exercises will remain theoretical and abstract.  Since by design these 
standards remain outside the formal, compulsory aspects of the financial services regulatory 
regime,
822
the most effective way to provide these standards legal effect is by way of changes 
to the underlying fund documentation
823
voluntarily agreed by the fund participants and the 
fund manager. 
As discussed above, the MFA expressly states that the recommendations in the Sound 
Practices go beyond the requirements of laws and regulations
824
and further that they do not 
cover all of the legal requirements with which a hedge fund manager must comply.
825
  
Moreover, the PWG Committee and the MFA have each recognized the lack of specific 
modularity of their recommendations, and therefore acknowledge in their respective reports 
that some recommendations may not even be applicable to certain hedge fund managers and 
other recommendations may even have to be tailored to suit certain hedge fund managers.
826
Since the recommendations are not legally binding on fund managers, there is no person or 
entity that is overseeing compliance therewith by fund managers and that has standing to 
enforce hedge fund managers to comply with any of such recommendations.  In essence then, 
the Best Practices and the Sound Practices are self-elected programs for fund managers for 
which the hedge fund managers themselves are responsible to self-regulate.  
It may be that some will be motivated to ‘go beyond’ compliance with their legal requirements 
and adopt some or all of the guidelines and standards.  By their title alone, “best practices” and 
“sound practices” imply a sense of “doing the right thing”.   Thus, even the title is, on an implicit 
level, a way to encourage fund managers to adopt one or more of these recommendations 
simply by implying that it should agree to do what is ‘right’.  However, neither the Best 
Practices nor the Sound Practices nor the HFWG Standards nor the ILPA Guidelines have the 
binding force of law.  They are simply recommendations and guidelines for the fund 
managers.
827
Private monitoring solutions - whether one-dimensional (i.e., side letters),
828
two-dimensional 
(i.e., board composition and operation)
829
or three-dimensional (listing)
830
- can often be more 
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effectively implemented by reference to such standards, either in whole or in part. As a result, 
these “soft” standards can be given “hard” edges by incorporating them into the legal structure 
of the fund.  By way of example, a side letter can include an undertaking that the fund is, and 
will remain, in compliance with particular sections of a set of “best practice”.  Alternatively, a 
board of directors could adopt an annual “comply or explain” statement to investors where the 
fund’s fulfilment of the standards will be measured and explained.  Finally, listing rules could 
be regularly updated to reflect, either explicitly or implicitly, changes in such “best practices” as 
they evolve over time. 
By providing a legal foundation for industry practice standards, therefore, the private 
monitoring solutions analyzed in the preceding chapters can provide a legally enforceable 
basis for implementing such standards. In addition, potential investors can ask each fund 
manager seeking its investment for such fund manager’s level of compliance with a particular 
set of standards as part of such potential investor’s due diligence process.  Investors can then 
evaluate the level of compliance and the areas of non-compliance of a fund manager and 
determine whether it is satisfied with the results and the reasons behind such decisions.  In the 
event investors request reasons for non-compliance, fund managers should be prepared to 
explain the deviations. 
Alternatively, the investment in a given fund could be conditioned on a fund managers’
covenant to comply with identified practice statements and such covenant, depending upon 
where placed, could be a contractual obligation
831
enforceable by the investor counterparty.  
Therefore, abstinence or forbearance of investment is a tool that may used to “enforce”
compliance with the recommendations.  This would lead to all or a portion of the 
recommendations being incorporated by reference into contracts to which the fund manager is 
a party.  This act by a fund manager would be tantamount to its voluntary obligation to comply 
with those recommendations so incorporated.  Similarly, the threat of redemption after 
investment can be another tool used by investors to “enforce” compliance with the 
recommendations.
Proactively, each of the Best Practices,
832
the Sound Practices,
833
the HFWG Standards
834
and 
the ILPA Guidelines
835
create an avenue for the fund manager to identify itself (and perhaps 
single itself out from others) as noble and worthy of attention for having voluntarily adopted 
one or more of these practice statements. In agreeing to be accountable, the fund manager 
could incorporate the applicable provisions into the fund’s organizational documents and 
offering documents.  This step not only puts investors on notice of the fund manager’s desire 
to comply, but would also create a contractual obligation of the fund manager which could be 
enforced by an investor in the fund.
By providing a legal foundation for industry practice standards, therefore, the private 
monitoring solutions analyzed in the preceding chapters can provide a legally enforceable 
basis for implementing such standards, and thereby contribute a normative basis that can 
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evolve over time as industry participants address new concerns that arise in the financial 
markets.
9.2.4 Substituting One Set of Agency Problems for Another
As noted in Chapter 1, there are two means by which agency cost can be reduced:  better 
alignment of interest of the agent and the principal (which is discussed below) and appointing a 
monitor to oversee and discipline the agent.
836
  In this context, such responsibility has 
traditionally been given to the financial regulator.
837
  A further critique, therefore, could be 
made that if there are agency problems related to government regulation of private fund 
governance, then similar breakdowns could occur in the context of the private monitoring 
solutions.
In the case of side letters,
838
the fund investor may not have the technical background or
trained personnel to act upon the information it receives.  Just as a regulator may not have the 
current, state-of-the-art expertise to “keep on top of” fund managers operating in new or 
particularly complex parts of the market, a fund investor who has obtained detailed side letter 
terms may not be able to effectively use the information it receives.  A similar gap may also 
exist in the knowledge and background of an independent director.
In the case of both independent directors
839
and securities exchanges,
840
both involve a 
significant move away from the investor-as-monitor and towards increased reliance on parties 
further and further away from the investor.  The paradox is then that an attempt to access 
expertise that the investor lacks by involving third-parties actually increases by some degree 
the risk of failures like have been identified above for state-based regulators because of the 
involvement of third parties who may not be as sufficiently incentivized as the investor to 
perform the monitoring. Ultimately, however, in the absence of regulatory action addressing 
governance concerns identified herein, the benefits of partial or incomplete actions outweighs 
the risks that arise from doing nothing.
9.2.5 Economic Incentives are Sufficient to Ensure Adequate Governance
For completeness, it is worthwhile to identify and address a countervailing line of argument 
that, in fact, nothing need be done to reinforce the position of investors in private investment 
funds.  Investment funds succeed in their pursuit of their investment objectives in part by 
aligning their interest of the fund manager with the interests of the fund participants.  As one 
commentator has observed:
If either party fails to live up to the implicit bargain, the theory is that there is a 
reputational penalty.  That is, investors who fail to satisfactorily reinvest in successful 
funds are quietly excluded from future funds.  Meanwhile, fund managers who do not 
live up to norms of good conduct find that they cannot raise capital for the next fund.
841
A good reputation is a valuable economic interest for both managers and investors.
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Some could argue, therefore, that the simple reliance on economic incentives to deliver 
adequate investment returns can also provide an adequate solution to governance concerns
by aligning the interests of the parties.
842
  The presence of significant carried interest or 
performance fees distinguishes many private investment funds from their retail fund cousins.
843
  
As a result, critics could claim that the agency problem could be effectively addressed solely 
by aligning the interests of the fund manager with the fund participants by creating a collection 
of performance fee thresholds, high watermarks and hurdles that would sufficiently incentivize 
the fund manager to adequately protect and grow the value of the fund.  
However, such incentive allocation can also encourage levels of risk disproportionate to the 
best interest of fund participants.
844
  Effective governance mechanisms in such circumstances 
are a means to mitigate the effects of such a divergence of interest between the parties.  
Although the effects of the “one way bet” aspect of incentive allocations can be counter-
balanced by requiring the fund manager to have significant sums of money at risk in the fund 
alongside of investors (thereby translating the fund managers participation into a “two way 
bet”), fund participants must still look to monitoring enrolments in order to construct a complete 
solution to the governance challenge.
Importantly, it should be noted that the hedge fund industry and the private equity industry 
have already established economic incentives such as described above as market standard 
terms.  Observers would, in fact, be hard pressed to find any funds in either asset class that 
does not already have such alignments of interests already in place.  Accordingly, based on 
the various governance failures discussed earlier in this thesis, such alignment is not in itself a 
complete solution to our concerns about the governance challenge.  As a result, there is
clearly more that can be done to supplement the benefits derived from the remuneration 
practices of private funds,  The private monitoring solutions can perform that role.
9.3 Recognizing the Limits of Regulators
Just as no regulatory regime is complete and final,
845
no regulatory reform can be expected to 
totally eliminate the prior shortcomings or gaps.  As one commentator has observed:
[F]inancial regulation reform in an era of rapid technology–driven 
innovation is an inherently dynamic phenomenon.  Conceptually, 
it should be viewed as an ongoing intellectual enterprise, a 
process of continuous collective deliberation and exchange of 
ideas, rather than a static set of rules enacted into law at any 
particular point.
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Although private investment funds have opted out of many aspects of the financial regulatory 
regime,
847
their managers, promoters and counterparties are frequently within the regulated 
sphere.
848
  Most of the instances of fraud and governance failures that have been discussed 
herein have occurred in the context of a fund manager who is registered with the SEC or 
authorized by the FSA.
849
  These entities were known to their regulators and subject to 
supervision and periodic review.  Importantly, as noted above in the case of Madoff,
850
accusations and allegation had been repeated filed with the SEC and the SEC failed to take 
meaningful steps to investigate this registered investment adviser.
Ultimately, there will always necessarily be a gap between (a) the number of professionals in a 
financial regulator with the requisite level of skills, experience and sophistication and (b) the 
number of private investment funds active in the markets and soliciting prospective investors.  
Absent an attempt to prohibit such vehicles outright, this inability to have sufficient “police on 
the beat”, especially in light of other investment protection failures involving mortgage lenders, 
banks and mutual funds which potential impact a vastly greater number of citizens, we must 
recognize that individuals contemplating investing in these funds are both best place and most 
motivated to ensure that the vehicles comply with desired standards of governance and 
investor protections.
The risk of “regulation for regulation’s sake” is ultimately that it will lure investors into a belief 
that it is the regulator, rather than the investor himself or herself, who has ultimate 
responsibility for the initial and ongoing oversight of a fund and its manager.  Rules without
adequate staffing and continuous policing will be inadequate to ensure that investors’ rights 
are adequately protected.
851
  For example, as previously noted the information required to be 
provided as part of the Form ADV used to register investment advisers in the US is 
rudimentary and subject to material gaps.  Investors who conduct even a basic due diligence 
exercise on the fund manager will often obtain much more relevant information than the Form 
ADV provides.  
So what should be the appropriate role for “investor protection” in the context of private 
investment funds in light of other competing regulatory priorities?  As one commentator has 
noted:
Investor protection has traditionally been concerned with the defensive protection of the 
vulnerable investor against unscrupulous market participants.
852
Despite the manner in which investor protection dominates the overt regulatory agendas of 
financial regulators across the globe, there are numerous different grounds on which 
regulatory action can be justified.
853
  As one commentator has observed:
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‘Investor protection’ has considerable intuitive appeal and dominates as a regulatory 
objective internationally.  But it remains a controversial justification for intervention.  
Sharp distinctions arise between characterizations of investor protection as, for 
example, a threat to entrepreneurialism and efficient capital raising, as an expression of 
social virtues and as a moral imperative.
854
Traditionally, investor protection focused on the vulnerable investor at risk of being defrauded 
by more sophisticated, and potentially less scrupulous, market professionals.
855
As discussed 
above, prospective investors who are permitted by marketing regulation to participate in private 
investment funds must demonstrate certain objective or subjective characteristics sufficient to 
distinguish them from the wider class of retail investors.
856
  This is not to say, however, that 
those non-retail investors will necessarily always have negotiating parity with each fund 
manager.  To require such parity as a condition of being exempted would leave few perfectly 
balanced counterparties to actually do business.
Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that informed investors who can effectively use the 
governance mechanisms built into the private investment fund vehicles themselves - as 
reinforced by the private monitoring solutions described above - can be better positioned in 
many instances to operate as an effective limitation on fund managers, than financial 
regulators who may lack the specialist expertise to correctly identify problems and 
shortcomings, and who must allocate their limited resources and headcount among numerous 
competing priorities.
9.4 Due Diligence as the Commercial Foundation for Private Monitoring Solutions
The approaches discussed above to resolving the governance challenge can be seen to sit 
alongside a longer-established and more widely recognized process that most investors in 
private funds purport to undertake prior to any investment - due diligence.  As a result, many 
current and prospective fund investors will already have a commercial, non-legal foundation on 
which to implement the private monitoring solutions.
857
The practice of due diligence (i.e., the commercial and legal review of a prospective private 
investment fund and its managers prior to investment) varies greatly in scope and depth from 
one investor to another.
858
  Efforts have been made over the years to standardize the 
approaches among investors and across asset classes.  Recent events, such as the Madoff 
debacle,
859
as well as the earlier meltdowns of Amaranth Advisors (2006) and Long Term 
Capital Management (1998), have highlighted the shortcomings of a limited due diligence 
based on untested presumptions and excessive confidence in the earlier efforts of other 
investors.
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Importantly, the limitation on the type and number of prospective investors who may participate 
in a private investment fund discussed above is based in part on the belief that such persons 
can and will ask for and review relevant information about a fund’s track record, compliance, 
controls and risk assessments.
860
  Failure by a prospective investor to conduct such a review 
undermines the basis upon which such exemptions were originally conceived.  
A due diligence exercise should be viewed as both a pre-investment and post-investment
activity.
861
  In addition to the ongoing monitoring of performance and its attributions, post-
investment due diligence will be linked, whether implicitly or explicitly, to the governance 
structure of the particular fund.  Of course, due diligence involves expenditures of time and/or 
money, and cannot be guaranteed in all circumstances to reveal all flaws or shortcomings in a 
prospective investment.
Each of the private monitoring solutions discussed above can also be seen as a means to 
ensure effective, post-investment due diligence continues over the duration of the fund 
investments.  The approaches differ in the breadth of fund participants who benefit from the 
diligence efforts.  Historically, due diligence has been seen as a separate process conducted 
by each investor for its own benefit, although there has been a growing trend in recent years 
towards standardizing and sharing the results of due diligence.
862
  The process of entering into 
a side letter with a fund manager to provide information or other rights would be an effective 
means to secure the basis for ongoing oversight of the investment.  It can also serve as a 
means to promote more effective governance.  Broadening the scope of application out to 
include enhanced governance procedures at the level of a fund’s board of directors, or for all 
funds admitted to a particular exchange, can similarly perform such a dual service.
Although it must be acknowledged that anticipated fund performance will always be the 
primary factor in selecting a private fund for investment,
863
the due diligence function can be 
expanded to analyse and address fund governance concerns as well.  A well-governed fund 
with poor performance will appeal to few discerning investors.  However, the risks to retaining 
a high return after a significant governance failure are substantial enough to warrant a 
reasonable allocation of time and attention to ensuring the appropriate private monitoring 
solutions are in place.  
9.5 Implementing Structural Approaches
As Easterbrook and Fischel have noted:
Investors in any venture are concerned about the possibility that the actions of 
others will reduce their return.  Those who attempt to attract other people’s 
money have incentives to adopt governance mechanism that respond to 
potential investors’ concerns. . .
864
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As discussed in Chapter 1, corporate governance is the means by which transparency and 
accountability are effectuated within the management of a legal vehicle, such as a partnership 
or company.  Both Partnership PIFs and Company PIFs provide scope for participants to 
negotiate and create bespoke solutions for governance issues, as they assess their 
importance in their particular circumstances.
865
As more litigation arises as a result of the recent global financial crisis, the law relating to 
limited partnerships in Delaware and offshore companies in the Cayman Islands will continue 
to evolve.  In the absence of comprehensive product-level regulation, these bodies of law are 
the principal source of law governing the relationship between fund managers and fund 
participants.  
Any analysis of the effectiveness of the private monitoring solutions to address the governance 
challenge must be conducted with the understanding that in many cases some or most of the 
fund investors may be unable to obtain the terms they desire, due to, for example, the small 
size of their proposed investments or the popularity of a particular fund or fund manager.  As a 
result, different investors in the same fund or the same investor in different funds will need to 
potentially rely on different methods for acquiring some or all of their desired terms. 
Importantly, all three private monitoring solutions currently exist in commercial practice today.  
They are not being considered or hypothesized in a vacuum.  Their viability being therefore 
established, at least in certain quarters for certain purposes, we can turn our attention now to 
how to best support their wider adoption and implementation.
9.5.1 Legal Duties and Obligations
As discussed in Chapter 2, as a result of complex structures adopted by many fund managers 
involving the use of multiple management vehicles, including entities established in various 
onshore and offshore jurisdictions, investors in a private investment fund may face significant 
difficulties in ensuring adequate oversight and accountability.  As the vehicle(s) in which the 
investors have entrusted their money are legally and commercially distinct, the interests of the 
investors and the fund manager can and will diverge with respect to many issues.
Each private investment fund that is individually negotiated and established contains within it 
agreements reached about the level of fiduciary protection and other duties that will be 
provided to investors.  Delaware law, in particular, allows parties to set by contract the terms of 
their relationship with great flexibility and very little paternalism.  However, one party’s 
“freedom of contract” is another party’s caveat emptor.
If the current approach in fund documentation to modifying private law duties has focused too 
much on providing certainty and minimizing litigation exposure for the fund manager, rather 
than inherent flaws or shortcomings in the decided cases themselves, then potential solutions 
to the governance challenge which seek to swing the pendulum back to the default private law 
positively (or further) are worth examining in detail.
866
Investors in private investment funds, 
therefore, need to be vigilant with respect to their ongoing participation in such funds in order 
to detect any structural or operational conflicts that may arise.  Simply relying indefinitely on 
the original pre-investment due diligence exercise will be insufficient.
867
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The underlying documentation of a private investment fund can be negotiated to address 
adequately the governance challenge present in private investment funds.  However, any 
discussion of appropriate steps to take must take place in light of the current commercial 
realities in this industry.  The perception has been recently that fund managers who are able to 
deliver consistently strong investment returns are able to raise any further required capital from 
their existing investors.
868
  As discussed earlier, any proposals made to address the 
governance challenge must be both pragmatic to adopt and practical to implement.  
Therefore, any implementation of private monitoring solutions to address the governance 
challenge will focus on the legal and equitable duties that a fund manager owes to its client, 
the private investment fund.  The key fund documents will affect the scope and applicability of 
the duty of care and fiduciary duties which will form the basis for claims against the fund 
manager. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, fiduciary duties can be an effective means of recourse for clients to 
ensure that the investment manager providing them with professional services does so in 
fulfilment of certain recognized standards. Unfortunately, in the case of a private investment 
fund, the fund vehicle itself intermediates the relationship between the investment manager 
and the ultimate participants. The fund itself, whether a limited partnership
869
or an offshore 
company,
870
must take the steps required to enforce any such claims. The participants in the 
fund must necessarily rely on the governance mechanisms of such vehicles in order for such 
actions to be commenced.
Historically, lawyers preparing the constitutional documents of a private investment fund on 
behalf of the fund manager have included clearly and broadly drafted exclusion clauses, which 
operate to protect the manager from investor claims.  The clauses and related provisions are 
required in order to shift the balance from the outcomes that would otherwise result if the basic 
legal and equitable rules and principles to be applied by a court.  
Whether a fund is a Company PIF or a Partnership PIF, the default position of the underlying 
law would be one in which partners and/or shareholders would directly benefit from duties and 
obligations imposed on their general partners and/or boards of directors, respectively.  Further, 
the bilateral agreements entered into with advisory entities, in addition to the partnership 
agreements and articles of associations that form these vehicles, also include extensively 
drafted exclusion clauses, which seek, to the extent possible under the general law and 
applicable financial services regulation, to circumscribe the recourse that a disgruntled client 
would have to his or her investment manager.  From this perspective, the private monitoring 
solutions to the governance challenge can be seen as an attempt to allow fund investors, on 
an informed basis, to enjoy the fuller benefit of the legal protections to which they are 
otherwise entitled.   
9.5.2 Effective Implementation
If a fund participant waits until significant investment losses have occurred or allegations of 
fraud have been made to closely review and analyze the constitutional documents of their 
fund, then it will be too late at that time to negotiate adequate and acceptable amendments to 
address the concerns that have been raised.  The time for such negotiations was prior to the 
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investor’s participation in the fund.  As unnegotiated fund documents will continue to reflect the 
primacy of the managers’ concerns for certainty and limitation, prospective investors must take 
affirmative steps to use the private monitoring solutions to return the balance back to one more 
appropriate in light of their underlying concerns.  
The private fund model can undergo refinement and improvement in response to the changing 
priorities of fund participants. In the face of sustained public criticism, and a hostile media 
environment, and in the absence of any credible or sustained effort by regulators to address 
the governance challenge, fund managers and investors still retain the flexibility to address 
governance concerns themselves.  
As private investment funds are ultimately commercial arrangements negotiated by informed 
and motivated parties, the enthusiasm of prospective fund managers for well-defined limitation 
on liability from lawsuits, which has been effectively implemented to date in fund documents, 
can be counter-balanced by investors who would prefer the fuller protections they would 
otherwise be entitled to under the private law as it currently stands. For example, as the scope 
of fiduciary duties
871
are defined by the contract(s) that establish that relationship, steps may 
be taken by the prospective investors to ensure that the scope of that duty is not reduced past 
the point which they would find commercially acceptable.   But such a decision can only be 
contemplated if the full measure of the legal impact of the fund documentation is assessed as 
part of an effective pre-investment diligence review.  Once such an assessment has been 
done, the extent to which the manager has attempted to shift the balance from the default 
positions that would otherwise apply can be determined.  
Informed investors may then seek to implement one or more private monitoring solutions to 
seek to redress any commercially unacceptable imbalances.  As a result, these private 
monitoring solutions can serve as common points of reference which may provide the 
alternative investment industry with an effective mechanism for attempting to resolve these 
issues across a variety of jurisdictions and numerous different funds themselves. Improved 
governance mechanisms also hold out the possibility of greater appeal among prospective 
investors for private investment funds.  With the implementation of private monitoring solutions
for the governance challenge, funds providing adequate independent oversight and increased 
transparency could lead the increased allocation by investors to these fund managers. 
The increasing remoteness of fund investors from the managers and promoters of private 
investment funds has occurred at a time where the institutional participation in private 
investment funds has remained high.  Such sophisticated and knowledge participants can 
identify and prioritize the concerns they have about conflicts of interest, accurate valuation 
practices and adequate disclosure.  When aided by reference to industry practice standards, 
such as the MFA’s Sound Practices,
872
or the PWC Committee’s Best Practices,
873
the HFWG 
Standards
874
or the ILPA Guidelines,
875
the duties and obligations of the fund manager in 
contract and in tort, and at equity, can be identified and established to the parties mutual 
satisfaction. 
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9.5.3 Non-State Market Driven Governance Systems
Although not in the area of financial services firms, there have been developments in other 
areas of regulation to which parallels could be drawn to the private monitoring solutions 
proposed herein, and the manner in which private actors can operate in a way that is 
synergistic with, and supplementary to, established governmental regulation.
Cashore has described non-state market-driven (NSMD) governance systems which operate 
outside traditional top-down state authority in order to privatize governance.
876
  Although his 
focus was on environmental regulation generally, and forest certification specifically, he 
identified a trend towards domestic and transactional private governance systems that deserve 
their legitimacy and effectiveness from the private actors that comprise the market for those 
goods and services.  His paper focused on establishing an analytical framework for NSMD 
governance systems which centred on whether a system could achieve legitimacy to operate 
in domestic and international spheres.
877
  In the NSMD governance systems Cashore 
describes, “no one can be incarcerated or fined for failing to comply.”
878
  However, he 
recognizes that state apparatus can be used in ways that are consistent with, and support, 
NSMD, even where state power is not used to force compliance.  In the context of the private 
monitoring solutions described herein, the private actors will need to potentially make use of a 
state’s court system, in order, for example, to enforce a contractual provision or a duty owned 
by a fiduciary to a company or a partnership.  However, they will do so as private litigants and 
not require relevant state agencies to undertake investigations or enforcement actions of their 
own.
As a result, fund participants making use of a private monitoring solution (e.g., side letter) have 
direct legal rights against a fund manager that a participant in a NSMD forest certification 
program might lack, although the issues of legitimacy that support NSMD could contribute to 
extra-judicial stability and authority for the private monitoring solutions, if they become widely 
adopted.
Importantly, private monitoring solutions can supplement and reinforce other approaches to 
addressing the governance challenge.  For example, effective boards of directors within funds 
can assist financial regulators in their oversight and enforcement rules.  As SEC General 
Counsel Brian Cartwright has stated in the context of independent mutual fund directors:
In many ways, we at the SEC have the same task you do: Investor protection.  So it’s 
no surprise that, just like you, we at the SEC also need to be committed, vigilant and 
independent.  Like you, America’s investors have entrusted us with a tough, 
challenging job.  Because we share the same goal, your effective oversight 
complements our work at the SEC.  We at the SEC benefit directly from the good work 
you perform as independent fund directors.  When you succeed in your role as effective 
independent directors, America’s investors benefit.  I therefore pledge my continued 
support and thank you from the bottom of my heart for your critical contribution to the 
protection of America’s investors.
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Similar sentiments could be expressed in connection with fund investors who take on 
monitoring responsibilities through side letters, or exchanges which agree to provide such 
monitoring services to the funds listed thereon.  As noted in Chapter 1, the choice between 
top-down state regulation and bottom-up self-regulation is not “either/or.”  
The private investment funds industry is a clear example of a part of the financial market, and 
the financial regulatory system, where knowledge and power is fragmented.  Fund participants 
can and should contribute to a hybrid regulatory process to achieve the regulatory goal of good 
governance in private funds.
9.5.4 The Last Line of Defense
The ability of prospective investors to potentially negotiate with fund managers about the terms 
of the fund documentation, including whether and in what manner to adopt private monitoring 
solution, does not guarantee that in every case, or in any particular case, the investor will be 
able to agree to adequate terms.  Such commercial negotiations will result in terms that reflect 
primarily the relative negotiating leverage of each party and the cut-and-thrust of the wider 
financial markets at the time of such negotiations.
The clear assumption underlying the line of demarcation drawn around private investment 
funds by both the SEC and the FSA, excluding retail investors and enabling only a small sub-
set of prospective investors to participate in these vehicles, is that such sophisticated, non-
retail investors will have the ability to evaluate the risks inherent in unsatisfactory legal 
documentation and decide not to invest. For retail investors who lack this ability, detailed 
product-level regulation is required.
880
Investors who are unable to get adequate enrolment of private monitoring solutions to address 
the concerns that they have identified must be willing to invoke the last line of defence that 
they have available to them: to “just say no” to an investment in that fund.  Surveys of private 
equity fund investors, for example, have revealed that this is not an idle threat, with over half 
(53%) of investors interviewed indicating that had in the past determined not to invest in a fund 
due to the terms and conditions, and approximately 20% stating they reach such decisions 
frequently.
881
9.6 “Our Reach Exceeds Our Grasp”
The question of whether private investment funds are useful additions to the financial markets 
of the 21st Century is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Similarly, I have not addressed herein 
whether such funds are proper investments, either for individual savers or institutional 
investors, nor have I discoursed upon the particular size or sophistication threshold at which 
such individual or institutional investor should be permitted to participate in these funds.  
Instead, I focus on the narrow, yet highly important, question of how private actors can best 
address the governance challenge present in private funds, given the decision of financial 
regulators not to regulate in this area.  As such, I have necessarily taken the law and 
regulation in this area as I have found them.  As a result the private monitoring solutions I 
propose herein are able to moderate governance concerns as they arise today.
Some critics might suggest that the private monitoring solutions are too modest in their design 
and in their impact to warrant serious consideration.  The limit of each of the solutions have 
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been listed and evaluated above.  However, in view of both the status quo and the 
acknowledged need to address the various shortcomings identified in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis, the private monitoring solutions can operate as the thin edge of a wedge 
that could ultimately lead to significant improvements in the way that private funds are 
governed.
Once recognition of the utility of these mechanisms is widened from their current users in the 
market, they can continue over tom eto be the means vy which further improvements are 
made.  Importantly, the private monitoring solutions are not an end in themselves.  As market 
practices continue to evolve, each of these mechanisms can be adapted or expanded to 
address such new development.  As a result, their initial modesty underlies their latent 
potential to have a broad and lasting impact on private fund governance over time.
Further regulatory initiatives in the area of private investment funds are possible in the future, 
and should such developments occur, the implementation of the private monitoring solutions 
will need to be re-evaluated.  However, in the absence of the outright criminalization of private 
funds or the creation of an exclusively regulated vehicle for such investment activities, there 
must always be a gap between the “reach” of our investment activities and the “grasp” of our 
regulatory system.  This gap creates the need for private actors to address their concerns 
themselves and, accordingly, the private monitoring solutions will have a purpose to serve.
9.7 Conclusions
Timothy F. Geithner, when he was President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, once
observed that “[h]edge funds, private equity and other kinds of investment vehicles help to 
dispose risk and add liquidity.”
882
Private investment funds serve an essential role in the global 
financial markets.  They should, and will, remain a feature of these markets for years to come.  
Accordingly, issues surrounding their operation and governance must be addressed, either by 
the government or by the private actors who participate in them.
The very aspect of private investment funds that raises so many concerns with certain 
commentators and regulators - their “private” nature - can provide adequate scope for the 
parties concerned to construct through negotiations mechanisms to address the governance 
challenge that they face.  These vehicles are “private” precisely because neither party desires 
to conduct their business through public, regulated vehicles.  This is a choice which both 
parties elect as optimal to them and their long term commercial interests. 
Despite the prevalence of well established ‘market forms’ for many types of private investment 
funds, each private investment fund is structured to address the unique requirements it faces, 
such as the tax treatment of the participants and/or the underlying investments, the regulatory 
status of the fund manager and the types of underlying investments being made.
By their collective nature, all investment funds (public and private) face potential investor 
inertia, ignorance and apathy.  As a result, a governance challenge that sits at the heart of all 
collective investment funds must be addressed:  how can the integrity of a professional 
relationship (i.e., the investment manager) be maintained where the ultimate clients (i.e., the 
participants in the fund) are distant and dispersed?
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In this thesis, three related monitoring enrolment mechanisms have been identified and 
analyzed as alternate solutions to the governance challenge.   The three approaches - side 
letters, board operation and exchange listings - focus particularly on the methods by which 
information can be received and, therefore, influence can be exercised.  
The power of the monitoring solutions discussed herein is that they lay out processes by which 
private actors can resolve issues related to the governance challenge over time and in different 
contexts.  As noted above, the monitoring solutions are not an end result, in and of 
themselves, but instead are potential tools which can be used either individually or 
cumulatively, in layers one upon another.  For example, an exchange may have in its listing 
rules that a certain proportion of directors be independent.  Similarly, such a provision may be 
contained in an investor’s side letter.  Alternatively, a side letter may contain certain provisions 
that attempt to address investors concerns, while also containing a further provision that these 
specific requirements fall away should the fund manager eventual decide to have the fund 
listed on an agreed exchange.
The private monitoring solution can thereby assist in establishing recognized practice 
standards for private investment funds that can provide a more responsive, real-time scheme 
for establishing minimum levels of investor protection.
883
  Whether they simply reflect current 
majority views or seek to “raise the bar” in terms of what fund managers should be doing, the 
flexibility that such standards provide foster the ability of such funds to continue to evolve and 
innovate.  Taken together, a practical and effective solution to the governance challenge is, 
therefore, available to private fund investors, which can supplement and extend the reach of 
financial regulations in the pursuit of their wider regulatory goals.
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